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Foreword
In the past decade, the countries of Southeast Asia and other regions have made significant
progress on the health care front. Thanks to a substantial expansion in the provision of health
care as a result of rapid economic development, infant and maternal mortality has fallen,
life expectancy has increased, total fertility rates are down, and population growth has
declined. That expansion is particularly evident in the greater numbers of physicians and
nurses per thousand population and in the growing share of total health expenditures in
gross domestic product. Although health status in the region could be improved even
further-through the extension of primary health care to still disenfranchised groups and
an effort to reduce the use of tobacco products-it is clear that much has been and will
continue to be accomplished in both preventive and curative health care.
Perhaps the greatest problem countries have experienced thus far lies in financing the
costs of such care. The financial pressures are now greater than ever, since more and more
older persons are seeking health care and their health problems (such as heart disease and
diabetes) tend to be of a chronic and serious nature. This change in overall disease patterns
implies that more people are seeking resource-intensive types of health care.
Despite the relatively high growth in income per capita throughout Southeast Asia during
the 1980s and early 1990s, many countries there have experienced enough periodic macro-
economic problems to greatly reduce the resources available for all sectors, including health.
Unfortunately, even if economic growth improves, competing claims for those resources-
in the case of health care, from investment opportunities in other than universal or even
voluntary health insurance programs-will continue to make them scarce.
To address this problem, many countries have moved to implement various forms of cost
recovery. Because of equity considerations, as well as the fact that the funding requirements
in the health sector are so large, health insurance is one option that is receiving particularly
close attention.
In view of these developments, the Economic Development Institute (EDI) of the World
Bank, together with the Asia Department of the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank,
the Canadian Department of Health and Welfare, the U.K. Overseas Development Agency,
the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the World Health Organization spon-
sored a regional seminar on health financing and health insurance in Asia, which was held
in Bali, Indonesia, from December 10 to 14, 1990. Ministers and other senior government
officials from ministries of finance, planning, health, and social security in Fiji, Indonesia,
the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, and Thailand met
with observers from China, Kenya, Morocco, and Nigeria to discuss their country's health
financing problems and assess the experience of a number of countries that have im-
plemented various types of health insurance in an effort to deal with their health financing
problems. Seminar participants were particularly interested in learning how programs of
v
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insurance were implemented, how they were working a number of years later, what
problems might be expected, and how they might be addressed.
At least two other international meetings have been held in the past several years to
consider issues related to developing and implementing health insurance: one in Seoul,
Korea, in March 1989; and the other in Taipei, Taiwan, in December 1989. The EDI meeting
was the only one to consider the policy problems and difficulties of developing and
implementing health insurance within a framework for assessing various health financing
options. This framework provided a set of criteria for assessing the performance of any set
of health financing options. These criteria were used to examine the various approaches to
health insurance adopted in a number of the world's more affluent countries. These
approaches were judged by their population coverage and financial access; the containment
of health care costs/expenditures; efficiency of resource use; equity across income and other
groups in financing health care; the degree of consumer choice available to those included
in the insurance program; and the program's incentives for technological innovation in the
delivery and financing of health care.
This volume opens with a discussion of the important role of health insurance at this time
in developing countries. Attention is also given to the macroeconomic context in which
health financing takes place in developing countries, the growth of the health sector as
development progresses, and the linkages between health financing, health status, and
indicators of development. Other chapters are devoted to health financing and the use of
health insurance in a set of six countries. Their experience can provide public policy officials
in other countries with considerable insight into the fundamental ingredients of an effective
health financing strategy.
These studies will enable policymakers to better evaluate the various forms of health
financing already in existence in their own country; the tradeoffs involved in incorporating
a pluralistic set of providers of care, both public and private; and the potential for including
a mix of financing options, including user charges, within a health financing strategy for
each country. Since health care financing policy inevitably requires the balancing of a
number of competing outcomes and future costs, these case studies should also provide
some insight into the short- and longer-term implications of a country's own choices. The
volume closes with a set of general lessons and some preliminary conclusions about the
relationships between health insurance, GDP growth, and health expenditures.
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Director
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Part I
The Conceptual Framework

1Introduction
David W. Durnlop and Jo. M. Martins
During the 1980s the global economy suffered serious disruptions in its long-term growth
as a result of significant energy price changes and the buildup of unsustainable levels of
debt. To adjust to these changes, many countries undertook policy initiatives aimed at
restructuring theireconomies. One question that aroused considerable debate in this process
was whether country governments needed to provide and finance all types of health care,
despite the increase in both the numbers of health care personnel and expenditures on health
since the 1960s (table 1-1). This question gained further attention following the widespread
pledges made at the Alma Ata Conference in 1977 to achieve health for all by the year 2000
through a strategy of primary health care (see, for example, Dunlop 1982; WHO 1988).
Many countries have not been able to sustain their prior commitments to either the
provision or the financing of health care. They have been focusing increasing attention on
alternative financing options, notably health insurance. Indeed, some governments have
viewed this option as an alternative to direct support for the health sector via the public
budget.
Why the Topic of Health Financing Is Important
With the decline in government commitments to health care, the policy debate regarding
the financing of health care has revolved around two questions in particular. First, what is
the appropriate role for the government and other institutions in financing health care?
Second, should the government intervene-and if so, how-in health care markets where
private sector initiatives may provide services most efficiently, especially for certain em-
ployed subgroups of the population, but by so doing may also create inequities of access to
services for a country's poor? By the early 1990s, many policy analysts had begun to
entertain the idea that health insurance implemented on a national basis, as in some of the
more affluent countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
might be one means of resolving the health financing problem. This mechanism-if appro-
priately configured in terms of subsidy targeting, the design of the benefit package, and
reimbursement policies-might also make it possible to maintain private initiatives in the
health sector and at the same time reduce the inequity of access.
Another growing concern is that major economic dislocations may occur if the problem
of financing health care is not resolved. To begin with, significant inefficiencies may arise
in those subsets of the health sector that are experiencing financing difficulties. This problem
would be particularly acute where pharmaceutical and other resources that use foreign
exchange are not readily available to personnel located in a particular health facility (see
Dunlop and Over 1988). Similar inefficiencies may occur if skilled personnel (e.g., physi-
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Table 1-1. Trends in Health Resource Availability and Expenditures in Asian and Selected Affluent Countries, 1960-91
Total expenditure
Popu- GDP per capita
lation per Health expendituire (U.S. dollars)
(millions) capita Population/doctor Population/nurse share of GDP Other
Country 1989 1987 1960 1961 1977 1984 1990 1960 1961 1977 1984 1990 1961 1982 1990 1982 years 1990
Bangladesh 106.5 160 - - 8,780 6,730 7,202 - - 56,880 8,980 9,003 - - 5.2 - 6.22
Brazil 147.47 2,020 2,560 - 1,700 1,080 684 2,770 - - 1,080 2,280 - - 4.6 - 153.34
Canada 26.25 15,160 910 855 560 510 453 300 129 130 510 96 5.5 8.9 9.0 1,010.82 1,945.33
China 1,111.90 290 3,010 - 1,160 1,000 721 2,850 - 480 1,700 1,442 - 2.7 3.2 8.22 10.60
Fiji 0.74 1,570 - - - - 2,229 - - - - 372 - - 3.3 - 1992 68.26
Germany 61.64 14,400 670 - 490 380 365 450 - 260 380 215 - 7.0 8.1 871.80 1,510.64
India 811.82 300 4,850 - 3,620 2,520 2,455 9,630 - 6,430 1,700 2,232 - - 4.5 - 15.44
Indonesia 179.14 450 46,780 - 13,640 9,460 7,135 - - 8,850 1,260 2,548 - 2.6 2.0 15.03 11.63
Japan 123.12 15,760 930 - 850 660 607 460 - 290 660 337 - 6.0 6.7 605.63 1,536.85
Korea, Rep. of 42.38 2,690 3,540 - 1,990 1,170 1,390 3,220 - 550 1,170 1,390 - - 3.6 - 403.98
Malaysia 17.32 1,810 7,470 - 8,730 1,930 2,720 1,780 - 1,290 1,930 697 - - 3.0 - 58.58
Nepal 18.44 160 72,870 - 35,250 32,710 17,031 - - 53,540 4,680 6,308 - - 4.2 - 6.93
Papua New
Guinea 3.59 700 14,390 - 14,040 6,160 12,870 2,450 - 1,930 890 1,589 - - 4.5 - 30.14
Philippines 60.10 590 6,930 1,613 2,760 6,700 8,229 - 4,348 3,110 2,740 2,655 - 2.2 2.6 18.23 21.50
Sri Lanka 16.81 400 4,490 4,630 6,750 5,520 7,297 4,150 1,613 2,050 1,290 1,431 3.7 3.2 3.5 10.25 17.88
Thailand 55.45 850 8,000 - 8,150 6,290 4,947 4,900 - 3,540 710 899 - 2.5 5.0 19.56 1979 55.22
United
Kingdom 57.20 10,420 1,090 909 750 - 612 420 470 300 - 306 4.0 5.3 6.0 513.35 882.01
United States 249.41 18,530 750 775 570 470 420 340 241 150 470 150 5.5 10.7 11.8 1,402.65 1,520.90
- Not available.
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, Various Years; World Bank, World Development Report/1981,1989,1993b; Abel-Smith
(1967); Griffin (1992); World Bank (1993a).
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cians) are not compensated according to the opportunity wage in the private market for
their services. Such inefficiencies often erode the effectiveness and quality of service to such
an extent that consumers are forced to seek health care from other providing entities. This
further exacerbates the inefficiency problem. Since publicly supported facilities tend to be
a bellwether of declines in service quality, those segments of the public that have tradition-
ally relied on these facilities will no longer be assured of receiving efficacious or appropriate
health care. Inequities may therefore develop in the care available to certain population
groups, and over time these inequities may contribute to political unrest. Furthermore,
where health care financing is inadequate, private sector forces tend to take hold as each
cadre of health personnel seeks to obtain its opportunity wage. In such instances, the socially
positive externalities of public health services-for example, immunizations, maternal and
child health care, and family planning (all individually consumed)-will not be produced
in the desired quantities, and there will be a general disregard for public health concerns.
It is widely believed that health insurance has the potential to stem the inefficient use of
resources and the decline in the quality of public sector service. The complicating factor here
is that health insurance may be implemented in many ways, through various types of
supporting institutions. Among the prominent instruments used are provider reimburse-
ment incentives and a variety of government regulatory jurisdictions. Furthermore, multi-
ple private insurance entities can operate in the health care market alongside public entities.
Their varied programs can have different health, social, and financial outcomes, depending
on how sector financing problems are addressed in conjunction with efforts to control
unnecessary costs and services, improve the efficiency of service provision, and ensure the
equitable distribution of service use throughout the population of a country. The specific
nature of these issues is examined in the chapters that follow.
Relationships between Health Financing, Macroeconomic Performance,
and Health Status
For developing countries, in particular, the financing of any sector, including health care,
can have important implications for macroeconomic management. That is to say, any
change in health financing policy, through the introduction of health insurance, for example,
can have a long-term impact on fiscal policy, the national allocation of resources, and
economic growth. To ensure that such changes have beneficial effects, it is vital to under-
stand (a) the relationship between the growth in national income and health sector expenditures;
(b) the effect of health care expenditure on health status, and thus on productivity and
economic growth; and (c) the relationship between preventive health and economic growth.
The concluding chapter of this volume presents some preliminary empirical findings about
whether health insurance changes the relationship between income and health expenditure
and has an effect on the rate of inflation in both the health sector and the economy as a whole.
GDP Growth and Health Expenditures
What is the relationship between growth in national income and health sector expenditures,
and what does this relationship mean in the context of developing countries? Over the past
fifteen years a number of studies have examined this relationship in the member countries
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (see Anderson
and Benham 1970:73-95; Newhouse 1977:115-25, 1987:159-67; Parkin, Mcguire, and Yule
1987:109-27; Schieber and Poullier 1989:1-8; Gerdtham and Jonsson 1991:227-34). The
aggregate real income elasticity of demand for health expenditures (as a proxy for medical
care) in twenty OECD countries has been estimated to be about 1.3 for the period 1975-87
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and 1.7 for the period 1960-75 (Schieber and Poullier 1989). These results were obtained by
estimating country-specific income elasticities from time-series data and then deriving a
simple mean value for the twenty countries. According to more recent information from six
of the largest OECD countries (the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, France,
and Germany) over the period 1980-90, the estimated elasticity of real per capita health
spending in relation to the gross domestic product ranged from a low of 0.62 (in the United
Kingdom) to 2.35 (in France), with the simple mean being 1.04 (Schieber and others 1992:7,
table 6). Other estimating procedures based on cross-sectional data across twenty or so
OECD countries at a particular point in time have produced similar results. The cross-sec-
tional statistical analyses have had to correct for possible variations in GDP and health sector
specific purchasing power and exchange rate variations across countries (see Parkin and
others 1987; Gerdtham and Jonsson 1991). After correcting for these possible biases,
Gerdtham and Jonsson found that aggregate health expenditure income elasticity in 1985
ranged from 1.24 to 1.43 in twenty-two OECD countries, depending on corrections for
purchasing power parity and exchange rate considerations.1
Some information on the income elasticity of demand for health care services is also
available for less affluent countries (see table 1-2). Cross-sectional data from household
expenditure surveys in the mid-1960s, for example, provide estimates of 1.20 for Kenya and
1.56 for Uganda. A recent analysis of health financing in Asia (Griffin 1990:7) has calculated
the elasticity of health spending with respect to per capita GDP for the region as a whole to
be about 1.3.2 Estimates from another study range from 1.5 for ten cities in Latin America
as of 1968 to 1.17 for Brazil as of 1974 (Musgrove 1983:245-57). Although the studies cited
do not represent a fully comprehensive review, they suggest that health care spending in
developing countries in an aggregate sense is probably elastic with respect to income over
the range of observations available.
This similar finding in three regions of the world lends support to Newhouse's (1977)
observation that health care is a luxury good. As Musgrove (1983:253) has pointed out,
Total health care spending is a normal good, with an income elasticity declining toward
one, but private health care is a luxury relative to publicly-provided free or subsidized
care. Therefore, private health care spending can have an elasticity above one even at
very high incomes, because as incomes rise, private services replace public services;
and, at a given level of income, private spending will be higher where fewer public
services are available.
Since the 1980s represented a period in which per capita income in many poorer nations
declined, health expenditures there may have declined more than proportionately as well,
especially among the least affluent residing there (World Bank 1990:43). The evidence from
many countries bears out this suggestion. The decline occurs both in private household
expenditures and in government expenditures for health services, in response to drops in
income and tax revenues. In the South Pacific member countries of the World Bank, for
example, real per capita health expenditures declined by as much as 75 percent over the
1980s (World Bank 1993a). Similar declines were also reported in Africa (Vogel 1990), the
Caribbean, and Latin America (Musgrove 1987, 1988).
These empirical findings about the relationship between health spending and income can
be of assistance in designing health insurance financing in developing countries. They
suggest, for example, that market segmentation is warranted for the benefit packages going
to the more and the less affluent members of society. Cross-subsidization between the more
and less affluent is also possible. To financially sustain the health care provided by public
agencies, the government in combination with health insurance could provide a basic
package of promotive, preventive, and curative health services and health promotion
Table 1-2. Relationship between Health Expenditures and Growth in GDP, as Reported in Selected Studies
Elasticity estimate: health expendituire
Study Location Period Type of data with respect to income (GDP)
High-income Countries
Newhouse (1977) OECD 1968-72 Aggregate at Mean 1.26 low 1.31 high
Parkin and others (1987) OECD 1980 Aggregate 0.80 low 1.57 high
United States (1989) OECD 1960-75 Aggregate 1.70
OECD 1975-87 Aggregate 1.30
OECD (1987) OECD 1960-84 Aggregate 1.60
Gerdtham/Jonsson (1991) OECD 1985 Aggregate 1.24 low 1.43 high
United States (1989) Australia 1975-87 Aggregate 0.90
Austria 1975-87 Aggregate 0.80
Belgium 1975-87 Aggregate 1.60
Canada 1975-87 Aggregate 0.90
Denmark 1975-87 Aggregate 0.90
Finland 1975-87 Aggregate 0.90
France 1975-87 Aggregate 3.10
Germany 1975-87 Aggregate 0.90
Greece 1975-87 Aggregate 2.50
Iceland 1975-87 Aggregate 1.50
Ireland 1975-87 Aggregate 1.50
Italy 1975-87 Aggregate 1.70
Japan 1975-87 Aggregate 1.40
Netherlands 1975-87 Aggregate 1.10
Norway 1975-87 Aggregate 2.00
Spain 1975-87 Aggregate 1.10
Sweden 1975-87 Aggregate 1.00
Switzerland 1975-87 Aggregate 1.00
United Kingdom 1975-87 Aggregate 1.00
United States 1975-87 Aggregate 1.10
Less Affluent Countries
Griffin (1990) All Asia ca. 1985 Aggregate 1.30
Gbesemete and Gerdham (1992) 30 countries in Africa 1985-90 Aggregate 0.89 low 1.07 high
Uganda 1963 Household 1.56
Massell and Heyer (1969) Kenya (Nairobi) 1963/4 Household 1.20
Kenya (Nairobi) 1963/4 Household 1.08
Musgrove (1983) Ten cities in Latin Americaa 1968 Household 1.50
Musgrove (1983) Brazil 1974 Household 1.17
a. The ten cities were in Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.
Source: As cited in the table.
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activities for the poor. For the more affluent, the package of health insurance benefits might
include private surgical care in combination with strategically designed user charges for
health services provided on a private basis, which could be used to subsidize the services
consumed by the less affluent.
Health Expenditure and Health Status, Labor Productivity, and Economic
Development
DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH STATUS. Health status-as typically indicated by factors such
as the infant mortality rate, life expectancy, and days of healthy life-is determined by
various aspects of human consumption and welfare, including health care, nutrition,
education, housing, water supply, environmental pollution, lifestyle, and income. Empirical
studies of the strength of these determinants on indicators of health status have been
conducted by a number of authors (see, for example, Hicks 1980; Wheeler 1980; Wolfe 1985;
WHO 1986; Musgrove 1987; Wolfe and Berman 1987; Over 1992a; World Bank 1993b). These
investigations have applied various regression techniques to household cross-sectional
information (see Wolfe and Berman on Nicaragua), as well as to cross-sectional country
information for various groupings of countries (Hicks, for example, provides eighty-three
observations from 1960 to 1977; Over covers the years 1940-79, Wheeler 1960-77, and the
World Bank 1993). All these studies have found that nutrition, education, and income have
a positive and statistically significant relationship to health status.
In the studies cited above, indicators of health status were also found to be influenced by
lifestyle and environmental pollution; and health care, via health spending, appeared to be
positively associated with improved life expectancy. This latter finding, however, has not
been confirmed by empirical studies reviewing the association between health status
indicators, especially infant mortality, and health spending in both Latin America and Africa
during the mid- and late 1980s, when declines in per capita incomes and health expenditures
occurred in most countries in both regions (see Musgrove 1988 on Latin America and
Elmendorf 1993 on Africa).
The level of health expenditures is affected by a nation's health status via several
pathways. First, the poorer a nation's health status, the heavier the burden of disease (BOD),
which generally is due to a high prevalence of diseases that primarily affect infants, mothers,
and children and that tend to be easy to prevent or treat at relatively low cost (World Bank
1993b). Thus, if a country's health status is low, the resources required to assist those afflicted
tends to be relatively low; initial financing requirements are also low, though they will
increase as preventable illness related to birth and childhood is addressed (Dunlop 1973).
Second, if a country's health status is low and it has a high BOD, average labor productivity
of the population will be lower than it might otherwise be, and income will be lower and,
via the relationship between GDP and health spending discussed above, health expendi-
tures will be concomitantly less. The capacity for rapidly increasing labor productivity will
also be dampened, since many in the population are in poor health. Finally, depending on
the extent to which countries invest in programs such as education, nutrition, and environ-
mental pollution, a country's health status may be concomitantly higher or lower than it
would be otherwise and thus would affect the level of health expenditures. The reported
findings above suggest that health expenditures could be lower for a given health status in
countries that have invested in improved nutrition, basic education (especially for women),
and reductions in pollution.
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DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE ROLE OF HEALTH. Empirical
work has been done on the role of health in economic development, as measured by GNP
or GDP per capita (Galenson and Pyatt 1964; Barlow 1968; Harbison, Maruhnic, and Resnick
1970; Hicks 1980; Wheeler 1980; Musgrove 1987; Over 1992a, 1992b). Barlow and Over used
macroeconomic models to examine this relationship, the former via the health effects of
malaria and the latter via the effects of AIDS on labor and capital productivity. Musgrove
(1987) also developed a schematic model to show how health improvements may affect
indicators of macroeconomic performance. The pathways in each show how improvements
in health status, as indicated by the infant mortality rate (IMR) and life expectancy, and
changes in fertility and mortality are linked to changes in health care consumption and
human welfare, and how these changes are linked to aggregate economic performance via
production and consumption. The Barlow model was used to estimate the aggregate
economic impact of improvements in health status in Sri Lanka during the 1950s as a result
of a reduction in the incidence of malaria. These effects, simulated through 1975, included
the aggregate gain of a simultaneous investment in family planning. The Over model was
used to assess the economic impact of AIDS on a number of countries in Africa: here it was
found that the disease may retard economic growth by an average of about 1 percent per
year. Given the past economic performance in these countries, such an impact would
amount to a 25 to 30 percent reduction in economic performance.
The other studies have used country cross-sectional information from the 1950s, 1960s,
and 1970s to empirically assess the relationship between health and income growth. The
Galenson and Pyatt analysis is especially noteworthy, since it explicitly defines this relation-
ship in terms of the determinants of labor productivity. Besides nutrition and education
indicators, health service supply variables such as population per nurse, physician, and
hospital bed were found to be statistically significant, particularly among the poorest
countries, reflecting the impact of inequity of resource supply on health status and threby
labor productivity. The findings were supported not only by single-equation models that
defined unidirectional causality between health and other human resource development
variables, but also by simultaneous equations that allowed for the possibility of causality in
both directions (see Wheeler 1980).
In addition, research has been conducted on two distinct linkages between health and
population growth. One is a direct linkage-between health improvements and mortality,
especially among infants-reflected in rising population growth. The other is an indirect
linkage occurring when reduced infant mortality dampens the demand for additional
pregnancies, and population growth is thereby reduced. Evidence from single-country
studies (see Barlow 1968, on Sri Lanka; Cross 1978, on Cuba; and Barnum 1983, on Nepal)
supports both links. It has also been shown that the reduced demand for children following
declines in child mortality cancels out the direct impact of increased population, if health
and family planning programs designed to achieve both are implemented (see Barlow 1968).
The World Bank's analysis of this linkage (1984,1986) provides similar and complementary
evidence suggesting that a reduction in mortality of one child per household will yield a
decline in desired family size of about 0.5 children per household.
Some important evidence also comes from India, which in 1917 experienced one of the
most extensive influenza pandemics of this century. Total agricultural output dropped
significantly as a result of this event, because it decimated the supply of labor for key
agricultural tasks (Schultz 1968). India's economic progress was adversely affected for
several years thereafter owing to the number of deaths or long-term health problems from
the virulent strain of influenza, as well as the resulting nutritional losses. Other examples
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of the macroeconomic losses associated with the lack of preventive health interventions can
be found in the country studies of malaria (Barlow 1968) and AIDS (Over 1992b) described
earlier.
Some evidence is also available on the economic impact of immunizations and child
survival. For example, Barnum (1981; Barnum and others 1980) has shown that the economic
benefits of child survival programs in Kenya and Colombia clearly outweigh the costs of
such interventions simply by reducing the demand for children. With a reduction in the
expected infant mortality rate, people appear to have a greater incentive to invest in the
quality rather than the number of offspring. Furthermore, primary health care, when
developed to more widely distribute the benefits of preventive health programs, eventually
helped increase health status and economic progress in a number of South Pacific countries
(World Bank 1993a), as well as Cuba (Cross 1978).
The above linkages clarifying the role of health development have two important im-
plications for health financing and the role of health insurance in an overall health financing
strategy. First, the health financing policy developed must ensure that labor productivity
gains arising from preventive health care programs are widely disseminated, especially
among the poor. This includes family planning and reproductive health services, which
should be made available as widely as possible and in a timely manner. In this context,
health insurance benefit packages and feasibility studies should be designed to include the
cost of essential services yielding high disease reduction, and their financing from premium
receipts should be incorporated. Benefits for medical care should be linked to the use of
prevention programs. Second, the health financing strategy should continue to contributed
to the widespread availability and use of essential health care services. If health insurance
programs do not include these features, they are likely to produce less effective results.
Implications for the Role and Design of Health Insurance Programs
in Developing Countries
Health insurance is but one of a number of options for financing health care (de Ferranti
1985; World Bank 1987). Direct government financing and private user charges are other
options that have been used in almost all countries, with varying benefits and costs. Now
that information about each option has become more accessible, the prospects for systematic
assessment of their impacts has greatly improved. In 1980 little was known about the extent
of financing, equity implications, or institutional requirements for implementation, let alone
the very existence of such options. Over the past twelve years, however, enough evidence
has been amassed to better assess the strengths of each. The time has therefore arrived to
improve our understanding of the role of health insurance in sustaining and distributing
the benefits of health care services to a growing world population.
Another important point to consider is that the design of a health insurance program
determines the extent to which it can act as an effective tool for developing and financing
health services within the constraints of a given country's costs and coverage. There are no
apparent conceptual reasons preventing health insurance from financing health promotion
and primary preventive services that can be considered "public goods," in the sense that
the benefits they confer on the individual cannot be separated from the benefits accruing to
other members of the community. However, health insurance programs do not usually
cover such services, and central or local governments in the more industrialized countries
often finance and deliver these services separately. When these services are cost-effective,
their supply and financing often avoid the use of more costly remedial care covered by
health insurance. The first priority of health insurance should be to cover health events that
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lead to large financial losses. It is obvious that the capacity of the poor to cope with financial
losses is low. Thus, lower thresholds need to be established for them or separate arrange-
ments need to be made if they are to be protected from relatively large financial losses. This
design priority is consistent with the participatory savings schemes that have recently been
uncovered in many low-income countries of Latin America and Asia.
The second priority should be to cover ambulatory care by tying it to certain minimum
quantities of preventive services. This approach would enhance health status and would be
a cost-effective way to increase preventive services coverage. Further, it has been demon-
strated in the United Kingdom that doctors will allocate time in their practice for preventive
health service delivery if they are reimbursed for the service. The third important design
element is a built-in system for periodic modification in response to changes in a country's
income, the health care delivery system, and disease patterns. As the case studies in the
following chapters attest, such changes will not come often but will have to be accommo-
dated through the costs and equity requirements of the health care financing system.
The case studies in this volume were prepared in 1990 and therefore reflect the situation
in the selected countries at the time of writing. These systems have continued to evolve since
then. As a result, their efficiency, effectiveness, and equity have changed, along with their
impact on the affected populations. An assessment of the full effect of the more recent
changes can only be speculative, because not enough time has elapsed to assess their full
impact. The usefulness of the case studies is not diminished by their dated information: they
represent dated but actual models that illustrate the importance of the cumulative effect of
past policy decisions on present systems and their place in basic policy concerns. It should
also be emphasized that this book is concerned with methods of health financing and their
impact on relevant policy variables. Health insurance is examined within this context.
The text is divided into three main parts. The first includes this introduction and presents
a framework for reviewing health financing, including health insurance. It focuses on four
policy issues: equity, overall cost control, efficiency in the use of resources, and consumer
choice. This framework is the basis for the review of the case studies in part II. The cases
were selected to give a range of altematives from health systems that have already gone
through an evolutionary process. They also offer a range of geographical and historical
perspectives. The systems illustrated differ widely not only in their financing and organi-
zation (as in the case of the United States and the United Kingdom), but also in the length
of their history (which is quite long for Germany, for example, but fairly short for the
Republic of Korea). All of the cases demonstrate how deliberate action or its absence has
affected the major policy variables, namely, those concerned with equity, overall affordabil-
ity, efficiency, and consumer choice. The volume concludes with some of the lessons that
can be gathered from both the discussion of the framework and the case studies.
Notes
1. These results are also consistent with those obtained for a large sample of countries in the
mid-1970s by Kravis, Heston, and Summers (1982). Estimates of the price and income elasticity of
demand for medical care in this study were -0.5 and 1.4, respectively.
2. Griffin's report does not make clear how this figure was estimated, the countries included in the
data set, or the period to which the figure applies.
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A Frameworkfor Assessing Health Financing
Strategies and the Role of Health Insurance
Willianm C. Hsiao
All developing countries face three major health policy questions: how to mobilize sufficient
funds to finance health care, how to allocate those funds and organize health care delivery
to produce the most health benefits for the largest number of people, and how to control the
costs of that care.
Because government funds are limited, health care must compete for its share with many
other worthy programs, such as economic development, roads and transportation, commu-
nications, and education. Unfortunately, many developing countries have had to reduce
their governmental funding (in real terms) for health care since the global economic
downturn of the early 1980s. Consequently, many nations have not been able to adequately
fund existing hospitals, clinics, primary care, and prevention programs. At the same time,
expectations and the demand for health care have steadily risen, only to put added strain
on government budgets.
These are but the immediate problems. A more long-term concern is that the rapid
developments in expensive medical technology and new drugs have inflated health care
costs even beyond what affluent nations can afford. In addition, recent demographic
changes in many developing countries have burdened government budgets with a twin
epidemiological problem: infectious and parasitic diseases still ravage the rural population,
while the urban population suffers increasingly from chronic illness. When the government
allocates funds to meet the pressing demands of powerful urban residents for expensive
curative medicine to treat chronic illness, it leaves fewer financial resources for rural people.
These are the difficult circumstances in which developing countries must decide how to
structure the financing of their health care. To complicate matters further, they must tailor
their policies to their individual political and economic realities, as well as their social values
and culture. A central question for all countries in establishing an appropriate financing
mechanism, however, will be where to place the locus of decisionmaking: Should it lie with
the consumers, providers, the government, insurance plans, or other financiers? The locus
of power determines who will receive the services, how resources will be allocated, and how
health care will be organized and delivered. In addition, the financing scheme adopted will
become the foundation for the nation's health care system in the decades ahead.
Policy Objectives and Major Considerations
Although the immediate concern of many developing countries is to mobilize enough funds
to support health activities, decisionmakers must keep an eye on their country's overall
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policy goals if they are to select the best financing approach for their particular circum-
stances. Around the world, several policy goals stand out: to provide universal and equal
access to reasonable health care, to keep health care expenditures at an affordable level, and
to make effective use of resources.
The likelihood of achieving these goals and the resultant cost to society depend greatly
on the method of financing. Whoever possesses the financial power can determine where
health care resources will be directed and how they will be used. There is by no means a
consensus on where the power should be placed to most effectively achieve a nation's goals.
Some take health care to be like other consumer goods and therefore argue that control over
what services to buy and at what price should rest with the consumer. In this view-known
as the demand-side argument-private organizations should provide the health services.
Competition for the consumer's dollar is expected to constrain the behavior of these
providers. Others would argue that control should rest on the supply side. Since health care
has many distinctive features, they point out, serious market failures can occur, most notably
because private insurance reduces price sensitivity among both consumers and providers
and physicians tend to have control over medical decisions. They would prefer to see power
concentrated in some public or quasi-public agency (perhaps organized on a community or
regional basis), which uses the payment system, technology assessment, and capital plan-
ning to constrain the behavior of providers.
How a nation structures its system of financing, payment, and delivery of health care can
have an enormous effect on the behavior of the key actors in the system: the patients, hospital
administrators, physicians, pharmacists, and insurance providers. The behavior of these
actors is constrained and motivated by the structure of the system and its incentives, and
their reactions determine health care outcomes.
System of Health Care Financing and Organization in Affluent Nations
A number of factors have led affluent nations to organize the financing of health services in
specific ways. Instead of relying totally on free choice and bilateral exchange between
consumers and providers (as shown in figure 2-1A), where the consumers pay the providers
fully and directly for services, these countries have introduced a formal financing organi-
zation to pool the financial risks. This financing organization pays the provider. Thus the
bilateral relationship is altered and becomes a trilateral relationship (see figure 2-1 B).
In the trilateral model, the organization that provides the financing has a dual role: to
mobilize funds and to pay out the funds to providers of health care. The organization obtains
its revenues through taxes or insurance premiums paid by thousands of insured individuals.
This arrangement, known as a plan in North America, consolidates fiscal power. The
method adopted by the plan to mobilize funds determines who will bear the financial
burden of health care costs. The plan also specifies who will have financial access to health
care (it stipulates who will be covered) and how resources will be allocated (it stipulates
what services will be covered and the method by which providers will be paid). The
institutional context in which the plan operates and the method it uses to maintain fiscal
balance determines whether the system can control total health expenditures.
The plan must also define the criteria and rates used in paying providers. Since money is
a strong incentive for providers, the payment system is what motivates them to offer their
services. The payment to hospitals can be based on a prospective budget, a fee for service,
or a charge per day, per admission, or per diagnosis-related group. A fee-for-service,
capitation, or salary system may be used to pay physicians. The system of payment has an
effect on efficiency and quality. Under the fee-for-service system, hospitals and physicians
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Figure 2-1. The Financing and Organizaion of Health Care: Two Models
A. Bilateral Exchange Model for Goods
Service
Consumers Providers
Hospitals
Money Clinics
Physicians
B. Trilateral Exchange Model for Goods
Subsidies
Traasur Financing PaymentsTreasury Organization
Taxes Premiums
Service
Consumers Providers
User's Fees Hospitals
Clinics
Physicians
Soutrce: Compiled by the author.
have an incentive to deliver more units of service, regardless of their medical necessity. If
hospitals are paid on a planned or actual number of beds occupied, they have an incentive
to keep their beds fully occupied by increasing the patient length of stay per admission.
When physicians are paid a salary, they have an incentive to see as few patients as possible,
and this may result in waiting lines.
Access, efficiency, and quality are also affected by the payment rates. If higher rates are
paid for curative medicine, the incentive structure will be tilted in that direction, drawing
medical professionals and capital investment to this service. If the payment rate is tilted in
favor of primary care and prevention, resources will swing in that direction. Thus payment
rates determine resource allocation and use.
The nature of the ownership and organization of hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies also has
great bearing on the efficiency of a health system. According to economic theory, owner-
operated, for-profit firms will be highly efficient in a competitive environment because they
will be motivated to earn the largest possible profit. The nonprofit firm, not driven by profit
motives, will operate less efficiently. Organization is also a critical factor because health
Table 2-1. Systems of Financing, Payment, and Delivery Organization in Selected Affluent Countries
Country Financing Ownership Payment Organization
Canada General taxation, central or
regional government Mixed public and private Global budget and single channel Services not integrated
France Mandated social insurance
(multiple public and private
plans) Mixed public and private Global budget and single channel Services not integrated
Germany Mandated social insurance
(multiple public and private
plans) Mixed public and private Global budget and single channel Services not integrated
Japan Mandated social insurance
(multiple public and private
plans) Mixed public and private Global budget and single channel Services integrated
Republic of Korea Mandated social insurance
(multiple public and private
plans) Mixed public and private No limit on expenditures Services not integrated
Singapore Pluralistic, universal provision
by public hospitals, with
private insurance "opt-out" Mixed public and private No limit on expenditures Services not integrated
Spain Social insurance, government
plan Public Global budget Services integrated
Sweden General taxation, local
government Public Global budget Services integrated
United Kingdom General taxation Public Global budget Services integrated
United States Pluralistic, free choice, and
competition Mixed public and private No limit on expenditures Services not integrated
Source: Compiled by the author.
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services are so numerous and diverse. Whether they fall in the category of primary care,
secondary care, tertiary care, or chronic illness care, how these services are integrated
through formal referral systems will affect their overall efficiency, cost, and quality.
As mentioned earlier, various strategies are available to determine the supply of facilities
and health personnel, as well as the total expenditure on health. One strategy relies on the
free market. Another relies on the government to establish a health care policy and a global
budget for this purpose, with regional arrangements to oversee facilities and equipment (so
as to minimize duplication), technology assessment (so as to control the diffusion of medical
technology), and manpower policy. The macropolicies would focus on the availability of
services, the efficiency of the health system, and its total costs.
The central health care concern of affluent nations over the past twenty years has not been
how to finance health care, but how to control the costs of such care. Other than the United
States, all of these nations have compulsory universal health insurance financed either
through a social insurance scheme or a general tax. But organized financing reduces the
economic constraints on both patients and providers, and thus allows health expenditures
to escalate rapidly. Since the affluent countries have already established that financing,
payment, and delivery mustbe integrated in order to control health expenditures, the central
question they are now debating is which integrative system will be most effective in this
respect. Developing countries, too, must recognize that financing health care is not the sole
objective of health care policy: such policy must also endeavor to design an integrative
system of financing, payment, and delivery that can achieve society's goals. Table 2-1 shows
the kinds of financing, payment, and delivery systems adopted by various affluent nations.
They can be divided into three main categories, defined by the source of financing: a general
tax, social insurance, or pluralistic provisions.
General Tax Financing
General tax financing consists of three types: central government financing with direct
public provision of services or a mixture of public and private provision; regional govern-
ment. financing with direct or indirect provision of services; and county government
financing with direct public provision of services.
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING WITH DIRECT PUBLIC OR PRIVATE PROVISION OF SERVICES.
Many nations have chosen to finance health care through general taxation. This means the
government allocates a portion of its annual budget for health care. Each year, the health
budget competes directly for funds with education, transportation, agricultural develop-
ment, housing, defense, and other government programs. The best-known examples of
general tax financing for health care are in the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth
nations.
General tax financing can shift the locus of decisionmaking from the consumers to the
central government, which determines how the resources will be allocated. Various options
are available. The government may choose what the International Labor Organization (1949)
terms "the direct provision" of hospital and medical services. In this case, the government
directly owns, operates, and manages health care facilities. Physicians may be salaried
employees or independent practitioners. (Often only specialists are employees of the
hospitals, while primary care physicians receive their compensation on a capitation or
fee-for-service basis.) With this approach, the financing, payment, and organization of
delivery are integrated to the fullest extent possible.
General tax financing has a serious shortcoming. Health care has to compete directly with
other social and economic programs for a portion of the government's budget. As expensive
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medical technology and new drugs develop, the financing demands increase, but thebudget
may be unable to meet these demands, especially during periods of slower economic
growth, and thus be unable to improve health facilities and expand technology at a
reasonable rate. That was the situation in the United Kingdom not long ago. Consequently,
there was a serious shortage of some curative services and long queues developed.
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING WITH DIRECT OR INDIRECT PROVISION OF SERVICES.
Health care can also be jointly financed by the federal and provincial (state) governments,
as exemplified by Canada. There the federal government provides a fixed sum, indexed to
the gross national product, to each province for health care. The provincial government has
to use its own tax revenues to finance the balance of health care costs. Hence, the provinces
have a strong interest in controlling cost. Another distinctive feature of Canada's approach
is that the payment and organization of services are not handled directly by the government,
as in the United Kingdom. Rather, services are provided indirectly: that is, the insurance
plan contracts with both public and private providers for services. Canada has a mixture of
public and private hospitals, and its physicians practice as independent entrepreneurs and
receive payments on a fee-for-service basis. Patients have the freedom to choose any
physician or hospital. To control resource allocation and health expenditure inflation,
Canada uses a supply-side strategy: the locus of decisionmaking lies in the provincial
governments. Standardized payments for physician services are made through a single
channel, which also monitors the volume of services and their appropriateness. Several
provinces have established a single budget for the services under their jurisdiction through
negotiations between the government (the payers) and providers. This is also known as a
global budget, but in this case it applies to the province as a whole, rather than the nation.
COUNTY GOVERNMENT FINANCING WITH DIRECT PUBLIC PROVISION OF SERVICES. Some
nations use the general tax approach but decentralize responsibility to the county govern-
ment. In Sweden, for example, the county government, the Landsting, provides the funds
and also delivers the health services to its residents. The Swedish approach is sometimes
referred to as "direct democracy" (see Culyer 1989) since local taxes are linked to a highly
visible local service. Under this system, the locus of decisionmaking rests with the county
government, but that power is checked through a community-based democracy. In Sweden,
hospitals are owned and managed by the county government. Most physicians are paid a
salary by the hospitals, but some practice as independent entrepreneurs, paid on a fee-for-
service basis.
The main drawback of this system is that not every county can support the same level of
services, since some counties are rich and some are poor. The central government is therefore
called upon to provide subsidies to the poor counties. One developing country that has
adopted local financing with direct provision is China. Under its collective agricultural
system, China relied on the local community to finance and deliver basic health care to most
of the rural population, but the disparity in health care and morbidity between the rich and
poor communities was pronounced (Hsiao 1984).
Social Insurance
There are two types of social insurance programs to provide universal health insurance
coverage. One type is a government-run plan with a standardized benefit structure and
contribution rates. This plan is usually financed through a combination of payroll and
general taxes. The second type consists of varied plans (public and private), which thus offer
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the consumer a choice, but insurance is still compulsory. In this case, the government
specifies a standard benefit structure and the actuarial standards with which the private
plans must comply.
The great advantage of the social insurance approach is that it is not viewed as a social
welfare benefit, but as a benefit earned through citizen contributions to an insurance plan
(Meyers 1981). People appear to be more willing to pay when they perceive a direct
relationship between their contributions and the insurance benefit. Affluent nations have
found that social insurance plans have wider public support and are more stable than social
welfare programs (Ron, Abel-Smith, and Tamburi 1990).
One lesson to be learned from affluent nations is that when fiscal power over health
insurance is concentrated in social or private insurance plans, the health ministry has limited
influence on the allocation of health care resources. As a result, preventive services may become
underfunded. This has been the experience of the Medicare program in the United States.
GOVERNMENTPLAN. A government-run social insurance plan usually obtains funds from
three sources: payroll taxes on employers, payroll taxes on employees, and a contribution
from general taxes. The locus of decisionmaking power is centralized, for it rests with the
administrators of the public insurance plan. A well-designed public social insurance plan
establishes an independent fund so that its actuarial (financial) soundness can be easily
ascertained apart from the government's general budget. The contribution rates are legis-
lated to fully finance the anticipated outlays over the next several decades.
A public plan may provide health services to its insured either directly or indirectly. Many
nations have chosen the former system and thus both own and operate hospitals, clinics,
and health stations. Spain and Portugal are notable examples. By integrating financing and
service delivery, and thereby removing the administrative work of submitting and paying
claims from the shoulders of the care provider, these countries believe that they have
improved the efficiency of their systems.
The difficulty with such plans, however, is that they are subjected to many political
pressures, which affect both resource allocation decisions and payment policy to providers.
With the aging of the population and the rapid inflation of health care costs, the increasing
cost of the benefits could become an unbearable burden for future generations. This is a
current concern in the United States and many South American nations (see Meyers 1981;
McGreevy 1990).
Moreover, when hospitals and clinics are owned and managed by a public insurance
program, political patronage may become an overriding factor in capital and personnel
decisions. In addition, medical care will tend to become bureaucratized, with an attendant
decline in the quality of services and efficiency, and a steep increase in costs. Patients,
however, have no other choice.
MANDATED PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PLANS. The government may mandate that everyone
must purchase health insurance but leave it to citizens to choose from among several public
or private plans, mostly offered by nonprofit firms. In many countries, these insurance plans
are called "sickness funds." Such funds can also be established by large industrial enter-
prises, trade unions, and local governments. Usually governments use general taxes to
subsidize the premiums for the elderly, disabled, farmers, and low-income people. Ger-
many, Japan, France, and the Republic of Korea are the most prominent examples of this
kind of system.
In most cases, health services are provided indirectly, and the plans differ primarily in
whether the nation has established a global budget to limit the total health expenditures and
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uses a single channel for paying providers. Germany, Japan, and France set a global
prospectivebudget, and all insurance plans pay theirclaims through a single channel, which
sets a standardized method and rate for medical services. This has been called the "single-
pipe" payment system (Reinhardt 1989), and it appears to have enabled these nations to
control health care cost inflation. Korea, which does not set a global budget, has experienced
rapid inflation of its health care costs (De Geynt 1991).
The organization of health care delivery varies under different social insurance schemes.
In Japan, most specialists are salaried hospital staff and therefore physician and hospital
services are integrated. In contrast, insurance plans in Germany and France treat physicians
and hospitals as separate entities. As a result, medical services are less integrated when
patients are hospitalized, and costs are more difficult to control, because there is less
coordination and less substitution of services between hospital and physician.
The mandated social insurance scheme is able to avoid many of the political pressures
and bureaucratic shortcomings of the public plan. The difficulty, however, is that multiple
insurance plans often give rise to adverse selection, because of the uneven age distribution
among plans. In Germany, for example, locally based sickness funds were originally
organized to cover farmers in their region, but as younger people moved to the cities to seek
higher-paying jobs, these plans were left with an increasingly elderly population. Conse-
quently, their premium rates had to be increased sharply. This created inequities in financ-
ing among sickness funds because the health risks were not adequately pooled. The
government had to cross-subsidize sickness funds in order to even out the risks assumed
by the different sickness funds.
Pluralistic Design
Pluralistic designs provide health coverage in one of two ways: through public hospitals
with private insurance "opt-outs," or through free choice and market competition.
UNIVERSAL PROVISION BY PUBLIC HOSPITALS WITH PRIVATE INSURANCE "OPT-OUTS". Several
nations offer universal coverage through public hospitals but permit citizens to purchase
private insurance if they wish. This is the case in Singapore. All citizens have the right to
obtain hospital and medical services from salaried physicians at public hospitals, which are
funded by general taxes or social insurance, but they can "opt out" of this system by
purchasing private insurance. Patients thus have a wider choice of services, including
services provided by private hospitals and private-practicing physicians, and higher-grade
services in public hospitals. Nevertheless, the people who opt out still have to pay the taxes
that fund the public insurance or facilities.
This approach decentralizes the locus of decisionmaking and gives greater discretion to
higher-income people who can and want to pay higher prices to have wider choices. The
demand for expensive curative medical services by these privately insured people could
dominate resource allocation and cause expenditures to rise. Many senior physicians limit
the hours they will treat public patients so that they can devote more of their time to private
patients whom they can charge higher fees. Over time, public hospitals deteriorate because
of the lack of universal support. Eventually, health care becomes a two-tiered system
burdened by rising operating costs because of inadequate market constraints on the private
sector.
FREE CHOICE AND MARKET COMPETITION. Yet another financing option is the free-market
approach, the underlying principle of which is that consumer choice and market competi-
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tion can best produce efficient health care and control its costs. This approach has been
adopted by the United States. The U.S. government offers an income tax incentive for
citizens to choose health insurance through their place of employment.' It then tries to fill
in the gaps left by employment-based insurance through public programs. A public insurance
program, Medicare, was introduced in 1966 to cover the elderly population. In addition,
about half of low-income people are covered through an income-tested program, Medicaid,
which is jointly financed by the federal and state governments but managed by the states.
In spite of these "gap fillings," at the time of writing 12 percent (33 million) of Americans
are not covered by insurance. This uncovered population includes employees of small firms,
workers in low-wage industries, part-time workers, workers between jobs, and their depen-
dents.
Under the free choice and market competition approach, the locus of decisionmaking
remains with the consumer. According to its advocates, this pluralistic approach to financ-
ing means that the private insurance plans have to compete for the consumer's dollar and
therefore will seek the financing and delivery arrangements that best meet consumers'
preferences. Consumer demand will force insurance plans and health maintenance organi-
zations to compete on price. The insurance plans, in turn, will pressure providers into
delivering the highest quality of care at the minimum cost (Enthoven and Kronic 1989). This
theory, however, has not been borne out by experience since health expenditures in the
United States have risen steadily over the past decade.
Several factors may impede this expected market competition. First, adverse selection by
the consumer makes it difficult to establish effective competition among insurance plans.
Second, physicians dominate medical affairs on the supply side, with the result that power
on the demand side becomes diffused, among the many insurance plans and consumers
there. When one type of insurance plan (such as managed care) is effective in controlling
the costs paid by the plan, the providers just pass the increased cost on to other types of
insurance plans.
An Assessment of Alternative Systems of Financing, Payment, and Delivery
Organization
The performance of the systems outlined in the preceding section are assessed in table 2-2.
The assessment is based on six criteria that represent common goals that nations throughout
the world have set for their health care systems: universal coverage, equal access, control of
expenditures, efficient use of resources, equity in financing, and consumer choice.
The assessment of how the different financing methods influence the achievement of policy
goals is imprecise,because at present there areno unequivocal and consistentmeasurements
available. Therefore, the ordinal scores shown in table 2-2 should be considered suggestive
only. The usefulness of the matrix is to point to the relevance of the nature of financing
methods to the attainment of given policy goals. [This paragraph was added by the editors
to clarify table 2-2.]
Universal coverage
A primary goal of a developed nation's health care system is to provide every citizen with
coverage or to make basic health care universally available. The experience of the United
States illustrates that universal coverage cannot be achieved through a free market alone.
Price competition in an insurance market, along with adverse selection, drives insurance
firms to insure the most healthy people. Most of the elderly, disabled, and sick are left
Table 2-2. Assessment of Alternative Methods of Financing, Payment, and Delivery Organization in Affluent Nations
Equity Efficient use
Method offinancing Universal coverage Equal access Equtity infinancing Cost control of resoutrces Consumer choice
General tax
Central govemment, direct provisions
(e.g., United Kingdom) Yes High Progressive Strong (supply) Moderate Low
Regional government, indirect provision
(e.g., Canada) Yes High Progressive Strong (supply) High High
Local government, direct provision
(e.g., Sweden) Yes Moderate Progressive Strong (supply) High Moderate
Social insurance
Government, direct provision
(e.g., Spain) Yes High Mildly regressive Strong (supply) Moderate Low
Mandated insurance with global budget
(e.g., Germany, Japan) Yes Moderate/high Regressive Strong (supply) Moderate High
Mandated insurance without global
budget (e.g., Republic of Korea) Yes Moderate Regressive Weak (demand) Low High
Pluralistic
Universal provision by public hospitals
with private insurance "opt-out"
(e.g., Australia, Singapore) Yes Moderate Mildly progressive Weak (demand) Low High
Free choice and market competition
(e.g., United States) No Low Regressive Weak (demand) Low High
Source: Compiled by the author.
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uncovered. At the same time, young adults and healthy people may not want to purchase
insurance. If they do, they want their risks to be pooled separately so that they can pay the
lowest premium. Furthermore, the poor cannot afford the insurance costs. The result of these
market forces leaves a large portion of the population uninsured.
Affluent nations have learned that universal coverage can only be attained through some
type of compulsory program. The government can use a general tax or government-run
social insurance to cover everyone, or it can mandate that all citizens should enroll in a public
or private insurance plan and provide subsidies for the poor and high-risk populations such
as the elderly and disabled.
Equal Access
Universal coverage does not ensure reasonably equal access to health care by all citizens.
Equal access can only be achieved through a fairly even distribution of health facilities and
health professionals across regions. The availability of health facilities depends on two
factors: capital investments and the payment policy for recurrent costs and for physician
services. Both factors are influenced by the locus of financial power. Market competition
draws the resources to those who can pay more. Since income is not evenly distributed
across communities, supply is uneven. In most nations with financing based on self-pay or
pluralistic financing, the number of physicians and hospital beds per 100,000 people can
differ as much as four- or fivefold between rich and poor communities.
In contrast, general tax and social insurance financing places decisionmaking in the hands
of a government agency. The political process usually produces a more even distribution of
capital investments across regions.
The distribution of health professionals and capital investments is also affected by
payment policy. Physicians have a natural tendency to gravitate toward medical centers
located in cities. If more favorable payment rates are given to urban medical services, there
is a further concentration of hospitals, physicians, dentists, and nurses in cities.
Controlling Health Expenditures
During the past few decades, health expenditures in most nations have been rising at a faster
rate than the per capita income. As governments and consumers find health expenditure
taking a larger share of their income, they look for ways to control the rate of increase.
One option is to constrain the supply side. Countries such as the United Kingdom and
Sweden, which use general tax financing along with direct provision of services, have
successfully constrained inflation in the area of health care through the governmental
budget process, where health care has to compete with other public programs. Another
supply-side approach, if services are provided indirectly, is to allow the payment system to
moderate inflation. Affluent nations have found two such measures to be effective: a
prospective global budget and incentive structure. Without a global budget with payments
made through a single channel, the financing system gives providers full control over price
and volume. In addition, the system of payment system can be used to control the incentive
structure of providers and thereby keep expenditures down. Hospital payment based on a
per day basis, for example, encourages longer length of stay, whereas payment based on
diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) induces hospitals to discharge patients earlier. Higher
payment rates for primary care services encourages physicians to supply those rather than
more expensive services.
Some nations employ a demand-side strategy to try to constrain inflation in the health
care field. The United States, Korea, and Singapore have adopted this approach. Korea
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established a very high rate of cost-sharing by patients (De Geynt 1991). The United States
developed a more sophisticated competitive strategy known as managed competition,
attributable in large part to Alain Enthoven. Under this scheme, consumers can choose
between competing insurance plans and health maintenance organizations (HMOs). At the
same time, cost sharing for the consumer is increased. The strategy chosen by Singapore
was to have employers and employees contribute to an individual saving fund for each
employee. This savings fund, known as the Medisave plan, can only be used to pay for
medical services. Any unused balance can be bequeathed to the individual's survivors. At
the time of obtaining a health service, the consumer pays 100 percent of the cost of health
care by drawing on his or her Medisave fund. The empirical evidence to date suggests that
the demand-side strategies do not seem to have been effective in constraining the increases
in health expenditures.
Efficient Use of Resources
The extent to which resources are used efficiently depends on three factors: resource
allocation, technology diffusion, and administrative efficiency.
Resources may be allocated among prevention, primary care, and curative medicine. The
effectiveness of prevention and primary care as measured by cost-benefit ratios has long
been documented. Consumers, however, have not demonstrated a strong willingness to pay
for prevention and primary care in comparison with curative medicine. Perhaps this is
because a sick person knows for certain that he or she will personally benefit from health
care and thus has a strong incentive to pay for relief from suffering. Moreover, prevention
and primary care do not necessarily produce immediate benefits. These services tend to
reduce the probability that a person will become ill in the future or that a minor illness will
become a serious one, rather than relieving immediate suffering or remedying life-threat-
ening conditions.
The resource problem created by many new technologies is that they are adopted before
their benefits are clearly demonstrated. Hospitals rush to install them in order to attract
consumers, whose lack of medical knowledge usually leads them to choose the provider
that offers the latest and most dazzling technology. Hospitals and physicians also want
sophisticated technology for prestige and profit. Unless capital outlays are carefully
planned, equipment and facilities may proliferate, with considerable duplication and waste.
In the area of administrative efficiency, the pluralistic or free-choice approach incurs
higher administrative costs than other financing strategies. Hospitals and clinics must
prepare information and submit claims to insurance plans that have different requirements.
Meanwhile, the insurance companies have to review the claims, monitor utilization, and
pay for services, as well as market their product.
Equally important, the pluralistic or free-choice method of financing cannot exert suffi-
cient market pressure to ensure that hospitals and clinics are managed efficiently. The
strategy of directly providing services in public hospitals and clinics has not proved any
better, however, in large part because of political patronage and bureaucratic inefficiency.
The administration of public institutions in many nations seems to be less efficient than that
of private hospitals and clinics. A financing system that provides services indirectly while
controlling health expenditures through a global budget seems to be capable of imposing
fiscal discipline on the total system without bureaucratizing hospitals and clinics.
Equity in Financing
Progressivity is a fundamental equity principle in financing. For any compulsory social
program, the amount that people pay in taxes should be proportional to their ability to pay.
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Income tax rates are usually set to rise as a person's taxable income increases, so general tax
financing is a progressive tool. Social insurance is usually financed from a payroll tax with
a limit on the maximum amount of income subject to the tax, which makes it mildly
regressive. Employment-based private insurance (as in the United States) charges high- or
low-paid employees the same amount, regardless of their income. Thus it is regressive.
Another equity consideration in health care financing is risk pooling. In an insurance plan,
the healthy members subsidize the cost of the less healthy members. General tax financing
plans or public social insurance plans pool the risks of all the people in a region or a nation.
Mandated social insurance plans pool the risk of smaller population groups, such as
occupational groups. Employment-based private plans are the least equitable, because
persons who can be employed full-time tend to be the healthiest members of the population,
rather than the disabled or the elderly. Therefore those people with a high health risk are
not pooled and are excluded.
Consumer Choice
Consumers make choices regarding three kinds of care prcviders: primary care physicians,
medical specialists, and hospitals. Nations that provide services directly usually allow
consumers a choice on primary care physicians but restrict the choice on hospitals and
specialists. This is the case in the United Kingdom and Sweden.
Financing plans that provide services indirectly usually give consumers greater choice in
selecting their hospitals and physicians. This is the case in Canada, Germany, Japan, and
Korea. The greatest degree of consumer choice is offered under the pluralistic system of
financing, as exemplified by the U.S. system. Consumers can freely choose primary care
physicians, specialists, and hospitals according to their income and insurance coverage.
Lessons from the Assessment and Implications for Developing Countries
Although developing countries may not necessarily find solutions to their specific problems
in the experience of affluent nations, that experience can help them avoid mistakes. Most
notably, it shows that some types of health care systems are more successful in achieving
some health care policy goals than others.
Important Lessons
Affluent nations have learned that health care differs from normal private goods and
commodities. In order to provide social protection for their citizens and to promote solidar-
ity among their peoples, all affluent nations have organized the financing for health care
into explicit systems. Such action changed the usual bilateral exchange relationship between
consumers and providers into a trilateral relationship. In this trilateral model, the govern-
ment must decide the locus of financial decisionmaking, which will influence the allocation
and use of resources.
Another significant lesson is that the financing of health care cannot be treated in isolation
from the organization of payment and delivery. These aspects of health care must be
integrated if a nation is to achieve universal and equal access to health care, control health
expenditures, and ensure efficient use of resources.
Affluent nations have tried two major approaches to attain their goals: demand-side and
supply-side strategies. Demand-side strategies rely on market competition and consumer
choice to achieve efficiency. Here, the locus of decisionmaking lies with the consumer, who
is allowed to choose both the health insurance and health services. But a demand-side
strategy cannot produce universal coverage or equal access to health care without strong
28 The Conceptual Frame7work
government regulation, nor is it effective in controlling health expenditures or promoting
efficient use of resources. In the United States, Korea, and Singapore-three nations that
have tried to control health care costs through demand-side strategy-the rates of increase
in expenditure have continued or even accelerated. Under a free market, facilities and
equipment may be widely duplicated, and new medical technology proliferates before it is
even proven.
Most affluent nations have employed a supply-side strategy to achieve their national
goals. They have relied on either general tax financing or compulsory social insurance to
achieve universal coverage and more equal access to health care for their citizens. In this
way, they have also been able to exercise greater control over increases in health expendi-
ture, either through the budgetary process or through a global budget for health care
established through negotiations between the financiers and providers.
Nations with universal coverage provide services either directly or indirectly. In the
former system, patients have less choice as to provider, and the health care system frequently
develops bureaucratic features. The method of indirect provision seems to offer patients
more freedom of choice and fewer bureaucratic problems.
In conclusion, developing counitries can learn that controlling health expenditures wvhile provid-
ing universal coverage and equal access to health care has not been achieved through market
mechanisms in the more affluent countries. The locus of decisionmaking must be centralized to
some central or regional authority that can conduct bilateral negotiations with providers to
set an effective global budget. Coverage must be made compulsory to ensure universal
coverage, and the government must take a strong lead in capital and manpower distribution
and payment policy in order to even out the distribution of services. Finally, the indirect
provision of services seems to offer more efficiency and greater consumer choice of provider.
Implications for Current Health Financing Problems in Developing Countries
The most urgent problem for developing countries is that their governments lack the funds
needed to finance health services expected by their citizens. Hospitals and health stations
need to be built, qualified health personnel need to be trained, and imported equipment,
drugs, and supplies need to be paid for with foreign exchange. Few developing countries
would be able to allocate enough general taxes to finance the expansion and improvement
of health care.
The financing problem is not without a solution, however. To begin with, it can be divided
into two parts: into its urban and rural components. A balanced and parallel development
strategy could be used to mobilize financial resources for each.
In the urban sector, industrialization is expanding and workers' real incomes are rising.
Here the government can organize a social insurance program to cover workers employed
by large firms, or it can rely on private insurance or staff-model HMOs. Either option will
make it possible to mobilize more funds for health care. Efforts in the urban sector will create
a greater imbalance between urban and rural areas, however, because health care will follow
"the money." The government must offset this effect by offering technical and managerial
support for the rural communities, to enable them to develop their own system of financing
in accordance with local conditions. At the same time, the government should allocate
resources to fund cost-effective prevention and primary care programs. Health care for the
urban poor also has to rely on government financing.
Another problem for developing countries is that they lack the information and manage-
rial infrastructure required to establish and manage insurance plans or community financ-
ing. It is particularly difficult to develop insurance plans when hospitals and clinics do not
have a uniform system of cost accounting and clinical records. If claim payments for services
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rendered cannot be verified and reasonable costs ascertained, fraud and abuse will become
prevalent.
The solutions to these problems are clear. First, developing nations need to transfer
knowledge from abroad in the fields of insurance, community financing, cost accounting
systems, and clinical recordkeeping. They should seek foreign aid and technical assistance
from world organizations and affluent countries to build the base of knowledge required
to develop insurance schemes or community financing.
If a nation decides to follow a supply-side strategy, knowledge must be acquired and
specialists trained in global budget systems, capital planning, technology assessment,
payment structure, and rate setting. Nations throughout the world-affluent and develop-
ing-all have to decide on the objectives of their health care system. Financing strategy is
merely a means of achieving these objectives. Affluent nations have tried various financing
options and their experiences offer valuable lessons. Each developing country can evaluate
the strengths and weaknesses of each option and select the best one for its purpose and its
particular circumstances. If a nation does not make a decision on health care financing, that
in itself is a decision. A nondecision leaves health care financing and delivery to consumer
choice and the free market, and the consequences of such a decision are clear.
Notes
This chapter greatly benefited from the able research assistance of Laura Rose and the editing skills
of Sarah Craig.
1. The health insurance premiums paid by employers for their employees' health insurance are not
subject to income tax to employees. The U.S. Treasury estimated that in 1989 the govemment lost $43
billion in tax revenues it otherwise would have collected. This tax credit approach can be extended to
produce universal coverage by giving the poor and near-poor population vouchers, financed by the
Treasury, so they also can choose an insurance plan.
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Part II
Country Case Studies

The Japanese Health Care System:
A Stepwise Approach to Universal Coverage
Naoki Ikegami and Toshihiko Hasegawa
In 1926 Japan became the first non-Westem country to introduce social insurance and in
1961 to achieve universal coverage. It therefore offers the developing nations a model of
how Western health care technologies and systems might be adapted to their circumstances.
Japan's eclectic approach has been highly successful: Japan has one of the lowest infant
mortality rates in the world and the longest life expectancy rate, yet the proportion of GDP
devoted to health has remained at about 6.6 percent (Kousei Tokei Kyoukai 1989). At
present, the health care system is facing a new challenge. The factors that contributed to its
success-rapid expansion through heavy reliance on the private sector; emphasis on acute
illness, especially among workers; the rapid adoption of new technologies through the
hierarchically structured medical profession; and equity in the provision of services-have
created an increasing demand for services among the rapidly growing elderly population
and for higher-quality care among the increasingly affluent public.
Japan is a constitutional monarchy of 122 million persons. Because nearly two-thirds of
the land (377,719 square kilometers) is mountainous forests, most of its people live in the
urban megalopolis stretching from Tokyo through Osaka to northern Kyushu. The country
is divided into 47 prefectures and 3,268 municipalities, whose leading officials are elected
by direct ballot. Despite the extensive system of local government, the country's policymak-
ing proress is highly centralized. This characteristic, together with Japan's ethnic homoge-
neity, has made its society extremely cohesive. It also enjoys one of the world's highest per
capita incomes, as a result of sustained economic growth since the end of World War II.
This chapter examines the policy options available to developing nations in the light of
Japan's experience with delivering and financing health care. It covers both the history and
present structure of Japan's system, with special attention to its approach to payment and
its strengths and weaknesses.
Historical Background
The history of health care in Japan can be divided into two periods: the indigenous period,
from early times to the late nineteenth century; and the Western period that followed.
The Indigenous System
Little is known about Japan's original health practices. Purification rituals still widely
performed in the native religion of Shintoism indicate a high regard for cleanliness and a
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general fear of contamination. According to historical records, Japan adopted Chinese
medical practices at the end of the fourth century and followed them until the latter half of
the nineteenth century. Chinese medicine is based on a philosophy of balance (between the
opposites Yin and Yang) and harmony (between five elements in the body resembling the
Medieval and Renaissance concept of the humors in the West). This holistic approach to
health care is still reflected in the preference for noninvasive procedures; the dispensing of
medicine forms a large part of the practitioner's services. These traditions have provided
the infrastructure for the development of Japan's health care system and have contributed
to its distinctive characteristics.
Japan's emphasis on social welfare can also be traced to China, where the family was the
center of the social order and caring for the elderly and infirm was the prescribed duty of
the head of the family. Although this system never developed to the extent that it did in
China, family care is still the cornerstone of social welfare in Japan. The selfless practice of
charity is a Christian concept quite foreign to the ethical duties emphasized in Confucianism
and the granting of mundane wishes characteristic of popular Buddhist and Shinto beliefs.
This difference rnay have been the main reason that Japan did not introduce institutional
care for the indigent and ill until it came under the influence of the West in the late nineteenth
century (Sakai 1982).
Instead, medical care was administered on an ambulatory basis. By the middle of the
eighteenth century, medical practitioners were well-recognized members of society, most
of whom followed the Chinese school. A few, however, practiced Western medicine, which
had been introduced by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century and later continued by the
Dutch. Guilds restricting entry into the profession did not exist, and practitioners were free
to open practices wherever they wished. By the time of the first national census in 1871,
about 87 of every 100,000 people declared medical practice as their occupation, and practi-
tioners could be found even in remote villages (Fuse 1979).
Although the system relied more or less on competitive market principles, the commercial
element in medical care was officially played down. Payment was euphemistically made
for only the medication dispensed by the practitioner; the technical skills were provided
without charge as a humane service (Ikegami 1989a). Under the prevailing honorarium
system, practitioners did not bill their patients but were paid what moral obligation dictated.
The payment was usually made in the middle or at the end of the year, when accounts were
settled. In theory, the rich paid munificently, to cover the services provided to the indigent.
The Change to the Western System
After 1868 the government attempted to westernize all aspects of Japanese Fociety. Under
this policy, Western medicine, which had earlier been restricted to surgery and gynecology,
eclipsed traditional Chinese medicine. From 1883 on, only those who had studied Western
medicine-the German school was chosen as the model-were able to obtain a medical
license. During the transitional period, however, existing practitioners and their sons were
granted a license without being obliged to take any examinations. This ensured that health
care would continue to be delivered in the rural areas and to the urban poor, since the fully
qualified physician was initially available mainly to the rich. The old method of dispensing
drugs and herbal medicine and the honorarium payment continued until the twentieth
century. The extent to which the practitioners declined to demand payment is not known.
Gradually, the hierarchy among practitioners was restructured on the basis of their
educational qualifications. At the pinnacle were the graduates of Tokyo University, who
provided the faculty of the other medical schools and filled the key positions in the public
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hospitals. For the most part, health care, as well as the education of physicians, was left to
the private sector. The main function of public hospitals was to provide teaching facilities,
care for the military, and a place to control communicable and venereal diseases. They came
to be regarded as centers of excellence with no stigma of charity and were patronized by the
rich. Most graduates of private medical schools went into private practice, since they were
usually denied access to academic careers and positions in prestigious hospitals. Thus the
pattem was set: physicians in the small public sector held the leading positions in the
academic and clinical fields; those in the larger private sector had less prestigious jobs. In
both sectors, the nursing of patients, including the provision of bedding and food, remained
a family responsibility, even when the patient was hospitalized. Since hospitals did not feel
constrained by the honorarium method of payment, they initiated the Westem practice of
requesting payment immediately after the delivery of a service, and based the fee on a
predetermined schedule.
The Emergence of Social Insurance
The early advocates of social insurance were those who believed the govemment needed to
play a greater role in social welfare to counteract the socialist movement that had accompa-
nied industrialization. Following an assassination attempt on the emperor in 1910, a charity
endowment under imperial patronage was established to provide medical care for the
indigent. After some initial success, this effort petered out because of a shortage of funds.
Industrialists argued that what was really needed was not charity to save those who were
already poor, but more positive measures to break the vicious circle of illness that led to
poverty. They also had more practical concerns about the need to maintain a healthy and
productive work force.
They could rely on two models to address this problem. On the provider side were the
Jippi Shinryoujyo (cost-price clinics), so named because they usually charged a half or a
third of the rates of private practitioners. These clinics were started by Umeshiro Suzuki,
the manager of a pulp factory. In 1911, Suzuki decided to open the company clinic to local
residents, and this experience led him to establish other such clinics, which became ex-
tremely popular despite the virulent opposition of the medical profession (Souda 1989). On
the financing side, there were the mutual aid associations introduced at the beginning of
this century. They were based on the German social insurance model, except that they were
operated as individual enterprises by managers as one aspect of their patemalistic manage-
ment. At first, their benefits were restricted to occupational injuries, but they were expanded
later to include general medical care.
These two models formed the basis of the social insurance system that emerged in 1926.
Fees were set at a level 20 percent below the customary charges and covered only manual
workers in large corporations, that is, enterprises having more than 300 employees. Benefits
centered on the ambulatory treatment of acute illness and injuries. Treatment was delivered
largely by private practitioners in the community (Saguchi 1982) and was financed through
insurance societies individually organized by the enterprises. Although only about two
million workers were initially enrolled, the introduction of social insurance was a remarkable
achievement because none of the interested parties were particularly enthusiastic: managers
feared malingering workers would become a problem; workers did not like having to pay
for half of the premiums, especially since they had to shoulder half the cost for occupational
injuries as well; and physicians objected to the low fees (Powell and Anezaki 1990). That it
did succeed may be attributed to the need for a healthy work force and the fear of the socialist
movement among both the general public and the political establishment.
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Although the rank and file of the medical profession were opposed the idea, the chairman
of the Japan Medical Association sought to reconcile its members to the program and
actually drew up the original fee schedule. This was based on a scale of relative values, with
the actual monetary value of each point to be calculated from the global budget presented
to each local medical association. Few physicians fully comprehended what the conse-
quences of this new financing mechanism would be. Most became resigned to the reduction
in fees because they believed it applied only to the poorer patients and would be offset by
the expected decline in uncompensated care (a 20 percent reduction was calculated on the
basis of the bad-debts ratio). As the number covered by social insurance increased, however,
the fee schedule came to be applied to a larger percentage of the population. Moreover, the
fees tumed out to be lower than the originally planned markdown of 20 percent because
high volume drove the monetary value of the fee down (as it did in the modern German
system) (Fuse 1979).
In 1935 social insurance for health care was extended to all manual workers belonging to
enterprises employing five or more persons. In 1940, the coverage was extended to the
workers' dependents, who also had to pay half the costs of their coverage. A similar scheme
for white-collar workers was introduced at this time.
Health Coveragefor the Rural Population
It was especially difficult to provide health care in rural areas, where delivery was as much
a problem as financing. Rural areas had not benefited from industrialization and their
situation grew even more dire when the Great Depression caused farm produce prices to
cave in and also brought unemployed urban workers back to the country. An added
problem was that fewer physicians were willing to practice in rural areas. Traditional
practitioners in the rural areas who had been granted licenses under a grandfather clause
in the new program had dwindled in number, and as they retired or died they were not
replaced by those who had completed the formal requirements under the new system. The
number of rural towns and villages without any physicians increased from 1,960 in 1923 to
3,243 in 1936; they represented 33 percent of all towns and villages at that time.
There appeared to be two workable options. One was to give direct responsibility for
delivering health care to community agricultural cooperative societies, the first of which
had been established in 1919. They financed the capital and operating expenses of clinics
and hospitals in their respective areas through voluntary contributions from all households.
By the end of 1936, a total of 738 such societies were providing services to half a million
people; they had 2,791 beds and employed a total of 461 physicians. The other option was
to rely on mutual aid organizations, which had an even longer history. They contracted with
the local physicians to care for their members at a predetermined remuneration, which was
some form of payment in kind (usually rice) made on a yearly basis.
The national health insurance system introduced in 1938 had its roots in these two
organizations. Thus it was patterned after them primarily in the form of "ordinary associa-
tions" organized and administered at the lowest level of local government. As soon as such
an association covered more than two-thirds of eligible residents, the prefectural governor
could order all other residents to join it. Another form it sometimes took was that of "special
associations" organized by members of the same trade who were self-employed (such as
barbers). In both cases, the household was the unit insured, which meant that any depen-
dents were covered. National health insurance differed from employee-based insurance in
that each insurer was free to set the benefit package, the method of contracting with
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providers, and the premium level. In most cases, it included services by the public health
nurses who proved to be very energetic in the drive to improve health standards. Co-pay-
ment rates varied but were usually half of the charges. National health insurance was also
available to self-employed workers in urban areas, but it proved more successful in rural
areas, where community support was far easier to gain (Higuchi 1974).
World War II and the Postwar Period
World War II and the war in China that preceded it greatly hastened the development of
social insurance in Japan, in part because of the army's concern ab"ut the poor health of the
draftees. It was largely through the army's efforts that the Ministry of Health and Welfare
was established in 1938. One of its more successful programs was to promote the use of
maternal and child care booklets containing personal health records. These booklets were
issued to every expectant mother. Because of the lack of resources, however, the hasty and
mandatory measures taken by the national health insurance program to increase the
population covered backfired. Thus after the numbers enrolled initially increased, from
523,223 in 1938 to a peak of 41.8 million in 1946, they fell to 23.1 million in 1952 and did not
recover until 1960 (Higuchi 1974).
Major reforms were carried out by the allied forces during the period of occupation from
1945 to 1951. Article 25 of the new constitution adopted in 1947 stipulates that the govern-
ment is responsible for providing an adequate minimum amount to help all Japanese realize
a healthy and culturally enriching life. This formed the basis for Japan's public assistance
programs. Medical schools that were below standard were either closed or upgraded. Under
the Medical Service Law of 1948, hospitals were reorganized so that some basic nursing,
nutrition, and sanitation standards could be imposed. The primary responsibility for
providing nursing care during hospitalization moved from the family to the nurse. Despite
some success, the fundamental structure of the Japanese health care system has remained
remarkably resistant to change.
Several aspects of the Japanese system as it has evolved in recent years could be of
considerable interest to developing nations. The first is the central government's subsidy to
national health insurance. Initially, it was discretionally based on general budgetary limits.
But in 1955 it became open-ended and was legislated so that subsidies amounted to 20
percent of the cost of medical care, one-third of the cost of public health nurses, and all
administrative costs. This paved the way for universal health insurance in 1961, when the
last remaining communities without national health insurance finally established their
plans. The subsidies have been increased to keep up with the expansion of benefits, which
has included a decrease in the co-payment rate in 1968 (from 50 percent to 30 percent), the
reimbursement of any co-payment exceeding a monthly total of Y30,000, and the establish-
ment of free medical care for the elderly (1973).1 The ratio of the national government's
subsidies has since been increased to 50 percent. Even when subsidies were provided
according to a fixed ratio, the government exercised some leverage; the subsidies were
decreased if the rate of contribution in a particular community was low. In recent years,
communities having high medical expenditures have become the subject of a special
inquiry.
Another interesting feature of Japan's system is its uniform fee schedule. Up to World
War II, national negotiations determined only the relative value of points on the fee scale,
and the actual fees were set through the global budget presented to the local medical
association. After intensive lobbying by the Japanese Medical Association, which included
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tactics such as a "doctors' strike," legislation in 1958 made fees nationally uniform for all
health plans without any budgeted global limits. Henceforth, the payment of medical
services would have to follow the fees centrally negotiated for the employees' social
insurance. The legislation also stipulated that separate accounts had to be maintained
according to the insurance budget and the health facilities' budget, and this made it difficult
to integrate the financing and delivery systems. On the positive side, this arrangement made
it possible to pay all providers the same amount irrespective of the insurance scheme. On
the negative side, it created rigid requirements for meeting local conditions (Higuchi 1979).
Cost containment has recently become the overriding concern of Japan's system. This
aspect of the system is discussed later under the section on the health financing system.
Old Features and Current Characteristics
The foregoing discussion demonstrates a fairly smooth transition to universal coverage
without a radical transformation of the system. This was possible in part because the
Japanese, with the recent exception of the elderly, have never expected medical care to be
provided free of charge. Public assistance or charity has never played a significant role in
their lives. It was because people disliked being under an obligation to physicians that the
honorarium method of payment became the norm and made the cost-price clinics so
popular. Also, the shift to Western medicine in the latter half of the nineteenth century made
allowances for the traditional practitioners of the time by granting them licenses under
a grandfather clause in the new program. Third, the social insurance system with its
accompanying controlling mechanism and the infrastructure for economic growth were
established in the 1950s before the advent of the massive explosion in high-cost medical
technology.
It should be emphasized that the primary goal of Japan's health care policy was not to
immediately establish an equitable health delivery system, but to see that some kind of
health service was provided at an affordable price. The system was essentially designed
after older institutions that had evolved more by accident than by design. Retrospectively,
it was quite logical to rely largely on an employee-based insurance scheme for an urban
setting and a community-based scheme for a rural setting. Local autonomy in defining the
benefits and payment mechanism was found to be particularly important for the latter.
These two schemes were unified under a uniform fee schedule in 1958 as a result of lobbying
by physicians.
The Delivery System
The government has traditionally taken a laissez-faire attitude toward the delivery system.
The notion that physicians should have the freedom to open their own practices and that
patients should be able to choose a clinic or hospital is deeply ingrained. Since most hospitals
in Japan began as physicians' clinics, nearly all of them maintain a large outpatient depart-
ment. Each hospital employs its own physicians; those working in clinics generally have no
access to hospital facilities. As a consequence, care remains largely fragmented. Each
institution basically competes for its market share by offering as attractive a range of services
as possible. There is some overlap in the function of hospitals (which are defined as medical
facilities with more than twenty beds) and clinics (those with fewer than twenty beds). Some
32 percent of the clinics have beds, and they hospitalize 9 percent of the total number of
inpatients. One-third of outpatient visits are made to hospitals (MHW 1989a).
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Table 3-1. Regional Differences in Medical Facilities and Personnel, 1987
(per 1,000 population)
Facility/personnel National mean1 Highest prefectutre Lowvest prefectutre
Hospitals 0.08 0.19 0.05
Psychiatric 0.01 0.02 0.01
General 0.07 0.17 0.04
Hospital beds 12.94 26.05 8.57
Psychiatric 2.84 5.67 1.59
General 9.50 19.82 6.41
Clinics 0.64 0.91 0.40
Dental clinics 0.39 0.68 0.29
Physiciansa 1.57 2.16 0.97
Dentistsa 0.55 0.94 0.33
Pharrnacists' 1.12 1.80 0.66
Nursesb 3.04 4.70 1.52
Practical nursesb 2.62 5.36 1.40
a. 1986.
b. 1938.
Source: Medical Care Facilities Survey, Japan, tables 26, 30, 52, 113; Survey of Physician, Dentists,
and Pharmacists, Japan, tables 20, 38; Report of Health Administration, Japan, table 155.
Private Sector Dominance
Between 1960 and 1987 the private sector increased its share of hospitals from 66.8 percent
to 80.6 percent of the total number and its share of hospital beds from 42 percent to 66
percent. Also by 1987, most clinics were in the private sector: the proportion had reached
93.5 percent for medical clinics and 99.3 percent for dental clinics. In Japan, "private" usually
means an organization owned and managed by a physician, whereas "public" includes such
quasi-public organizations as the Red Cross. In either case, the directors are all physicians
and have the ultimate responsibility for clinical and administrative matters. The Medical
Service Act of 1947 continued to restrict investor-owned health care organizations and
constrained vertical integration.
This private sector dominance explains the large number of facilities, their small size, and
the regional differences in their distribution (see table 3-1). Not counting clinic beds, there
are 12.9 hospital beds per 1,000 population, one of the highest such ratios in the world. In
1960 there were 9.1 hospital beds per 1,000 population. Prefectures differ greatly in the
availability of resources per capita. The number of clinics, physicians, dentists, and phar-
macists tends to be higher in Tokyo and Osaka, but there are more hospital beds and nurses
in the outlying regions of Hokkaido (the north) and the west (MHW 1988, 1989a, 1989b).
Health legislation was enacted in 1985 to remedy these inequities. Prefectural governors
became responsible for setting a ceiling on the number of hospital beds in each service area.
The trouble was that many hospitals had hurriedly opened or expanded before the formal
enactment of the bed ceiling in each prefecture. A more fundamental problem is that no
funds have been made available for restructuring the delivery system and thus it is difficult
to meet increased needs within the existing bed quota. The planning approach in this case
obviously seems to be incompatible with a delivery system dominated by the private sector.
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Table 3-2. Number of Personnel per 100 Beds in General Hospitals According
to Ownership, 1987
Mintistry of
Healtlh and
Welfare Private Prefectiural Teaciing
Total average hospitals lhospitals hospitals hospitals
Personnel (n 8,749) (n = 239) (it = 3,088) (i = 3,088) (n = 168)
Total 84.6 66.9 71.6 99.4 145.8
Physicians 9.8 6.3 6.8 12.4 40.4
Dentists 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.4 6.4
Pharmacists 2.2 1.2 2.1 2.4 3.3
Midwives 1.1 0.9 0.3 2.2 1.9
Nurses 21.9 25.8 8.0 42.9 44.8
Practical nurses 14.5 7.0 19.4 8.6 5.8
Nurse aides 7.1 5.2 9.0 2.2 6.5
Allied health personnel 9.5 5.9 7.3 11.4 14.9
Administrative staff 9.4 6.1 9.2 7.9 14.2
Others 8.7 8.3 9.5 9.1 7.6
Bed occupancy rate
(percent) (82.4) (76.0) (81.6) (80.0) (81.7)
Soutrce: Medical Care Facilities Survey, Japan, table 106; Report from Hospitals, Japan, table 34.
Low Staffing Ratios
As of 1987, the staffing ratio of Japanese hospitals was one-half to one-quarter of that of
other OECD countries (OECD 1987). This figure has increased in recent years. The total
number of personnel per 100 beds in general hospitals is still only 84.6; about half of that
number are nursing staff (see table 3-2). The number of physicians is 9.8 (including 2.0
full-time equivalents being part-time physicians); allied health personnel 9.5, and adminis-
trative staff 9.4. There has been a continuing debate over whether the staffing level is low
because of insufficient funding, as providers maintain, or because the intensity of care does
not warrant it, as the insurers argue. It should also be noted that where the patient requires
a great deal of nursing care, the family or the nurse's aide hired by the family makes a
significant contribution.
The staffing ratio varies widely, depending on ownership, and does not necessarily reflect
the intensity of care. Ministry of Health and Welfare hospitals have the lowest staffing ratio,
at 66.9 per 100 hospital beds. Private hospitals have the second lowest, at 71.6, and most of
the nursing staff are practical nurses. Prefectural hospitals have one of the highest ratios, at
99.4. Teaching hospitals, irrespective of ownership, have the highest staffing ratio, at 145.8,
but even in those hospitals the nursing ratio is only slightly more than one nurse for every
two beds.
The total number of personnel per clinic is 6.7 for all clinics and 5.1 for clinics without
beds. There are 1.2 physicians per clinic because most clinics are solo practices. Pharmaceu-
ticals are usually dispensed by physicians or their assistants, since very few pharmacists are
employed in the clinics. On average, clinics without beds have a small nursing staff, few of
whom are fully qualified (MHW 1989a).
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Table 3-3. Japan's Utilitzation Rates Compared with Those of the United States,
1987-86
Formii of iftilizationi Japan United States
Outpatient physician
consultation (per capita) 14.2 (1978) 4.6 (1981)
Hospital admission rates
(percentage of population)a 6.7 (1983) 17.0 (1981)
Average length of stay (days) Acute hospitals 7.3 (1985)
general hospitalsb 43.8 (1984) Nursing homes 401.0
Tota l 20.4
Number of surgical
operations (per 1,000
population)' 22.0 (1984) 91.0 (1986)
Note: Figures in parentheses show date of survey.
a. From OECD (1987), table 35, 30.
b. Based on Shimura (1989), table 10.
c. Calculated from Japan's 1984 Patient Survey and the U.S. 1986 AHA Survey.
High Ratio of Diagniostic Equipmentt
Hospitals and clinics in Japan have a wide range of sophisticated medical equipment. In
1987, 30.7 percent of the hospitals had whole-body scanners (this figure is up from 15.1
percent in 1984), and 9.5 percent had head scanners. Some clinics also had scanners, so that
the total number of head scanners throughout the country was 1,174, and whole-body
scanners totaled 3,400. The number of nuclear magnetic resonance scanners was 119. Clinics
also have a high ratio of ultrasonic imagers, gastric fiberscopes, and electroencephalographs.
About two-thirds of the clinics can perform diagnostic X rays and electrocardiograms. In
contrast, only 18 percent of the hospitals have intensive care units and 5.8 percent have
cardiac care units (MHW 1989a). The Japanese seem to have a preference for noninvasive
diagnostic procedures because of their ties to traditional Chinese medicine, which are also
shared by the domestic producers of equipment (Ikegami 1988).
UtilizationI Rates
Japan's outpatient consultation ra lc is the highest in the world, three times that of the United
States (OECD 1987). In contrast, hospital admission rates are only about a third of those in
the United States (see table 3-3). Clearly, Japan places considerable emphasis on ambulatory
care. Many hospitals in Japan function as nursing homes; thus the average length of stay for
all general hospitals amounts to 43.8 days. When the average length of stay for acute
hospitals (7.3 days) and nursing homes in the United States are combined, it is still only half
that of Japanese general hospitals (Shimura 1989). Inpatient utilization rates may be lower
in Japan because of the lower procedure rates. Extrapolating from a two-week national
survey of discharged patients, there were an estimated 2.7 million operations per year in
1984 (22 per thousand population) (MHW 1986a). This rate is about one-quarter of the per
capita rate of the United States, which has the highest rate of operations in the world (AHA
1987).
42 Comitry Case Stuedies
The Financing System
In contrast to delivery, the government has always been active in the financing of the health
care system because of its desire to maintain equity between insurance plans and to contain
costs. The present system consists of three categories of insurance (see table 3-4).
First, there is insurance for employees and their dependents. It, in turn, can be divided
into four types: government-managed health insurance for those employed in small com-
panies (which covers 27.0 percent of the population); society-managed health insurance for
those employed in large companies (which covers 24.7 percent); seamen's insurance (which
covers 0.4 percent); and mutual aid associations for national and local government employ-
ees and for private school employees (which covers 9.8 percent).
The second system is for the self-employed, pensioners, and their dependents. It can be
divided into ordinary national health insurance (NHI) with the municipal government
acting as insurer (it covers 33.6 percent) and the NHI associations with members in the same
trade such as physicians or barbers (these cover 3.0 percent). All Japanese, including the
elderly, are members of either of these systems.
The third insurance system is actually a secondary insurance plan created by the Geriatric
Health Act (GHA) in 1983. It pays for all health care expenditure incurred by those seventy
and older; this group makes up 7.4 percent of the population (MHW 1989c). Services are
mainly benefits in kind, with only the co-payment paid directly to the provider.
Under employee health insurance, the insured get medical benefits that represent 90
percent of their fees; their dependents' benefits are 80 and 70 percent, respectively for
inpatient and outpatient services (table 3-5). Under the NHI system, coverage is 70 percent
for both the household head and their dependents. There is a limit to the amount that has
to be paid per month because a mechanism is in place to reimburse high-cost medical
expenses. When the monthly co-payment exceeds Y57,000, the balance is paid back to the
patient. Those suffering from some chronic diseases are subjected to a lower ceiling.
The monthly premium for employees' health insurance schemes is based on a fixed share
of income, averaging about 8 percent of the standard monthly salary. Employers and
employees each pay an equal amount, but there is a limit to the required contribution. In
society-managed health insurance, the employers tend to contribute a larger share. The
government subsidizes 16.4 percent of the cost for the government-managed health insur-
ance but pays only for the administrative expenses for the other employees' plans. Under
the NHI plan, contributions are based on the individual's income and assets and averages
Y137,118 per household. The national government subsidizes about 50 percent of the benefit
costs, in addition to which the municipal government pays any deficits out of its general
expenditure budget. Under the GHA plan, which is for those over seventy, outpatient
charges are Y800 per month and inpatient charges Y400 per day. These are financed from a
central pool, to which the national government provides 30 percent, prefectural government
5 percent, and municipal government 5 percent; the rest is provided by insurers who
contribute a sum inversely proportional to the ratio of those aged seventy and over to total
members.
Health Care Expenditure
The official estimates of health care expenditure in Japan are calculated from social insur-
ance returns, which amount to 5.15 percent of the gross national product and 6.60 percent
of the gross domestic product (Kousei Tokei Kyoukai 1989). These estimates include the
patients' co-payment but exclude preventive health outlays and grants to public hospitals
and other health expenditures. The official estimate for 1984 was 6.29 percent of GDP. The
Table 3-4. Present Status of the Health Insurance Plans, 1989
Number of insured persons
inciliding dependents
Plan Category Insuirer (1,000 persons) Percentage of total
Employees' health insurance Government-managed health insurance National government 33,430 27.0
Society-managed health insurance 1,814 health insurance
societies 30,545 24.7
Seamen's insurance National government 506 0.4
Mutual aid associations 27 MAAs (national) 12,147 9.8
54 MAAs (local)
1 MAAs (private schools)
Self-employed and pensioner National health insurance 3,262 municipal governments 41,560 33.6
health insurance NHI associations 167 associations 3,649 3.0
Geriatric health insurance Municipal governments 8,975 7.4
Source: Outline of Health Insurance, Shakai Hoken Junpo 1669 (1989), p. 36.
Table 3-5. Insurance Benefits and Contributions, 1989
Medical care benefit (%) National
Share of total High-cost medical Insurance benefits Insurance government
Plan Category Insured Dependent bills (%) expenses (cash) contribution subsidy
Employees' Government- 90 Inpatient 80 Patients Injury and 8.3% of monthly 16.4% of benefit
health managed Outpatient 70 maximum sickness income plus costs
insurance health deductible allowance; special insurance
insurance Y57,000 (V31,800 maternity contribution of
for low-income allowance; 1% for bonus
persons) delivery income
expenses; etc.
Society-managed Abatement for 8.137% (average Y7,750 million
health patients suffering for all societies) benefit cost
insurance from diseases
Seamen's requiring costly 8.3% Y2,700 million
insurance treatment (patient benefit costs as
deductible is rate and fixed
Mutual V10,000 for hemo- 6.30-10.22% Administrative
associations philiacs and those
suffering from
chronic
insufficiency of
the kidneys
requiring regular
dialysis)
Self-employed National health 70 70 Midciw.ery Contribution 50%/o of benefits
and pensioner insurance expemies; funeral based on indiv-
health NHI associations expenses; nursing idual income and 32-52% of
insurance allowances; etc. assets; average benefit costs
(optional) per household,
Y137,118
Geriatric health 100% with co-payment of Not applicable Contributions 20%/ (local
insurance 800 per month for made acording government;
outpatients, 400 per day to relevant scem insurer 70%O)
for inpatients (maximum
two months)
Source: Outline of Health Insurance, Shakai Hoken Junpo 1669 (1989), p. 36.
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Table 3-6. Indices of Per Capita Income, Consumer Price Index, Health Care
Expenditure, and Ratio of Health Care Expenditure to GNP and GDP, 1955-58
Health care Health care
Per capita Health care expenditure expenditure
inconme CPI expenditure as percentage as percentage
Year (1960 = 100) (1960 = 100) (1960 = 100) of GNP of GDP
1955 55 92 58 2.77 3.42
1960 100 100 100 2.46 3.03
1965 192 133 274 3.33 4.18
1970 414 175 610 3.32 4.09
1975 786 300 1,582 4.26 5.22
1980 1,210 412 2,926 4.89 6.01
1985 1,508 472 3,911 4.98 6.30
1986 1,563 473 4,168 5.10 6.45
1987 1,606 473 4,414 5.15 6.60
Source: 1989 Trends in the Nation's Healthi, Japan, p. 230.
health care expenditure index has risen over seventy-six times from 1955 to 1987, which
amounts to more than twice the increase in per capita income (see table 3-6). This is reflected
in its ratio to GNP, which has increased from 2.77 percent to 5.15 percent. Nevertheless,
economic growth has helped to curtail the real elasticities of total health expenditure to GDP
over the 1960-84 period to 1.4, which is below the mean of 1.6 for the OECD countries (OECD
1987).
Source of Funds
Of the total health care expenditure under social insurance, just over half is funded by
insurance contributions, a third by the government, and the rest by patient charges (see table
3-7). Under the government's expansionary fiscal policies of 1955-83, the proportion it
contributed more than doubled, from 15.9 percent of the total to 36.4 percent. Insurance
contributions also increased, from 45.5 percent to 55.6 percent. Patient charges, however,
dropped sharply, from 38.7 percent to 11.1 percent, owing to a reduction in the co-payment
for NHI subscribers (from the original 50 percent to 30 percent) and the concomitant increase
in the central government's subsidy. In 1973, medical care for those over the age of seventy
became free, and the co-payment ceiling on high-cost medical expenses was introduced.
After 1983, a major fiscal deficit forced the government to place more emphasis on cost
containment. Since then, its contributions have decreased and patient charges have gone up
slightly, largely as a result of the Geriatric Health Act of 1982, which introduced cross-sub-
sidization among the insurance plans for the financing of geriatric care and a token
co-payment by the elderly. Another cost-cutting measure, taken in 1984, reduced the 100
percent benefit for employees to 90 percent of the fee (Kousei Tokei Kyoukai 1989).
Distribution
The expanded role of the hospitals in the delivery system is reflected in their increased share
of the health care expenditure. Although the proportion devoted to general medical care
(total minus dental care and drugs dispensed in the pharmacy from physicians' prescrip-
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Table 3-7. Change in the Composition of Sources of Funds, 1955-87
(percent)
Government's contributtion Insurers'
Year Central Local Total contribiution Patiernt charges Total
1955 11.6 4.2 15.9 45.5 38.7 100.00
1960 15.7 4.0 19.6 50.4 30.0 100.00
1965 22.1 3.9 25.9 53.5 20.6 100.00
1970 24.2 3.5 27.6 53.0 19.3 100.00
1975 28.9 4.6 33.5 53.5 13.0 100.00
1980 30.4 5.1 35.5 53.2 11.3 100.00
1981 30.3 5.1 35.4 53.5 11.1 100.00
1982 30.4 5.2 35.6 53.6 10.8 100.00
1983 30.6 5.7 36.4 52.5 11.1 100.00
1984 28.6 5.9 34.5 53.7 11.9 100.00
1985 26.6 6.8 33.4 54.3 11.3 100.00
1986 26.1 6.9 33.1 54.6 12.3 100.00
1987 24.9 6.7 31.6 55.6 12.7 100.00
Souirce: 1989 Trends in the Nation's Health, Japan, p. 231
tions) has remained fairly constant, at about 88 percent of the total health expenditure, that
for hospital inpatient and outpatient care increased from 48.1 percent in 1962 to 58.9 percent
in 1987 (table 3-8). In 1962, the proportion of the expenditure by hospitals on outpatient care
was about half that of the clinics; by 1987, the difference had narrowed to 18.8 percent for
hospitals against 25.5 percent for clinics. In general, the proportion for inpatient care has
increased at the expense of outpatient care. In 1962 inpatient care constituted only 38.2
percent versus 49.4 percent for outpatient care; in 1987, their ratio was nearly equal, 43.2
percent versus 44.3 percent (Kousei Tokei Kyoukai 1989). This change is largely due to the
increase in the hospitalization of the elderly.
Payment Mechanism
Despite the various systems of financing, payment to the provider is based on a single fee
schedule. Although providers essentially collect a fee for their service according to the
number of procedures they have performed, the price of each is precisely spelled out in the
nationally uniform itemized fee schedule, known as the point-fee system (one point equals
V10). Only the services listed in the schedule can be charged to the patient and insurer. No
allowance is made for professional expertise or the quality of care, and the payment is the
same no matter who performs the service or where, as long as the provider is legally
qualified (as a physician, nurse, or other allied health professional). Extra charges cannot be
claimed, except for room charges and a very restricted range of specialized services. Thus,
the individual provider is paid without consideration of cost or what the consumer is
prepared to pay. The hospital's revenue is expected to pay not only for its operating expenses
but also for capital investment. The private sector, in particular, has few other sources of
revenue besides that paid by social insurance. This payment system has been of crucial
importance in keeping expenditures down and in determining the use of health resources
in Japan.
The structure of the present payment schedule dates back to 1958, although some elements
can be traced to the schedule designed by the Japan Medical Association in 1927, which was
based on the service-inclusive price of one standard drug per day. Over the years, the
Table 3-8. Change in the Composition of Health Care Expenditure, Hospitals and Clinics, 1962-87
(percent)
General medical care General inpatient care General outpatient care
Year Hospitals Clinics Total Hospitals Clinics Total Hospitals Clinics Total Dental care Pharmacya Total
1962 48.1 39.5 87.6 33.8 4.4 38.2 14.3 35.1 49.4 12.4 - 100.00
1965 49.0 40.8 89.8 32.4 4.2 36.6 16.6 36.6 53.3 10.2 - 100.00
1970 48.6 41.6 90.2 31.3 4.0 35.3 17.3 37.6 54.9 9.8 - 100.00
1975 50.9 40.3 91.2 34.9 4.3 39.3 16.0 36.0 52.0 8.8 - 100.00
1980 52.6 35.4 87.9 36.2 4.2 40.3 16.4 31.2 47.6 10.7 1.4 100.00
1985 57.5 30.1 87.6 40.6 3.6 44.2 16.9 26.5 43.4 10.5 1.9 100.00
1986 57.6 29.8 87.4 40.5 3.4 43.8 17.1 26.5 43.6 10.5 2.0 100.00
1987 58.9 28.6 87.5 40.2 3.1 43.2 18.8 25.5 44.3 10.3 2.2 100.00
- Not available.
a. Includes only drugs dispensed according to physicians' prescriptions.
Source: 1989 Trends in the Nation's Health, Japan, p. 232.
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schedule has been revised now and then to compensate for the increase in personnel
expenses and inflation and to set fees for new technologies. These changes are based on
periodic surveys of the financial condition of health care facilities. Fees were revised, for
example, when the deficit became so large that it threatened to adversely affect health
services in general. The fees for a new technology are usually set by comparing it to the
nearest procedure. They are not based on calculations of the procedure's likely average cost.
A superficial examination of the relative values of individual fees for different services
does not suggest thatJapan's fee schedule necessarily favors ambulatory care and diagnostic
procedures, which are its distinguishiing features. On the contrary, t>'e relative values for
surgical procedures in Japan are much higher than even the customary, prevailing, and
reasonable (CPR) charge in the United States, as in the case of coronary bypass surgery. But
the extent of the services covered by the fee differs in the two countries. In Japan, it is an
all-inclusive fee. Phlvsicianis providing services in the hospital do not bill the patient
separately, and the fee is meant to cover all costs arising from performing the procedure.
Note, too, that Japanese physicians see a large number of outpatients. According to a
national one-day survey of clinics without beds, the average number of patients each clinic
physician sees a day is 49, and 13 percent see more than 100 (MHW 1985). Thus although
Japan's first consultation fee may be one-third that of the European mean, and one consul-
tation fee may be one-third that of the European mean and one-tenth that of the U.S.mean
(according to 1984 figures), this difference is expected to be compensated by the larger case
load.
Paymen2t Process
The billing to the insurers and the actual payment to the providers is made through the
intermediary payment funds established in each prefecture. At the beginning of each month,
every hospital and clinic presents these clearinghouses with detailed itemized bills for the
patients provided with care in the past month. As already noted, physicians do not bill the
patient separately. and those working in hospitals receive their remuneration in the form of
a salary. These bills are then inspected by the phvsicians' panel of the payment fund to see
if the services have been appropriate. Monthly bills in excess of Y5 million are given special
reviews at the national level. The insurers pay the payment funds for the total amount of
the bills they owe. Some insurance societies further review the bills themselves before
making their payment. The weakness in the evaluation is that the only criteria used are
whether the services are appropriate to the patient's age, sex, and diagnosis. Of the approxi-
mately 1.6 billion claims submitted in any one year, only about 1.25 percent are judged to
have provided excessive service and will have the payment reduced as a result. Health care
institutionis generally see a reduction as a warning and are likely to curtail the future use of
the services in question. Thus, the claims review acts as means of containing costs.
Fee Sclwedille Negotiations
Negotiations over the fee schedule are of the utmost importance both to the provider and
the consumer and therefore are usually heated. The actual negotiations are conducted by
the Central Social Medical Care Council of the MHW. At present, the council consists of
eight representatives from the providers (five physicians, two dentists, and one pharmacist),
eight from the payers (four from insurers, and two each from management and labor), and
four representatives of the public interest (one lawyer and three economists, one of whom
chairs the council).
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Providers and payers are always at loggerheads, usually over the income level of physi-
cians. Payers point out that despite the financial deficit in some facilities, physicians in
general have a high income compared with that of other workers and international stan-
dards. Physicians counter that they work longer hours and are being asked to ignore their
capital and personal investment in their work. Another common topic of debate is whether
to raise the fees for the services provided more by clinics than by hospitals, or the other way
around. Clinical specialties also frequently disagree over which should get what share of
the total increase.
The actual increase in points for each item is decided by a complicated process. Since
radical changes are difficult to make with so many opposing contenders and the average
cost of a service is also difficuIlt to calculate tunder a uniform system, an incremental
approach is taken toward revisions. Between 1965 and 1978 fees were revised by dividing
the items covered intc, four broad categories: physician's technical services were tied to
increases in per capita ;NP; personnel expenses (excluding physicians) were tied to the
average wage; material items to the consumer price index; and pharmaceutical items to
current market price surveys. This approach has prevented clinical specialties from gaining
a more advantageous position over time.
Until recently, these limits tended to ke-p the relative power balance in the hands of
providers, favoring the services performed bv physicians in clinics over hospital services.
The incremental approach favors them because the original 1927 schedule was first devised
primarily for their services. The Japan Hospital Association (JMA), which has generally
represented the interests of physicians and clinics, has not been directly represented, but all
'ive physicians in the Central Social Medical Care Council were nominated by the JMA. In
contrast, hospital physicians tend to be divided between public hospitals offering high
technologies and private hospitals, where more basic care is provided. Specialty societies
have not gained much power because of medical school rivalries and the lack of develop-
ment in specialty certifications.
Average Daili, Cost of Medical Care
The price control exerted through the fee schedule accounts in large part for the low average
daily cost of medical care in Japan. The average cost per day for inpatient care is Y13,523, of
which 54.0 percent is for basic hospitalization (room charges plus nursing care), 20.5 percent
for medication (drugs and injections), and 11.5 percent for diagnostic and other examina-
tions. Providers cite this low cost as the reason why staffing has been kept at a low level.
The average cost per day for outpatient care is Y4,329, 44.2 percent of which i, 'or medica-
tion and 18.4 percent for examinations. Hospitals have higher charges than clinics: 1.6 times
higher for inpatient care, 1.8 for outpatient care. These figures are from surveys of the
monthly insurance bills presented to the insurer, based on the fee schedule. The actual cost
to the provider would be different.
Between 1976 and 1987 medication costs for inpatients (for drugs and injections) de-
creased from 26.3 percent to 20.5 percent of total costs. Over the same period, examinations
increased from 8.2 percent to 11.5 percent. Changes were even more marked for outpatient
care, where medications fell from 53.1 percent to 44.2 percent and examinations increased
from 14.4 percent to a high of 19.4 percent and then fell back to 18.4 percent. These changes
have been achieved by actually reducing fees: that is, the reimbursement price of medication
was cut by nearly one-half between 1981 and 1986, while multiple laboratory examinations
were reimbursed at a lower rate (since 1988, repeat examinations during the same month
have also been reimbursed at a lower rate). Despite these efforts, the average daily charges
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roughly doubled for both inpatient and outpatient care during this period, with the increase
greater for outpatient care (MHW 1978, 1982, 1985, 1989e).
Managing Physician Behavior throught the Fee System
One prominent goal of Japan's health policy has been to discourage physicians from
dispensing excessive medications. This has been pursued by steadily lowering the price of
medications since the fee schedule revision of 1981, while increasing the fee for writing
prescriptions to an outside pharmacy. Japan still does not have a network of pharmacies to
serve patients, however, and since the pharmacists bill the insurers separately, there is no
way to check whether the dispensed drugs were appropriate or not. To add to the problem,
some physicians and pharmacists privately agree to divide the profits of dispensing drugs.
The fee schedule has also been used to achieve other objectives, such as shortening the
length of hospitalization. Basic hospitalization charges have therefore been graded by the
length of stay. The daily fee for those hospitalized for more than six months is now about
half that for those hospitalized for less than one week. Fees have also been introduced for
writing referral letters between clinics and hospitals, and for home visits to the bedridden
by physicians and nurses. The effect of these changes on provider behavior remains to be
seen, however.
Physicians'Income
As mentioned earlier, one controversial issue is what income is appropriate for physicians.
The average income of physicians has declined in recent years, as a result of schedule
revisions and also the increased ratio of physicians employed by hospitals as opposed to
those in private practice. In part, these developments reflect the rapid increase in physicians:
the number of entrants into medical school increased from 2,820 in 1960 to a peak of 8,620
in 1980. An oversupply of physicians is now projected and the plan is to decrease their
number by 10 percent by 1995 (Kousei Tokei Kyoukai 1989). From 1976 to 1986 the number
of physicians per 1,000 population increased from 1.2 to 1.6. During this period, the
proportion of physicians owning clinics or hospitals decreased from 46.6 percent to 34.3
percent (MHW 1988), while their average annual income fell from 8.2 times to 6.8 times the
average for all workers. The income of hospital-employed physicians has always been less
than half that of the physicians in open practice and at present is only 2.4 times that of the
average in 1987 for all workers (Niki 1989).
The Public and Preventive Health Sector
The MHW has always taken an active role in the delivery of public and preventive health
services. It maintains close control through the local government health department and the
system of 850 health centers responsible for both environmental and preventive health.
These centers were established to combat tuberculosis and other infectious diseases. New
screening services and home care have been started under a system of project grants. The
MHW specifies the conditions for grants and covers one-third of the total cost, while the
rest comes equally from the prefectures and municipalities. Tlhe authority to give grants
rests with the divisions in the bureaus, but the conditions they have imposed h..ve led to
inefficient practices: health centers, maternal and child health centers, and geriatric welfare
centers, for example, must be housed in different buildings to qualify for a grant. The central
government exercises considerable power over the prefectures, and thus it is not surprising
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thaf more than half of their health departrnent directors have been secondeu from the
Ministry of Health and Welfare.
In 1987 health care expenditures accounted for 7.5 per, ent of the central government's
total expenditures. It is difficult to judge exactly how much went to public health, however.
On the basis of grants in aid, which are specifically for public health purposes, outlays in
this area account for only 2 percent of the central government's health care expenditures. In
contrast, local governments allocate 46.6 percent to public health, which raises the total ratio
to 23.1 percent (table 3-9). Most of local government's funds go into sanitation measures,
primarily garbage collection (MHW 1989f).
The government's prevertive health measures are heavily concentrated in mass screen-
ings of people for possible risk factors or disease, which have become so popular that every
Japanese now has an average of one checkup per year (Hismachi 1988). The annual checkup
provided at a nominal charge under the GHA for all those over the age of forty consists of
a general examination, urinalysis, and checking of blood pressure, serum GOT, GPT, and
choles erol. A third of the population undergoes a more detailed examination, including
electrn zardiogram, eye tests, and anemia and blood sugar examinations. Separatc tests are
run fc r gastric and uterine cancer (beginning at age thirty-five) and for lung and breast
cancer. The mandatory screening for school children includes an electrocardiogram. The
effica. y let alone the effectiveness of these measures has not yet been rigorously evaluated
(Ikeg imi 1988). The examinations are largely contracted out to local medical associations,
which have developed a stronger voice in recent years. The next large item in the category
of preventive health is the spa sanatoriums directly maintained by insurers. The total sum
for these public and preventive measures amounts to about 3.3 percent of the official health
care expenditure. By comparison, health insurance societies allocate 6 percent of their total
expenditure to these activities (Federation of Insurance Societies 1989).
Success of the System
The Japanese systern has performed well in several respects: its health outcomes have been
exceptionally good, the accessibility to and quality of health care are high, and costs have
been kept relatively low.
Exceptionally Good Health Outcomes
Measured by the infant mortality and life expectancy at birti, Japan's health record has been
impressive. Infant mortality has declined from a level of 124.1 per thousand births in 1930
to the present 5.0. During this period, life expectancy at birth for males has increased from
44.82 to 75.61 years, while for females it has risen from 46.54 to 81.39. Although social factors
not directly related to the health care system-such as the high literacy rate and the relative
equality of income-play a more significant role, it must be emphasized that these outcomes
are among the best in the world. At least part of the credit for the low infant mortality rate
goes to the public health measures focused on maternal and child care.
High Accessibility and Equality
The reliance on the private sector has led to a plentiful supply of health facilities, and assured
a high geographical accessibility, with the exception of some isolated hamlets. The economic
barriers have been removed by universal health insurance and there is unrestricted access
to all hospitals and clinics. All these features have given Japan the highest outpatient
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Table 3-9. Government Health Care Expenditure, Fiscal 1987
(millions of yen)
Expendit tire Central governmenta Local govern men tb Total'
General govermment
expenditure 54.1 (100) 63.2 (100) 117.3 (100)
MHW expenditure 10.1 (18.7)
Health care
expenditure 4.0 (7.5) (100) 3.6 (5.8) (100) 7.7 (6.5) (100)
Public and
preventive health
expenditure 0.8 (0.1) (2.0) 1.7 (2.7) (46.6) 1.8 (1.5) (23.1)
Other health care
expenditure 4.0 (7.4) (98.0) 1.9 (2.9) (53.4) 5.9 (5.0) (76.9)
a. Central government health care expenditure consists of aid to health insurance (72.6 percent),
public welfare medical care assistance (15.1 percent), and grants (13.3 percent). Central government
public and preventive health expenditure has been calculated from the grants-in-aid to specific
programs (such as screening).
b. Local government health care expenditure consists of aid to public hospitals and NHI (51.5
percent); sanitation measures, including garbage collection (40.5 percent); operation of health centers
(6.1 percent); and tuberculosis control (1.9 percent).
c. Does not include health expenditures coming under the Ministries of Education, Labor, or the
Self-Defense Agency.
Souirce: Compiled from the 1989 Handbookfor Ministry of Health and Welfare Grants and 1989 Trends
in the Nation's Health, Japan.
consultation rate in the world. Emergency care is also readily accessible through the free
public ambulance system operated by the local government fire department. What a patient
earns makes no difference. According to a survey made of the NHI in Tokyo, neither the
utilization rate nor the health care expenditure per person was affected by the income level
(Tokyo 1988). In a national survey performed in 1985, of those who had experienced an
illness but had not seen a physician, only 0.4 percent gave economic reasons for not doing
so (MHW 1986b).
Equality of service level has been maintained because there exists no economic pressure
to discriminate service delivery according to the patients' insurance plan since providers
are paid in exactly the same way (the same fee schedule also applies to those receiving public
assistance). Moreover, it is illegal to request extra payment other than room charges and a
very restricted raaige of new technologies still undergoing assessment (such as lithotripsy).
Hospitals are not allowed to provide better food for the patients in private rooms. Giving
personal gifts to physicians is a fairly widespread custom, especially after discharge from
the hospital, but it is not obligatory and their monetary value is usually not too high except
for private room patients in hospitals of private medical schools.
Relatively Low Cost
As has been mentioned, health care expenditure amounts to only 5.15 percent of Japan's
GNP. This is low even when the method of calculation and Japan's still relatively young
population ar. taken into consideration. The percentage increased rapidly from the mid-
Table 3-10. Ten Leading Causes of Death, 1899-1987
Rank 1889 1930 1935 1951 1981 1987
1. Pneumonia and Gastroenteritis Tuberculosis all forms Cerebrovascular disease Neoplasm Neoplasm
bronchitis
2. Cerebrovascular disease Pneumonia and Pneumonia and Tuberculosis, all forms Cerebrovascular disease Heart disease
bronchitis bronchitis
3. Tuberculosis, all forms Tuberculosis, all forms Gastroenteritis Pneuwnida and Heart disease Cerebrovascular disease
bronchitis
4. Gastroenteritis Cerebrovascular disease Cerebrovascular disease Neoplasm Pneuwonia and Pneumonia and
bronchitis bronchitis
5. Old age Old age Old age Old age Old age Accidents
6. - - - Gastroenteritis Accidents Old age deterioration
7. - - - Heart disease Suicide Suicide
8. - - - Oter disease, peculiar Chronic hepatic disease Chronic hepatic disease
newbom and cirrhosis and cirrhosis
9. - - - Accidents Hypertension Nephritis and nephrosis
10. - - - Nephritis and nephrosis Nephritis and nephrosis Hyperteso
- Not available.
Source: 1989 Trends in the Nation's Health, Japan.
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1950s until the late 1970s (it started from a level of 2.77 percent in 1955), but the momentum
has slackened in the past decade or so. The uniform fee system can be credited in large part
with keeping costs down. Whereas the consumer price index increased 4.90 times and
average wages 13.87 times over the period 1955-83, health care fees increased only 2.76 times
(Matsuura 1986). The JMA calculates the real rate of increase to have been only 2.45 percent
over the period 1981-88 (Yoshida 1989). The fee system not only seems resistant to inflation,
it also tends to reward physicians in clinics engaged in primary care rather than specialists
providing tertiary care. The second factor behind the low costs is the emphasis on ambula-
tory care and on diagnostic procedures rather than hospitalization and surgical procedures.
The third reason may be the dominance of the private sector, where organizations must
maintain their efficiency if they are to survive. In the private sector, there is little professional
division of labor, and an employee may play several roles. In general, allied health personnel
are not as specialized as their counterparts in the West.
Failures of the System
The system has experienced its most difficult problems in responding to Japan's aging
society and maintaining an even quality of care.
Responding to the Aging Society
With the steady improvement in Japan's health indices, the elderly population has experi-
enced substantial growth. Both birth and death rates have declined to one-third the level of
1930. The ratio of the population sixty-five and over has grown from about 5 percent in the
1950s to the present level of 11 percent. These changes have had major effects on the health
care system. When vital statistics were first compiled, the leading causes of death were
gastroenteritis, pneumonia, and bronchitis (table 3-10). In the years spanning World War II,
tuberculosis became the major cause of death and was referred to as the "national disease."
Since then, cerebrovascular disease, then neoplasm, and heart disease have become the most
frequent causes of death. This shift has been reflected in utilization rates. As late as 1960,
the combined utilization rate for inpatient and outpatient care differed little from one age
group to another, except for a peak in the early childhood years. The rate for all age groups
rose up to 1970, with a sharp peak in the fifty-five to sixty-nine age groups. After 1970, the
utilization rate for the elderly increased sharply, with a decline in all other age groups
(Kousei Tokei Kyokai 1989). This trend is closely related to the introduction of "free" medical
care in 1973.
Both the delivery and financing systems have had great difficulty adjusting to the altered
needs brought about by this change, partly because it happened so fast. Japan's health care
system developed to provide for acute illness and injury of the worker. Since the demand
was episodic, fee-for-service seemed an appropriate method of payment and the freedom
to choose one's physician was an asset for the patient. Social insurance removed the
economic barriers to medical care, while nursing care was left to the family. But with the
growing need for geriatric care, the system has shifted its emphasis to continuity, rehabili-
tation, and nursing care interposed with acute medical care during periods of serious illness.
Such needs cannot, ie met without a community-based social support network. This type
of care has been difficult to administer owing to the fragmentation in the delivery system,
the procedure-based fee sys Lem, and the undeveloped state of social services (for example,
there are only 27,105 home helpers in Japan) (MHW 1989g). Furthermore, providers have
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managed to evade the real issue by responding to new demands through an increase in
checkups and diagnostic equipment. The reason for this state of affairs lies not only with
the health care system. When there were fewer elderly, they could be cared for traditionally
by their families during what was often a short terminal illness. Today, this period is
prolonged, and since more than half of Japan's housewives are employed there are fewer
family members available to provide home care. More fundamental is the elders' general
lack of self-reliance and determination to combat the aging process (Ikegami 1989b).
As a result, the percentage of the elderly who are institutionalized has increased, despite
the fact that 62 percent still live with their children (MHW 1989h). The institutionalization
rate for those sixty-five and older increased from 0.9 percent in 1955 to 6.2 percent in 1987
(MHW 1956-89). Seventy-five percent of the elderly who are institutionalized are in hospi-
tals and clinics. From the perspective of the providers, this means that 43 percent of the
inpatients are over sixty-five and nearly half (45 percent) of them have been hospitalized
for six months or more (MHW 1989i). Both physicians and patients-or more precisely their
families-continue to cling to the illusion that a "complete cure" may be achieved. This
tendency has been abetted by economic incentives: both parties benefit from the virtually
free hospitalization provided by the GHA. Providers can also benefit from hospitalizing less
seriously ill patients because the fee system does not take severity into account to any degree.
There is no system of assessment units. According to a 1988 survey by the Japan Nurse
Association, 33.7 percent of the inpatients had virtually no difficulty performing their
everyday functions.
The heavy demand for medical services by the elderly is rapidly changing the structure
of the system. The dramatic rise in the utilization rate of the elderly between 1970 and 1975
was primarily due to the legislation providing for their free medical care. In 1987, although
those over the age of seventy made up only 7.3 percent of the general population, they
accounted for 30.8 percent of the total health care expenditure (Kousei Tokei Kyoukai 1989).
Although the GHA was enacted in 1982 to meet these challenges, the resulting cross-sub-
sidization between plans has reduced the autonomy of tie insurance societies. In 1987 they
contributed 33 percent of their total expenditure to the GHA pool: this figure is expected to
reach 50 percent in 1997. In 1988, the Federation of Insurance Societies (1989) stated that it
had a current deficit of Y2.8 billion. More than a third of the insurance societies have had to
raise their contribution rates beyond the 8.3 percent rate levied by government-managed
health insurance. The issue is complicated by differing interpretations of equity. The
government maintains that everyone should equally share the burden of geriatric care and
that those who are able to do so should contribute more. Insurance societies argue that
although their contributions are collected one hundred percent from payroll deductions, for
those enrolled in the NHI the contribution is only 94 percent. Moreover, they find the basis
for calculating the rate unfair because little accurate information is available on the income
of the self-employed.
Whatever financing system will be used in the future, caring for the elderly will be a heavy
burden. At present, those sixty-five and over account for 11 percent of health care financing.
This figure is expected to rise to 16.3 percent by the year 2,000 and to reach the unprece-
dented level of 23.6 percent in the year 2020 (Kousei Tokei Kyoukai 1989).
Uneven Quality
In Japan's fragmented health delivery system, hospitals and clinics compete for patients,
who have unrestricted access. A review process is difficult to implement, however, because
of the hierarchical structure of the medical profession. Much of the power and prestige is
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concentrated among the professors at medical schools, whose informal patronage and
recommendations are the basis for recruiting hospital physicians. Thus there has been little
effort to establish object*ve postgraduate criteria for evaluating individual physicians.
Most hospitals tend tc avoid overt and rigorous evaluations since their physicians are
usuallv graduates of the same medical school. The competence of physicians is usudl!y
evaluated by their peers, and their public reputation based on the hospital's prestige. This
system has given rise to two problems. First, consumers suffer because physicians are
prompted to seek emplovment at university and other prestigious hospitals primarily on
the basis of their research rather than their clinical competence. The quest for higher-quaiity
care has also caused extreme congestion and reduced consultation times for outpatients and
has forced inpatients to wait in line for their consultations. It is not unheard of for a
university professor with several residents assisting him to see about one hundred patients
during a single morning's rounds. Second,with the growing concentration of patients in
these hospitals, policymakers are facing higher costs with doubtful benefits. Yet this
preference is lilelv t.) intensify in the future. When the patients have doubts about quality,
they turn to the medical cetiters and would oppose any restrictions on access to them.
Although the volume is heavy, few such centers have the ability to treat patients in a given
specialty. Consequently, they can hardly function as centers of excellence.
Importance of the Procedure-Based Uniform Fee Schedule
Japan's procedu e-based uniform fee schedule is the most important factor to have shaped
the nation's health care system. It has also been the greatest driving force for containing
costs. Because the government has to subsidize the NHI and government-managed health
insurance at a fixed rate, it is under pressure to contain public expenditure. Furthermore,
insurance societies recognize that they would not directly benefit from an increase in their
contributions because they cannot negotiate for higher-quality medical coverage-their free
hand is limited to preventive activities not listed in the schedule. Their obligation under the
GHA to cross-subsidize the medical care of the elderly has also made them eager to pursue
global cost containment.
For its part, the JMA has actively supported the procedure-based uniform fee schedule
because this payment system upholds their cardinal principle of paying physicians a fee for
their service. In any case, under Japan's fragmented and functionally undifferentiated
delivery system it would be very hard to introduce an alternative method of payment, such
as capitation. Differential payment for specialists would also be difficult to administer
because detailed formal qualifications have not been established. In its 1987 Interim Report
the government acknowledged that the present method of payment would continue in the
future. Although the fee schedule itself and the economic incentives it provides are the
product of the country's unique sociohistorical conditions-that is, institutional care devel-
oped late in its history and practitioners providing ambulatory care became the predomi-
nant care givers-it would be useful to analyze its advantages and disadvantages from a
policy perspective.
Because payment is made on a fee-for-service basis, the fee schedule provides the
economic incentive for the physicians to work. At the same time, by controlling the fee
schedule, the government is able to not only curtail the total health care expenditure but
also encourage the provision of individual procedures by setting the fee higher than the
expected cost. The rapid diffusion of renal dialysis was encouraged by a policy decision to
set the fee at a high level. As has been mentioned, equality has also been realized by rigidly
maintaining a uniform fee schedule and by strictly forbidding claims for extra payment.
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But there are drawbacks to this system. It is extremely difficult to decide which procedures
are effective and should be encouraged, and which are ineffective and should be discour-
aged. Because the effectiveness of the technology must be evaluated in the situational
context, the proof of its efficacy by no means indicates that it would be effective in any setting
in which it was applied. Even in the case of renal dialysis, there have been claims that in
some cases dialysis has been started before it was truly warranted. In other areas such as
drugs, there are numerous possibilities for technology creep, such as the expanded use in
situations where its efficacy has not yet been proved. Under the present system of reviewing
medical claims, the appropriateness of the procedure can only be evaluated on the basis of
the patient's age, sex, and diagnosis. Providers argue that the diagnostic criteria are too rigid.
To reduce the risk of not getting paid, they often add a diagnosis to fit the procedure. It is
quite common for five or six diagnoses to appear on a patient's bill.
Another problem is that the incentive to pursue efficiency remains confined to measures
to lower the cost of the procedure itself, to lower the provider's cost as much as possible.
Initiatives to lower the total cost of the patient's medical service would not be financially
rewarding. New regulations have been enforced, but these have further complicated billing
procedures and added to administrative costs. In the case of medication, the pharmaceutical
industry counteracted the fee reduction by stepping up the introduction of new products.
Although under current regulations the fee for a new drug can be no more than 7 percent
higher than that for a preexisting similar product, its patent will protect it from fierce price
cutting by its competitors. Because of this mechanism, the industry has suffered no great
loss in its profit margin (JPMA 1989). This has led to the extensive use of third-generation
antibiotics (Iglehart 1988).
The most serious drawback of the fee schedule is that quality has been sacrificed to
quantitative growth. Although it does create an incentive to provide services, there is no
mechanism to ensure high standards. Since fees tend to be set at the lowest workable level,
conscientious service is penalized. Still, the schedule's advantages are said to outweigh these
defects, and it remains central to Japan's health care systems.
The limits of economic incentives must also be recognized. Although the fee system may
have been instrumental in helping Japan attain the highest per capita rate of renal dialysis,
Japan still has one of the lowest organ transplant rates in the developed world. By the end
of 1987, only 5,328 renal transplants had been performed (Kousei Tokei Kyoukai 1989).
Policy Implications for Developing Nations
Japan's experience with health care brings to light several issues that developing nations
should take into consideration when designing their own systems. These issues pertain to
equality and efficiency, the possibility of mixing public and private financing, the possibility
of combining formal and informal care, the public and private mix in health care delivery,
accessibility and quality, and the difficulty of introducing change.
Equality and Efficiency
The key issue in formulating health policy is whether to put the emphasis on equality or on
effic:iency. If equality is the primary concern, then the goal should be to achieve a uniform
system of health care, regardless of an individual's financial status or locality. The medical
profession has conflicting views about this issue. Some are opposed to the practical means
required to achieve equality-that is, universal health insurance-but in theory they agree
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with the ends. In their opinion, professional qualifications ensure a uniform standard of
quality. The profession's goal of uniform quality of service rests on a philosophy of
paternalism as opposed to consumerism. Professionals do not necessarily see any inconsis-
tency in their attitude; they would like to believe that an allocation function can be exercised
through the discretion of each physician.
If greater value is placed on efficiency, then a plural system of health services is needed.
The consumer or, more precisely, the sponsors acting in their interests will choose the best
coverage package according to market principles of marginal benefit and marginal cost.
Complete equality would be rejected as being unattainable and the government's direct
financial responsibility would center on ensuring a decent minimum coverage. Because profes-
sional qualifications themselves do not guarantee a uniform standard in health delivery, the
physician's performance must be carefully evaluated under this competitive model.
This equality-efficiency issue has little to do with ownership. A white paper published in
the United Kingdom ("Working for Patients") calls for the creation of an internal market
within the framework of a publicly financed and publicly managed national health service.
But Japan's delivery system, which is dominated by the private sector, also emphasizes
equality. In this sense, then, it would be better not to regard Japan's system as a market-ori-
ented one. Despite the fact that providers do compete for patients and consumers have
freedom of choice, the former are paid in exactly the same way tinder the uniform fee
schedule and the latter do not really have any information about the level of quality. Indeed,
one argument used to justify the present legal restriction on advertising in Japan states that
since each and every provider satisfies the standard level, there is no need for such
advertising (Kousei Gyousei Kenkyukai 1987). Efforts to differentiate payment have been
fiercely resisted by the JMA to such a degree that this subject cannot be openly discussed.
To back their argument, providers can ultimately call on the need for absolute equality in
health care. Yet, in practice, providers privately do feel that there is a quality difference and
discreetly promote their services. At the same time, patients shop around for the best
physician by relying on the grapevine for information.
From an operation l1 point of view, the central question is whether it is possible for
sponsors to evaluate health services. In other words, can policymakers afford to make a
public decision to give priority to efficiency rather than equality when the public opposes
an openly multitier health care system. From a practical point of view, this problem has been
difficult for Japan to resolve because it has few programs to ensure quality. From an
ideological point of view, the difficulty is that the government's basic policy objective has
been to achieve national uniformity and equality.
Public/Private Mix in Financing
Much depends on whether the emphasis falls on equality or efficiency. If the policy goal is
to establish a uniform system, then a public, single financing system is more cost-effective.
But if the government's responsibility is confined to providing a decent minimum for those
unable to afford better care, then a plural source of funding coming largely from the private
sector is the obvious solution. Here safeguards have to be made to prevent "skimming" of
healthy members. This phenomenon is by no means confined to health insurance. Even in
the case of social insurance, individual insurers in Japan tend to jealously guard their
existing privileges-in the form of more extensive free checkups, subsidized vacations in
sanatoriums owned by the insurance society, sanatoriums, partial payback of the co-pay-
ments-which are made possible by having a more healthy membership.
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Japan's experience shows that establishing a nationally uniform system of payment has
a far greater impact on the shape of the health care system than the continued existence of
plural sources of funds. By the nature of the system itself, insurers lose their autonomy in
deciding benefits and setting the fee schedule. Higuchi (1974) has pointed out that Japan
has experienced a steady decline in the number of medical facilities owned and run by
insurance carriers since their loss of autonomy under the NHI Act of 1958. The uniform
system of payment highlights differences in co-payments and benefits, eventually creating
pressure for central government subsidies to resolve the problem. It should also be noted
that strict rules forbidding extra charges curtails the development of private health insur-
ance. In addition, with changes in industrial structure and with young people leaving rural
areas, there is a disproportionate enrollment of the elderly in some of the insurance plans.
To remedy this situation, there needs to be a system of cross-subsidization that eventually
minimizes any substantial differences between the plans, as is currently occurring in Japan.
Thus what may start as a system of mutual cooperation for closed segments of society will
probably end up as a nationally unifonm social security system.
In the case of developing nations, if the ultimate goal is to create a nationally unifonn
system, a pragmatic solution would be, at one stage in the future, to establish a uniform
system of payment. The remaining inequities could be gradually decreased by increasing
government subsidies following the example set by Japan. It would be very difficult to start
with a uniform system because setting the fees at the present level of private practice would
be prohibitively expensive; at the same time, bringing the whole level down to what is
affordable would be politically infeasible. Nevertheless, if a single-tier health care system is
the goal, plans must be made for the eventual unification of the schemes, if only because of
the growing elderly population. Conversely, if greater emphasis is to be placed on efficiency,
then the existing insurance plans should have the freedom to negotiate with the providers.
In this case, the eventual goal would be to integrate financing and delivery within each
competing independent plan.
Fornal and Informal Care
In any given country, a great deal of health care is provided by the family. Even in the West,
the formal system can never handle the full load of taking care of the elderly without the
active support of the family. In the case of Japan, their support is taken more for granted
and often extends to hospitalization. As a result, hospitals in Japan evolved without any
infrastructure of social welfare. This arrangement worked well in the days when diseases
were acute and families large. Demographic and social changes have now made family
support increasingly difficult to maintain. The low staffing level is only partly compensated
by the relatively low intensity of care required by the patients as part of a deliberate
admission policy. Families have had to hire private nurses or aides who ostensibly act as
their surrogates. Social insurance usually does not fully cover this expense, and the quality
of such care tends to suffer.
Developing countries that share the Confucian tradition of filial piety and whose hospitals
have also not developed from social institutions will probably face a similar quandary in
the future. Both from a moral and fiscal point of view, it would be good policy to encourage
informal care. But, with the more elderly, a disproportionate burden will be placed on the
family carers. Although it would not be expedient to deny the right of those wishing to take
care of the elderly, every effort should be made to develop a social support system in time
to meet the challenge of the aging society.
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Public-Private Mix in Delivery
In Japan the medical associations have effectively blocked the appearance of investor-
owned hospitals. At the same time, private practitioners have asked the public sector to
provide those services poorly paid for by the fee system, such as high-technology medicine.
Since these services are of greater interest professionally, the chance to perform them has
compensated for the salaried physician's lower income. It must be remembered that
historically Japanese public hospitals have had a reputation for being centers of excellence.
Until recently, this arrangement led to a coexistence of the two sectors. As a result, aggressive
marketing is still relatively unknown even in the private sector because of legal restrictions
and because hospitals are owned by physicians who devote their energies to clinical
practice. Faced with the fact that more and more of the quality-conscious public are turning
to the public sector, providers in the private sector are finding it difficult to counter this
trend. Regulations have blocked their vertical integration and have hindered efforts to raise
capital. The recent health planning legislation has further curtailed competition by limiting
the number of hospital beds and by requiring a special permit from the Ministry of Health
and Welfare itself to open another new hospital in a different prefecture.
For the developing countries, it would be difficult to socialize their delivery system
entirely. Therefore, the two primary issues for them to consider are whether encouraging
private sector development is justified, and whether a distinction should be made between
the for-profit, investor-owned hospitals and the physician-owned or nonprofit organiza-
tions. Private sector development would make it possible to respond to a perceived health
problem more flexibly and rapidly, and it would be more economical for the govemment if
the initial outlay were made by private capital. A decision to encourage the private sector
would be very difficult to reverse, however. Such a decision should always be taken in
conj,unction with measures for evaluating the quality of care. In addition, regulations to
constrain competition must be periodically reviewed to check whether the provider or the
consumer is benefiting most.
Accessibility and Qua lily
Given a choice, the consumer would like unrestricted and immediate access to the foremost
specialist in the hospital with the latest equipment. But even if there were no resource
constraints, the best would still not be collectively available because a specialist must have
a steady flow of patients whose conditions match his specialty in order to maintain his
expertise. So there must be a functional differentiation between primary, secondary, and
tertiary levels of care, and an appropriate referral system between the levels. Although many
obstacles stand in the way of achieving such a rational system, there are ways to reduce the
difficulties. The primary care physician can act as a "gatekeeper" and deny access to the
specialist. But if physicians stand to lose nothing by referring, then too many referrals may
undo their gatekeeper function. If this function is too rigidly enforced, patients may not gain
access to the specialist's care when they really need it. And if access is granted strictly on
the basis of the egalitarian principles of medical need, then the affluent will most likely turn
to the black market.
Japan has had a laissez-faire policy to this problem, but several forces have been at work
to restrain direct access to tertiary care. The large number of clinics gives them greater
geographical accessibility and they are less crowded, with more convenient consulting
hours. Also, clinic physicians have a financial incentive not to refer patients. They are paid
on a fee-for-service basis and once a referral is made, the patient is seldom referred back. In
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addition, there are the familiar arguments for continuity of care and the total approach, both
more likely to be realized in a clinic rather than a hospital setting. However, these restraining
forces are gradually being eroded by the growing demand for quality, which consumers
increasingly feel to be available only in the public and teaching hospitals. To counter this
trend, the Ministry of Health and Welfare is trying to introduce a bigger co-payment for
those coming to teaching hospitals without a referral. This has been vigorously opposed by
the teaching hospitals. To argue their position, they can point out the need for the various
levels of care for teaching purposes-in Japan, every medical school must have its own
attached teaching bospital. A larger co-payment that effectively reduces the number of
patients will lead to a revenue loss, both directly and because the fee system pays more for
outpatient care. Physicians in the leading hospitals would stand to lose personally because,
in contrast to the local hospitals, they receive large money gifts from patients in a kind of
black market for quality care.
Such accessibility and quality issues must always be considered in designing the health
care system of a developing country. Unrestrained pursuit of quality care by the individual
causes a collective loss in attaining it, so access to high-technology medicine should be
limited. To compensate for this limitation, the health care system should efficiently differ-
entiate between providers, while an appropriate referral system links them. The government
should educate the public about the need to limit access, while reassuring people that an
appropriate referral will be made if the need arises. The government mast also decide
whether to allow specialists to charge extra for their services to those who do not come
through the regular referral channels. This would overtly admit that those with money can
bypass the system. But not to do so would create a black market in which objective
evaluation of the quality of care would become next to impossible.
Difficulty of Introducing Change
Health care systems are very difficult to change. Since the economic incentives under which
the systems operate have been shaped by the country's sociohistorical conditions, each
system has its own intrinsic rationale. Each and every aspect of the system will be regarded
as sacred by the interested parties, which can use emotionally loaded expressions such as
"the value of human life," "equality," and "freedom" to further their interests. In these
circumstances, society's value system will have to be changed before a health care system
can be altered to any extent. Even if values do change, institutional inertia may prevent
people from adapting to the new requirements. This is why the very reason for the success
of Japan's health care system-which has attained exceptionally good health indices,
quantitative expansion at reasonable cost, and equality-may turn into liabilities when the
primary objectives become the care of the elderly and the pursuit of higher quality.
If physicians are to change their values, the medical schools where those values are
instilled need to be reformed. Indeed, the Ministry of Health and Welfare's 1987 Interim
Report has recommended such reforms as one of four major priorities. But Japan's teaching
hospitals are safeguarded not only by clinical freedom but also by academic freedom. There
are also special ties, including the doctor-patient relationship, between the senior faculty
and the governing elite. Developing countries appear to face a similar situation, in that their
policymakers must face the added burden of trying to keep pace with the most recent
advances in medical technology in an economy that is still being developed. It is precisely
because of these adverse conditions that a firm, proactive policy, preferably of bipartisan
support, is needed in health care with every effort made to elicit public support.
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Notes
1. On November 29, 1990, US$1 was worth Y130.
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Issues in Health Care Delivery: The Case of Korea
Bong-nmin Yang
In the mid-1970s the Republic of Korea introduced a compulsory health insurance program
designed to improve the equity and efficiency of its health care system. Initially, the program
focused on the industrial sector, but then it was gradually expanded to cover government
workers and rural and urban self-employed populations. By July 1989, the entire population
was covered by national health insurance (NHI).
The introduction of the NHI system has created many changes in the health care sector.
Traditionally, health care was financed mainly by user charges, and the government made
little effort to intervene in the health care market. The predominantly free-market system of
old is now giving way to public intervention. In addition, people are able to consume more
medical services and demand higher-quality care, and the needs of the working class and
poor population are being better met. Also, new technologies are being imported aggres-
sively and competitively, and the quality of health care is improving.
These changes have not been without their costs. The claims for resources in the health
care sector have increased sharply in recent years because of a rapid rise in health care costs.
As a result, the health insurance system now appears to be drifting away from the primary
objective of social insurance, namely, to attain social equity. The changes and the impact of
health insurance in Korea, along with its prospects for the future, are the subject of this
chapter. It covers recent trends in health status, the method of NHI financing, the structure
and organization of the health care market, the payment system, and the drawbacks of the
NHI program.
Trends in Health Status
In the past three decades health status in Korea has improved tremendously. Between 1965
and 1985 alone, the average life expectancy at birth increased from age fifty-five to sixty-five
for males and from fifty-eight to seventy-one for females. The crude death rate per 1,000
people fell from 14.0 in 1960 to 6.2 in 1985 (MHSA, various years).'
Like many other countries, Korea has experienced a significant change in the pattern of
morbidity and mortality in recent times. As is evident from table 4-1, noncommunicable
diseases are now the leading cause of death. Furthermore, the proportion of the population
that is age sixty-five or older has increased: from 3.5 percent in 1975 to 4.7 percent in 1990.
The proportion is expected to reach 6.2 percent by the year 2000 (Economic Planning Board,
various years).
The aging and morbidity patterns suggest that the health care costs incurred to prevent,
diagnose, and treat illnesses associated with aging and chronic disorders will increase. If it
is assumed that all other cost-inducing factors are held constant, resources will come under
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Table 4-1. Change in Rank of Five Leading Causes of Death, 1933-88
Cautses of death 1933 1941 1965 1988
Infectious and parasitic disease 3 4 4
Malignant neoplasms 5 2
Disease of the circulatory system 5 * * 1
Disease of the respiratory system 4 2 1 5
Disease of the digestive system 2 1 2 4
Disease of the nervous system and 1 3 3 3
sensory organs, injury, and poisoning
*Not one of the five leading causes.
Soturce: Kim (1989), pp. 155-74.
a great deal of pressure from these additional health care needs. How to finance these new
requirements has now become an urgent question for Korea's health care system and its
economy. The central concern for policymakers is not only the expenditures generated by
vulnerable population groups but also the ability of the productive population to support
such outlays.
Korea's Health Care System
Over the past century, the health care system of Korea developed along Western lines. A
substantial change is now taking place with the introduction of national health insurance.
The changes are most evident in the financing of health care, the role of the government,
consumer access to health services, the market structure, and health care expenditures. The
following description of the system focuses on the kinds of insurance offered, the market
structure, and method of payment.
Health Insurance
The Korean government has mandated that all citizens must be insured for health services.
About 90 percent of the population is covered by insurance schemes and the remaining 10
percent (that is, those below the poverty line) by government-initiated public assistance
programs. The insured must pay a share of the insurance premium. One group of plans
covers the corporate sector and civil servants; in this case, the amount of each employee's
premium is a fixed percentage of the nominal wage, which has been set at 3.4 percent for
the former and 4.6 percent for the latter. Another group consists of urban and rural regional
programs; here, the amount of each household's monthly contribution is determined by the
income class it belongs to, as assessed from the family's total assets and wage earnings.
Korea has 313 independent nonprofit corporate and regional insurance societies (also
known as sickness funds). Each society has its own administrative structure and is respon-
sible for financing all the recurrent expenses of its members, including benefits. In practice,
however, the societies do not have much managerial control, since all of them receive their
rules and guidelines from the central authority. Thus there is little room for competition
among insurers or for innovative management within each society.
Administrative functions-including claims processing and payment, data collection,
and program monitoring-are handled by the Korean Medical Insurance Corporation and
the Federation of Korean Medical Insurance Societies, the two conglomerate bodies estab-
lished to oversee the administration of all insurance societies. Occasionally, they examine
the appropriateness of filed claims and if necessary require adjustments to be made on the
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basis of a professional committee's review. Since their operations are closely monitored by
the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, they can be considered agencies of the govern-
ment.
The government determines the extent and the level of benefits. Basically, most outpatient
and inpatient services are covered by health insurance. Many less common, high-cost
services are excluded. Most of these are new or expensive high-technology procedures such
as CAT scanning. Providers charge unregulated market prices for noninsured services,
while government-controlled prices are applied for insurance-covered services.
Three types of cost-sharing mechanisms are incorporated into each plan. The first is a
deductible, which is applied to each unit of service. For example, patients pay a flat fee of
about US$4 for each visit to a physician. In addition, they pay coinsurance rates of 30 percent
for clinic outpatient services, 50 percent for hospital outpatient services, and 55 percent for
general hospital outpatient services. The coinsurance rate for inpatient services is 20 percent
across all types of providers. The third cost-sharing feature is the benefit limit. The sickness
funds pay a maximum of 180 hospital days per year. Special fees are charged for treatments
from senior physicians at general hospitals. Since such fees are outside the domain of
insurance coverage, patients end up paying a much greater amount than that reported to
the insurance societies. Although this is not a cost-sharing device under the insurance
scheme, patients could view it as an additional price increase for higher-quality services.
The bulk of health care financing comes from private sources in the form of premiums,
coinsurance payments, deductibles, and 3ther kinds of user charges. The effective coinsur-
ance rate, sum of deductibles, and coinsurance payments for outpatient visits are shown in
table 4-2. The coinsurance rate is about 62.0 percent for general hospitals, 65.0 percent for
other hospitals, and 41.2 percent for clinics. When customary out-of-pocket cash payments
as "thank-you" gifts to physicians and nurses are taken into account, the effective rate for
inpatient services rendered by many hospitals could well exceed 20 percent. In most cases,
patients or their families pay such compensation against their will. These payments occur
outside the insurance and tax systems. Effective rates experienced a sudden increase in 1986,
when the deductible system was added to the existing coinsurance system. Another rate
increase was due at the time of writing because of an expected 10 percent rise in the flat fee
for various physician services.
Market Structure and Organization
Korea has a strong profit-oriented private sector, which has been growing rapidly since the
increase in per capita income of recent years and the expansion of the health insurance
system. In 1975, two years before the health insurance programs were introduced, 34.5
percent of all hospitals were public institutions. By 1987 the share had dropped to 12.6
percent. More than 87 percent are now owned and operated by the private sector (Korean
Hospital Association 1988). Table4-3 shows how total health care resources were distributed
in the public and private sectors in 1985.
With the introduction of health insurance, the role of public hospitals has changed. Many
such hospitals have lost private and insurance patients to private hospitals and are taking
on an increasing number of the beneficiaries of public assistance programs. At the same
time, the national hospitals established in the 1950s to treat tuberculosis and mental illness
continue to operate in the same manner, since there is still a need to separate services of this
kind.
The aggregate supply of hospital beds and physicians and their distribution across
regions are shown in table 4-4. Korea has 2.2 hospital beds and 0.5 physicians per 1,000
population. These figures are much lower than in Western nations. Slightly more than 52
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Table 4-2. Effective Coinsurance Rate for Outpatient Services, 1985-87
(percent)
Service 1985 1986 1987
General hospital 50 60.1 62.0
Hospital 50 62.1 65.0
Clinic 30 40.3 41.2
Souirce: KMIC (1989a).
percent of all hospital beds and 61 percent of all physicians are located in the four major
urban areas, where about 40 percent of the population lives. About 8 percent of physicians
are located in rural areas, where 34.6 percent of the population lives.
as in Japan, physicians in Korea can prescribe and dispense drugs. Private physicians and
hospital outpatient departments generate much of their revenue by dispensing drugs.
Pharmacists can sell any kind of drug to consumers without a doctor's prescription. There
are incentives for physicians to prescribe drugs and to generate a greater number of visits.
Similar incentives exist for pharmacists. As a result, about 30-35 percent of health care
expenditures now go for drug consumption each year (KMIC various years). These figures
would be even higher if personal expenditure on over-the-counter drugs and medical
sundries dispensed through retail channels were included.
Up until 1988 patients were free to choose physicians and hospitals, and to choose
between clinics and hospitals. In July 1989, however, Korea established a referral system
requiring people to seek care from clinics first. Now they cannot visit hospitals without a
letter of referral from a clinic. This change should lead people to use more clinic services
and fewer hospital services.
Payment System
Patients pay a fee for all services at all referral levels. This is the predominant method of
paying physicians for clinic services. Hospital physicians are paid a salary, and those at
private hospitals are occasionally paid a bonus based on their performance.
Table 4-3. Private and Public Health Resources, 1985
(number)
Service Privately owned Puiblic Total
Healthfacilities
Hospitals 444 (89.2) 54 (10.8) 498 (100.0)
Clinics 24,535 (88.6) 3,168 (11.4) 27,703 (100.0)
Pharmacies 16,097 (100.0) - 16,097 (100.0)
Hospital beds 59,608 (80.2) 14,757 (19.8) 74,365 (100.0)
Health manpower
General practitioners 7,074 (82.5) 1,505 (17.5) 8,579 (100.0)
Specialists 9,947 (88.4) 1,309 (11.6) 11,256 (100.0)
- Not available.
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total. Clinics include health centers, health
subcenters, and primary health care posts.
Souirce: Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 1987 Yearbook of Health and Social Statistics; and Special
Reports by Korean Medical Association and Korean Hospital Association.
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Table 4-4. Distribution of Health Resources: Hospital Beds and Physicians
Seoul Three major
Resource (capital city) citiesa All other cities Rutral area Total
Population (thousands) 9,639 6,932 9,872 14,006 40,448
(23.8) (17.1) (24.4) (34.6) (100.0)
Number of physiciartsb 8,817 4,431 6,681 1,697 21,626
(40.8) (20.5) (30.9) (7.8) (100.0)
Physicians per 100,000
population 91.47 63.92 67.67 12.12 53.47
Number of hospital beds 27,271 17,026 - - 89,463
(30.5) (19.0) (100.0)
Beds per 100,000 population 282.9 245.6 - - 221.2
- Not available.
Note: Population and physician figures are for 1985; hospital beds for 1988. Figures in parentheses
are percentages of the total.
a. The three major cities are Pusan, Taegu, and Incheon.
b. Traditional herb doctors are not included in the physician calculation.
Source: KMIC (1988) for hospital beds and population; Insurance Claims File Tape, Korea Medical
Insurance Corporation, for active number of physicians.
Providers (hospitals and clinics) are reimbursed for insurance-covered services according
to a set of fee schedules. The govemment plays a role in setting the fee schedules, although
the level is negotiated by all parties concerned. The government sets fees on a cost-plus basis
at a level that allows most providers to earn a profit. Fee schedules are reviewed annually
to consider factors such as changes in the consumer price index, in profit margins of sampled
providers, in the wage levels of medical personnel, and in other costs of production.
The fee schedule seems to offer generous rates, although no study has yet been done to
assess the adequacy and reasonableness of current fee schedules. A recent study of physician
income based on the claims files of private physicians in six districts (one urban and five
rural) indicates an average annual revenue of 88.92 million won (equivalent to US$132,717)
per private practicing physician in 1986 (KIPH 1987). When estimated production costs (for
example, for rent, employee compensation, supplies, and capital equipment) of 24 million
won (US$35,874) are subtracted, the net income is on average US$96,843, which is thirteen
tirnes the average annual wage of all Koreans: the average household annual income in 1988
was US$7,720. This difference is in marked contrast to that in the United States, Japan, and
the United Kingdom, where the ratio of physician incomes to average employee incomes in
1981 was 5.1, 4.7, and 2.4, respectively.
Evolution of National Health Insurance
Tu o interesting aspects of the Korean case are the way in which health insurance evolved
and the factors that precipitated the change.
Gradual Expansion of Compulsory Health Insurance
The first step toward a health insurance system was the Health Insurance Act of December
1963, which was passed at a time when Korea's per capita GNP was still below US$100. This
legislation was primarily aimed at introducing voluntary coverage. Because financial re-
sources were limited, however, participation was low and little was accomplished. At first,
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the compulsory social security program for health care applied only to corporations hiring
500 or more workers. In 1983 the corporate health insurance program was extended to firms
hiring sixteen or more employees. Since the program required contributions by individuals
and employers, it appealed to the health authorities, who were starved of funds and doubted
that they would ever obtain revenue from government sources.
A special program for civil servants and private school teachers began in January 1979.
In January 1980, this program was extended to families of military personnel and pension-
ers. Next, Korea introduced an occupational health insurance program in December 1981
to cover groups of self-employed workers within the same occupation, although it operated
on a voluntary basis. In January 1988 it initiated a rural regional health insurance program
for people in farming and fishing occupations. Finally, a program to cover self-employed
and unemployed people in urban areas was established in July 1989 to cover the only
remaining group excluded from insurance benefits.
In addition to the health insurance schemes, the government finances two public assis-
tance programs for medical care: medical aid for the destitute and medical assistance for
low-income individuals. The first category of beneficiaries consists of individuals who are
extremely poor or those living in public facilities, such as the homeless and elderly. The
second category includes individuals whose income and assets, along with other eligibility
characteristics, fall below a specific nominal standard.
Since national health insurance was introduced, there have been three sudden increases
in the number of total beneficiaries: in 1981, when self-employed workers within the same
occupation were included; in 1988, when the rural insurance program was introduced; and
in 1989, when self-employed and unemployed urban residents gained coverage (see table
4-5). Thus over the past decade and a half, the government has obviously made a concerted
effort to improve and promote its health insurance programs.
Under the new system of universal health insurance, attitudes toward health care have
changed greatly. Many Koreans now regard health care as one of their fundamental rights.
Unlike other goods or services, these services are considered essential to human survival,
regardless of wealth or social standing, and therefore everyone in the population is assumed
to be entitled to some minimum level of these services.
The new system also subjects providers to many constraints and thus has reduced their
autonomy, particularly in the matter of fees. Physician and hospital charges are contingent
on the government's fixed-fee schedules, and Ministry of Health approval is now required
before hospitals can acquire certain equipment and expand or become established in certain
areas.
For the government, the transition implies greater financial and social obligations. Even
if the economy were to slow down in the future, it would be difficult for the government to
cut health insurance budgets or reduce benefits because people have become accustomed
to these benefits and would not accept such reductions. On the contrary, the government is
likely to face an even greater burden as certain groups, such as the elderly and handicapped,
demand their fair share of the pie.
Factors that Led to the Establishment of National Health Insurance
The Korean government established the national health insurance system over a period of
thirteen years and in the process met with little resistance, either politically, economically,
or socially. Several factors account for this relatively smooth transition.
First, the fact that the Democratic People's Republic to the north provided health care free
of charge for all its citizens, whereas the Republic of Korea did not, became an important
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Table 4-5. Health Care Security Coverage by Type of Program, 1977-89
(thoutsands of persons)
Progranm 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1988 1989
A. Total population 36,437 37,606 38,724 39,951 41,209 42,082 42,593 42,886
B. Total beneficiaries
(C + D) 5,298 9,923 15,134 19,298 21,136 25,643 32,588 42,886
B/A (14.5) (26.4) (39.1) (48.3) (51.3) (61.0) (76.5) (100.0)
C. Health insurance 3,203 7,789 11,407 15,570 17,878 21,257 28,298 38,640
C/A (8.8) (20.7) (29.5) (39.0) (43.4) (50.6) (66.4) (91.0)
D. Public assistance 2,095 2,134 3,727 3,728 3,258 4,368 4,290 4,246
D/A (5.7) (5.7) (9.6) (9.3) (7.9) (10.4) (10.1) (9.0)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentages of total populations. All 1989 statistics are estimated
figures. Households that refused to pay premiums were taken into accountin the 1989 total beneficiary
categoly.
Souirce: Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, Yearbook of Health and Social Statistics for 1977-87; other
government sources for 1988-89.
political issue. Korea felt it had to introduce a comparable structure that would guarantee
an equitable opportunity of health care use for all its social classes. Competition between
the two Koreas contributed significantly to the move that culminated in mandatory health
insurance legislation in the mid-1970s.
Second, with the rapid industrialization of the 1960s, people began to recognize that some
of the physical hardships they had to endure were not solely their fault. Exercising their
voting rights, people in the workplace demanded health insurance schemes that would
require employers to contribute to the premiums.
Third, unilateral government policies promoting economic growth during the period
1960-76 created an unequal distribution of wealth among social classes and raised social
equity issues. To avoid conflict among the classes, the government introduced the concept
of social welfare into its policy agenda. The first outcome of this new policy orientation was
the new health insurance program. The government and the leading political party strongly
supported the idea in the hope that it could help remedy the inequities, the injustice, and
the economic burden that illness imposed in a society undergoing rapid industrialization.
Fourth, the idea that health insurance coverage should be expanded met with public
approval and thus quickly became an important political issue. As the gap in health care
utilization between the insured and the uninsured widened in the early 1980s, the majority
of the uninsured pressed politicians to expand the existing health insurance programs.
Politicians responded positively, especially those in the leading Democratic Justice Party.
Fifth, the growing economy made the expansion of health insurance programs feasible.
As the GNP and per capital disposable income increased, not only was the government able
to finance part of the expenditures of the schemes, but people could afford to pay the
premiums and other related expenses. (Under the corporate program, premiums are shared
equally between employees and employers, and under the urban and rural program they
are shared equally by the government and the insured.) The number of beneficiaries rose
noticeably in 1988 and 1989 (see table 4-5) because people were willing to pay the premiums,
and the government promised it would be responsible for part of the expenses incurred.
Sixth, as expenditures climbed to cover the increased use of health services and rising
medical fees, consumers still prcferred to be insured rather than face the risks of being
uninsured. In general, the public raised few objections to the proposals for a universal health
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care security system, although some questioned whether a tax-financed system or one
financed by premiums and user fees was more appropriate. The consensus was that every
Korean should have health insurance and that the financial burden of the system should be
shared fairly among all levels of society.
The drive toward universal health insurance also had the advantage of being backed by
a strong public executive and a "regulation-oriented" intellectual tradition. And since there
was no dominant private insurance to block any reform endeavor, the government could
easily move forward toward its goal.
All these changes were the product of Korea's development from an agrarian to an
industrial society. Consumers approved the idea of universal health insurance; upon
recognizing the public mood, politicians pushed forward with it; the growing economy gave
it financial support; and the market economy put no significant obstacles in its way. Despite
this widespread support, little analytical work was conducted to pave the way for universal
health insurance. The government did not have much information on the possible impacts
of such insurance, and in setting up its fee schedules it simply borrowed the Japanese setup,
with a few slight modifications. Consequently, the appropriateness of the relative value
scale continues to be a source of controversy between the government and provider groups.
Evaluations after the fact are now being conducted to provide guidance for possible
reforms that may be required to sustain the progress toward social equity and improve the
efficiency of resource use in the health care sector. Evaluations are being conducted by
research institutions, government agencies, consumer groups, academicians, provider
groups, politicians, and others. It has been difficult to reach a consensus on the nature and
the extent of these reforms, however, because each of these groups is pursuing its own
interests only. The principal problem is that the government, which is the ultimate
decisionmaker in health policies, has yet to determine its position on the matter. Yet most
Koreans would agree that reform is necessary, owing to a variety of problems.
Problems with the System
Some of these problems are directly related to the structure of the Korean system itself.
Others are the indirect result of the profit-pursuing activities of the health industry, particularly
the pharmaceutical companies, for-profit hospitals, and medical supply companies.
Inflation
Rising health care costs are now viewed as a problem in Korea. The health care system has
embarked on an inflationary path by choice, not simply because people are demanding more
health care services, but because the system is structured in a way that encourages the degree
of service and consumption to expand and that promotes more expensive services. One of
the problems is that no clear lines have been drawn between the roles of general hospitals,
other hospitals, and local clinics. Thus although most general hospitals are designed to treat
complex problems, many deliver primary care services to ambulatory patients through their
clinics and emergency rooms, while many general practitioners provide both inpatient and
outpatient services and have every incentive to hold the patients as long as possible. As it
stands, the system puts less emphasis on cost consciousness and more on waste, and the
end result has been a rapid increase in health care expenditures.
Between 1975 and 1985 the health care share of the total economy increased from 2.8
percent to 4.24 percent (table 4-6), with an annual rate of increase of about 28 percent (KMIS
1989).2 The ratio remained fairly stable from 1975 to 1980, but then increased rapidly in the
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Table 4-6. Total Health Care Expenditures as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product,
1975-89
Item 1975 1978 1980 1983 1985 1989
NHE/GDP 2.84 2.88 2.96 3.60 4.24 6.20
Note: The 1989 figure is an estimate based on rough calculation.
Soutrce: Bank of Korea, Inputt-Oiutpiut Tables, various years.
1980s. The fact that about 80 percent of total beneficiaries came under insurance coverage
on or after 1979 might suggest that the rapid increases in the 1980-85 period should be
attributed to the expansion of insurance schemes. As table 4-7 illustrates, the nominal
increases before 1980 w ±re largely due to the changes in GNP deflators, whereas most of
the changes after 1980 were due to real expenditure changes. It has also been estimated that
with the increasing and continuous expansion of insurance coverage, the share of national
health expenditure in GDP could easily rise even further.
Many factors have contributed to the rapid increase in national health expenditures. A
substantial part of the total cost escalation is attributable to the increase in cost per case. The
treatment cost per case has gone up 2.8 times for inpatient services and 1.8 times for
outpatients services over the past decade, whereas the consumer price index has gone up
60 percent for the same period (KMIC, Statistical Yearbook, various years). On the supply
side, the cost per case has gone up because physicians tend to promote more return visits
per case to compensate for the probable losses in income from controlled fees. On the
demand side, patients who pay less with insurance ask for higher-quality and expensive
services.
To complicate matters, the population has increased, age distribution has changed, and
personal income has gone up. All of these factors have pushed up the demand for health
care services. Utilization data show that the number of outpatient cases per capita per year
rose from 1.79 in 1980 to 3.27 in 1988, and that the hospital admission rate increased from
0.048 to 0.067 over the same period (see table 4-8). These data suggest that something needs
to be done before it is too late.3
Inequity
With the advent of national health insurance, more and more resources are being poured
into the health sector, which means that the shortage of health personnel and supplies is
Table 4-7. Decomposition of Health Spending Increases
(compountded annuial growth rate, percent)
Real expenditure
Nominal Utilizatiorl!
Year expendituire GNP deflator Demography intensity
1975-80 32 24.2 7.8
(1.55) (6.3)
1980-85 25 8.2 16.8
(1.36) (15.4)
Souirce: Nominal expenditure from KMIC study (1989); GNP deflator and population data from
Economic Planning Board, Statistical Yearbook, various years.
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Table 4-8. Change in Health Care Utilizations from 1980 to 1988
Costs per case (thotusands of won) Cases per capita
Year Ouitpatient service Inpatient sertvice Outpatient service Inpatient service
1980 7.6 137.3 1.785 0.048
1981 8.3 151.5 2.154 0.056
1982 9.7 186.3 2.344 0.061
1983 10.6 222.4 2.647 0.061
1984 11.2 252.0 3.008 0.062
1985 12.0 277.6 3.077 0.063
1986 12.3 293.0 2.939 0.064
1987 12.5 305.4 3.164 0.068
1988 13.7 350.4 3.272 0.067
Souirce: KMIC (1988).
less of a problem than in the past. Instead, the distribution of resources has become the
central concern. On one hand, not enough resources are available in rural areas, but on the
other hand, there seems to be an excess supply in urban areas. Even though the number of
physicians (in relation to population growth) has steadily increased since 1974, most of the
rural areas have not benefited, because physicians who newly enter the market prefer to
work in large urban areas. As a result, physicians and health-related facilities are still in
short supply in rural areas. The people in remote areas also have to contend with financial
problems, as well as poor accessibility to health care services. Today 35 percent of the rural
population is being served by only 7.8 percent of physicians.
Another problem is that Korea has high coinsurance rates (table 4-2). Indeed, they are
among the highest such rates in the world. Although a high coinsurance rate is useful in
helping to reduce moral hazard, it is hardly consistent with the principle of social insurance
that Korea has adopted. Instead, the individual is being asked to pay a substantial propor-
tion of the service charges. When the coinsurance rate is applied irrespective of family
income, as in the case of Korea, it represents a greater burden to low-income families than
to high-income families. The care needed by high-risk, low-income households is blocked
because of financial barriers, whereas the high-income groups are seldom affected (see table
4-9).
Yet another equity problem stems from Korea's two-class system of health care: one for
the rich and another for the poor. Those who cannot afford noncovered expensive high-tech
services, thank-you gifts to physicians and nurses, or special treatment charges have to settle
for lower-quality services. As previously noted, patients who want to be treated by a regular
staff physician in a hospital have to pay extra for that special treatment. If they cannot afford
the additional charges, a less-experienced intern or a resident is automatically assigned to
them. The situation is even worse for the beneficiaries of public assistance programs. Their
requests for care are often denied or they receive minimal services.
Inefficiency in Insurance Administration
Korea's health care system has run into two main kinds of insurance administration
problems. First, each insurance society has its own director and managers, most of whom
are government-appointed employees. Despite their position, they do very little manage-
ment and have little incentive to do a good job. Rather, they consume precious economic
resources through high salaries and extensive fringe benefits. Second, the size of the
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Table 4-9. Per Capita Health Service Utilization by Income Classes
(year= 1987)
Income class Cases/inszlred
1-5 1.63
6-10 1.91
11-15 2.48
16-20 2.97
21-25 3.64
26-30 3.27
31-35 3.08
36-40 2.94
41-45 3.17
< 46 3.77
Note: 1-5 = lowest income group; 46 = highest income group.
Soutrce: KMIC (1988).
insurance societies creates further inefficiencies. The system is currently structured so that
a large number of small insurers each cover only a small fraction of the population (there
are about 30,000 to 200,000 people covered in each society). Under such an arrangement, the
system can hardly realize economies of scale. A recent cross-sectional econometric study
based on data for 1984 and 1986 found that per capita administrative costs would be lowest
for a population of about 1.7 million (Yang and Lee 1988). This implies that a dramatic cost
saving can be attained through a restructuring of the societies.4
Under the circumstances, it is not surprising to find that a considerable fraction of total
revenue is devoted to administrative costs.5 The proportion of administrative costs to total
revenue is well in excess of 10 percent on average, and in 1988 went as high as 22 percent
in the case of regional health insurance, according to an intemal report from the Korean
Medical Insurance Corporation (1989b). Thissuggests ahigh degree of inefficiency in system
operations, especially when compared with the 1.5 percent level in Canada and 2.6 percent
level in the United Kingdom (Hatcher and others 1984; Himmelstein and Woolhandler
1986).
Inequitable Risk Pooling
Since there are many small insurance funds, each covering a small fraction of the population
and a small geographic area, some serve predominantly healthy populations in wealthy
communities, whereas others serve poor communities at high risk. This implies that the
results will be inequitable even if risk among beneficiaries was pooled. Therefore the
financial burden of insurance payments is likely to fall heavily on poor communities, unless
a mechanism for the intersociety transfer of funds is adopted.
Resistance to Compulsory Insurance Programs
Some groups, including the urban poor and farming families, have expressed considerable
opposition to the mandatory insurance system. They argue that the scale of contributions
is regressive rather than progressive and thus is unfair. Even though the amount of each
household's monthly contribution is determined by the income class it belongs to, which is
determined from tax records, Korea's tax system has given rise to a large underground
economy. Thus it may be difficult for insurance societies to obtain contributions from each
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household. Some households also point out that they rarely seek medical services. Even
when they decide tc do so, appropriate providers are not available. Still others argue that
user charges are often too high.
In 1988,19 percent of rural households and in 1989,29 percent of households in the urban
program refused to pay premiums or to join any health insurance schemes (KMIC 1989a).
If such resistance to compulsory insurance persists, the insurance funds could eventually
dry up.
The government sets fees on a cost-plus basis at a level that allows most hospitals to earn
a profit. In the long run, this arrangement gives providers little incentive to be efficient.
Instead, it rewards cost-increasing behaviors. No matter how inefficient providers may be,
their survival is in a sense guaranteed by the government-set prices. By investing in new
technology and hiring more personnel, hospitals can increase their costs and then be fully
rewarded as the government allows another fee increase. In other words, providers have
no economic incentive to control costs.
Price control also generates demand among the providers. In order to compensate for
possible revenue losses from fee controls, physicians increase the volume of their services.
It is unusual nowadays to find general practitioners and specialists in private practice who
give patients more than a one-time prescription. Such practices put a heavy burden on
patients, not only in terms of money but also of time. This is not to say that physicians or
hospitals are the only ones to blame, but they are a part of a system whose incentives are
clearly backward.
Significant increases in patient days of hospitalization and in the number of outpatient
visits per illness episode have occurred since 1980. In the years between 1980 and 1988, for
example, the average period of hospitalization for inpatients rose from 8.59 days to 13.39
days. Over the same period, the average number of physician visits per outpatient almost
doubled, from 2.72 visits to 4.93 visits (KMIC 1988). Whether the increases are primarily the
physicians' doing or the result of the increased complexity of the illnesses treated is arguable.
Still, it is undeniable that physicians have played some role in causing the changes.
New Technologies
The private sector has recently invested in medical facilities and high-tech equipment
without much resistance from the government or the public. Many of the new technologies
are seldom used but add considerable costs to hospital operations (Korea Development
Institute 1989). Newspapers have called such wasteful hospital behavior "high-tech for
display, but not for use."
The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs formed a special conumittee to address ineffi-
ciencies such as the duplication of facilities and services and excess capacities in the hospital
sector. Hospitals are now required to secure the approval of the committee for major new
hospital investments. For example, the construction of new hospitals in urban areas and
acquisition of expensive high-tech equipment at all hospitals have come under government
regulation.
The committee has been rather ineffective in reducing inefficiencies in the hospital sector,
however. The duplication of sophisticated technologies and excess capacities have become
even more common in recent years. The extent of the latter problem becomes even clearer
when it is compared with the situation in other countries. To mention just a few examples,
Korea has thirty-eight hospitals with approved heart transplant racilities, whereas the
Canadian government has approved fewer than thirty-two heart transplant centers. Almost
all Korean hospitals with more than 200 beds have at least one CAT scanner and there are
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twenty-six that can provide extracorporial shock-wave lithotripsy treatmnent, whereas only
four centers in the whole of Canada offer such treatment.
Lack of Policy on Drug Distibution
In 1988 the government tried to divide the role of drug distribution between pharmacists
and physicians by making physicians the prescriber and pharmacists the dispenser. Both
parties were afraid of losing revenue, as they believed drug consumption would fall under
the new policy, and they flatly turned down the government proposal, leaving the public
as the only loser. With the highly aggressive pharmaceutical companies and profit-oriented
providers holding political clout, public-oriented drug policies are not likely to develop in
Korea, at least in the near future.
Concluding Comments
The Korean health care system is dominated by private providers pursuing both economic
profit and professional autonomy. At the same time, the government has installed regula-
tory mechanisms in order to meet the public's demand for improved health care provision.
These government policies, influenced by providers, are often ineffective and usually end
up protecting providers at the expense of consumers. For example, when the system was
jeopardized by a shortage of insurance funds in 1985, the government, by raising coinsur-
ance rates, urged the public (especially the poor) to use fewer health services. The same
situation occurred in 1990, thereby raising effective coinsurance rates further. When the
providers' profit margins fell as a result of competitive high-tech purchases among provid-
ers, the government allowed another substantial increase in the reimbursement rate, but this
only added to the consumers' financial burden.
In sum, the position of the public, especially of the poor population, is not given as much
attention as it deserves in the Korean health care system. Thus the system may not be the
best one for other countries to emulate. The unusual structure, with social insurance in the
form of typical private insurance, would bring about neither equity nor efficiency, and
unless the incentives were changed, it would not be too successful.
Korea had an opportunity to build a sound health care system through reform at the time
that the national health insurance program was pouring additional resources into it. Now
that the program has been fully implemented, it may be difficult to achieve even minor
reforms in the system.
Yet unless basic reforms are initiated, resources will continue to be wasted, health care
expenditures will continue to rise, insurance coverage will be reduced, and low-income
famnilies will have less access to the care they need. These problems will become more
widespread and more intolerable in the future. Thus Korea now needs to focus its attention
on two critical policy questions: What organizational pattern provides health care providers
with the incentive to be cost-effective and to look for ways to deliver better care at less cost?
and Which organizational and financing mechanism meets Korea's equity objectives?
Korea's national health insurance funds, which are a by-product of an ideologically and
politically motivated social movement over the past_decade, have helped reshape the
Korean health care system. They could certainly be a giant step toward health for all, but
only if they are managed with an eye to the issues outlined above. From the experience of
other countries, it appears that some strategies are available to lead the system in the right
direction. The question is whether the government and the health sector fully recognize the
significance of the current situation and are willing to pursue new strategies. If they are not,
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their great accomplishment thus far-Korea's national health insurance societies-will fail
to function to the benefit of all.
Notes
1. The extent to which these health improvements are attributable to health service interventions or
to improvements in diet, sanitation, and other aspects of the standard of living has not yet been
established.
2. The period 1975-85 is the most recent one for which the Bank of Korea has complete input-output
data for all sectors of the economy. This is also the period in which the Korean economy recorded
unprecedented high growth rates. The increasing share of health out of GDP therefore indicates how
fast the health sector expanded during the period.
3. Anderson (1989) argues that Koreans recognize the need for cost containment and know that a
higher percentage of their wages will be deducted unless they control health care utilization. There
seems to be little evidence to support his argument, however. Since most health insurance is obtained
through the job and half of the premium is paid by employers, savings from lower premiums from
reduced utilization would not accrue to individuals directly. Therefore, the incentive for them to be
premium conscious is not large. The same can be said of regional health insurance, where half of the
premium and part of the administration costs are paid by the government. Whatever the program, the
premium in itself is not meaningful when compared with the large amount of user charges. Few
Koreans are even fully aware of the cost containment issue. Even those who are tend to ask the
government to be responsible for cost increases. Furthermore, there is no sign of voluntary utilization
control at any level of society. If there is any, it is due to high coinsurance rates.
4. Whether reshuffling of the insurance societies is politically acceptable is beyond the scope of this
discussion. However, the issue has recently been debated in Congress and in academic societies. A
government decision on the issue is yet to be made.
5. Anderson (1989) has estimated that insurance societies are able to limit their administrative costs
to less than 5 percent of revenues, but this figure seems doubtful, especially when one takes into
account the salaries paid to government-appointed administrators and other expenditures.
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The Canadian Health Care System:
Where Are We and How Did We Get Here?
Robert G. Evans and Maureen M. Law
Canada's system of universal public insurance for health care is by a considerable margin
the nation's most successful and popular public program. Far more than just an adminis-
trative mechanism for paying medical bills, it is widely regarded as an important symbol of
community, a concrete representation of mutual support and concern. In a nation subject
to strong divisive forces rooted in both geography and history, the health insurance system
is an important unifying idea as well as an institution. It expresses a fundamental equality
of Canadian citizens in the face of disease and death, and a commitment that the rest of the
community, through the public system, will help each individual with these problems as
far as it can. As David Peterson, the premier of Ontario, pointed out at the opening of the
International Conference on Quality Assurance and Effectiveness in Health Care in 1989,
"There is no social program that we have that more defines Canadianism or that is more
important to the people of our country."
Historical Account
Canada's program has passed through several stages, which can be defined as the early
efforts of the 1930s and 1940s, the Saskatchewan program of 1946, the national hospital
program of 1945-56, the national hospital program from 1956 on, the Saskatchewan insur-
ance plan of 1961, the financing arrangements of 1977, and the Canada Health Act of 1984.
The Early Efforts (1930s and 1940s)
A national health insurance program had first been promised by the Liberal Party during
the election campaign of 1919. Despite the party's success at the polls in that election, the
first serious public discussion of public financing for health care did not really begin on a
national level until 1937. In that year the Report of the Rowell-Sirois Commission (Canada
1937), an important Royal Commission that examined all aspects of federal-provincial
relations, recommended the development of "state medicine and state hospitalization or
health insurance." It declared that such programs should be a provincial responsibility.
These recommendations were to have a major impact on the thinking of future federal and
provincial governments concerning the possible options for the creation of a "national"
health financing program.1
Over the next eight years, there were several federal committees, of both politicians and
public servants, to discuss the possibilities for public financing of health care. The Beveridge
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Report (1942) in the United Kingdom was very influential. These committees wrestled with
some difficult questions.
First, since the Canadian constitution assigns health care matters almost exclusively to
provincial jurisdiction, how would it be possible to create a program that all provinces
would support or could afford? Would it be possible to achieve a constitutional amendment
that would permit the federal government to mount the program?
Second, what would such a program cost? Although income tax data were available on
physicians' incomes and the Dominion Bureau of Statistics had data on hospital costs, no
one knew what would happen to utilization following the introduction of public financing.
Third, how should revenue be collected? The "insurance" approach that was always
envisaged would require some kind of poll tax. It was thought that this could be collected
through employers, but what about the unemployed and the retired? The cost of having to
register everyone and collect premiums was considered too complicated and costly. And
who would pay for those would could not pay for themselves?
Fourth, should the program cover only the poor, leaving those who could afford it to
cover themselves with voluntary, private insurance?
Fifth, what would be the reaction of the medical profession? The Canadian Medical
Association (CMA) had also begun to debate the subject. Its first statement on the subject
came in 1939 when it declared that it was not able to speak for its members on this because
the members were not sufficiently familiar with such plans to take a position. By 1943,
however, they were ready to endorse two resolutions:
1. The CMA approves the adoption of the principle of health insurance.
2. The CMA favours a plan of health insurance which will secure the development and
provision of the highest standard of health services, preventive and curative, if such
plan be fair both to the insured and to all those rendering the services. (Canadian
Medical Association, 1943)
The doctors spoke of a preference for a plan that would have an income ceiling for
beneficiaries. They also tended to favor a system of capitation payments for general
practitioners and a fee for service for specialists.
Sixth, what would be the reaction of business? A British Columbia proposal for a
provincial program had been scuttled at the last minute owing to the opposition of business
leaders to a new tax. The insurance industry at that time endorsed the concept, provided
that the plan was totally self-financing and that the federal government would pay for those
who could not. Farm and labor organizations were strongly supportive.
Seventh, what would be the reaction of the provinces? In 1944 all provinces agreed to the
concept of comprehensive public health insurance, but they stressed the need for each
province to be free to introduce each benefit as it was able to do so.
Despite these difficult questions, it is striking that the reports of the various government
committees and the statements of the diverse interest groups during that period reflected a
high level of support for comprehensive programs that would include, indeed would
emphasize, preventive measures.
And so it seemed that by 1943 Canada was, after years of discussion, poised to introduce
some form of public health insurance. Throughout 1944, however, a series of federal-pro-
vincial disputes delayed the calling of the meeting planned to introduce the federal propos-
als. Thus it was that these proposals became swept into the wide-ranging plans for the
postwar reconstruction of Canadian society.
Finally, at the historic federal-provincial meeting in August 1945, the federal govemment
unveiled its proposals. These included the following recommendations:
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1. Immediate planning and administration grants were to be provided to assist the
provinces in preparing to implement health insurance.
2. Provinces were to administer a universal, comprehensive, compulsory health insur-
ance program that they would implement by progressive stages, according to an
agreed-upon timetable.
3. The federal government would make a grant of one-fifth of the estimated cost of the
service, plus one-half of the additional actual cost to a maximum of $12.96 per capita.
4. The federal government would provide additional health grants (to provinces that had
implemented the program) for public health purposes.
5. The federal government would provide provinces with hospital construction grants.
Unfortunately, the entire conference collapsed because the participants failed to reach an
agreement over the division of resources between the federal and the provincial govern-
ments, and the health proposals were left if not dead at least in limbo.
The Saskatchewan Hospital Insurance Program (1946)
Following the collapse of these efforts to establish a national program, the action shifted to
the province of Saskatchewan. This was the province hardest hit by the depression. The
sparse population, scarce resources, and dependence upon a single crop resulted in the
development of cooperative agencies not only for the marketing of the wheat but also for
the provision of essential social services. In fact, the cooperative movement flourished in
Saskatchewan as in no other Canadian province, and this form of local initiative was to be
extremely important in the history of health insurance in Canada.
Saskatchewan had already pioneered the municipal doctor schemes, in which general
practitioners were employed, on salary, by rural municipalities. They also had a "union
hospital" system which had (by legislation) grouped municipalities into districts for the
purpose of building and operating hospitals. Some municipalities had even gone beyond
their responsibility for providing care for the indigent to begin collecting local taxes to pay
hospital bills for all of their residents.
In 1944, in anticipation of the federal program, the Saskatchewan government passed
legislation to create a commission to administer a health insurance program in the province,
thus raising public expectations.
When in 1946 the premier announced the government's plan to launch the first com-
prehensive public hospital insurance program in North America, the province was suffering
from severe shortages of health resources, including doctors, nurses, hospital beds, and
financial resources. It was feared that these resources would be completely overwhelmed.
Nevertheless, the premier, Tommy Douglas, had a strong personal commitment to the
enterprise. He was convinced that Saskatchewan would demonstrate the feasibility of public
health insurance, thus facilitating the introduction of the national program and the transfer
of federal resources to the province. As he said in the Saskatchewan legislature,
I made a pledge with myself long before I ever sat in this House, in the years when I
knew something about what it meant to get health services when you didn't have the
money to pay for it. I made a pledge with myself that someday if I ever had anything
to do with it, people would be able to get health services just as they are able to get
education services, as an inalienable right of being a citizen of a Christian country.
(Regina Leader Post, September 1, 1944)
It appears that there was never any thought of introducing a program that would be less
than universal and compulsory.
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With respect to the benefits, it was decided, with the same underlying principle, that all
essential hospital services should be covered and there should be no limit to the number of
benefit days except the criterion of medical necessity. It was assumed that hospitals would
continue to charge extra for private and semiprivate ward accommodation, but that it would
be necessary to ensure that there were an adequate number of standard rate beds available.
The initial cost estimates were made on the basis of existing hospital data and the estimate
of utilization that had been agreed upon at the federal-provincial conference in 1945.
The major factor in the decision about the method of revenue collection was the require-
ment that had been proposed by the federal government of an "insurance" approach-that
is, that a registration fee or premium be paid for each person covered by the plan. The
government therefore decided to contribute an amount equal to what it had been contrib-
uting to hospitals prior to the program and to collect the rest through premiums.
How to pay the hospitals proved to be the most complex of the problems to be resolved.
Certain principles guided the deliberations (Taylor 1978):
1. The hospital services plan would become the chief source of revenue for all hospitals
in the province.
2. It would be impossible to permit a hospital to close through the lack of funds.
3. The earning of a large surplus by any hospital would be undesirable.
4. A system of payment should be one that would encourage efficient operation and promote
improvement in services. It must not subsidize inefficiency, waste, or extravagance.
5. Additional payments by patients for "extras" should be kept at an absolute minimum.
6. Payment should be for operating costs only. Capital costs were to be borne by the
community, with the assistance of provincial construction grants.
It was agreed that the most practical method of payment would be to pay the costs of
operation, but initially this was difficult to determine because of the lack of standard
accounting procedures, and so initially the hospitals were paid according to a point system
in which hospitals were graded on the basis of their size and the setvices they provided.
Administration was assigned to the Health Services Plan Commission, which was com-
posed of public servants.
THE RESULTS. Initially the hospital utilization rate increased even more rapidly than
expected and as a result the costs exceeded considerably the initial cost estimates. There
were a number of important factors behind this: the shortage of physicians and the
difficulties of transportation in the rural areas led to a high rate of hospitalization; the health
of the population was relatively poor because of poverty and large families; there were no
alternative facilities such as nursing homes.
Nevertheless, the program survived these early difficulties, and within a year or two the
plan was working well, and the people of Saskatchewan were convinced that the decision
to proceed without the federal government had been a good one.
All of Canada benefited from the Saskatchewan experience. It has been said that "in the
educational process through which Canadian governments learned how to administer
universal hospital insurance, Saskatchewan paid most of the tuition fees" (Taylor 1978).
The Background to the National Hospital Program (1945-56)
Between 1945 and 1956, the federal government did not renew its health insurance offer to
the provinces. Nevertheless, some important developments took place, in addition to the
introduction of the Saskatchewan program. British Columbia introduced a similar program
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in 1949, but poor design and administration led to some serious early difficulties and
contributed to the defeat of the provincial government in 1952. In 1954 the new government
terminated the effort to collect premiums through both payroll deductions and individual
registration and moved instead to financing from taxation. Alberta introduced a patchwork
program in 1950, which required individual municipalities to opt into the plan, and then
applied indirect pressure to force them to do so. Newfoundland, which became a province
in 1949, brought with it its "cottage hospital system," which provided hospital and physician
services to residents who paid an annual premium. The hospitals were provincially owned
and the doctors were salaried. The system covered the population outside the urban centers
(about half of the total population).
On the negative side, the CMA in 1949 abandoned its earlier support for govemment
health programs in favor of extending voluntary plans to cover all Canadians, with govern-
ments paying the premiums for those who could not afford them. During this period there
was also a rapid expansion of voluntary insurance enrolment. Undoubtedly the most
important development, however, was that Ontario with its great political clout assumed
the leadership role in pressuring the federal government to deliver on its earlier promises
of a national program.
By 1956 the federal government was under strong pressure to act. First, in 1952 a national
sickness survey had demonstrated serious inequities with regard to health status and the
financial burdens resulting from illness. These inequities applied both to socioeconomic
groups and to geographical areas. Second, there were also serious disparities among
provinces, with respect to their ability to provide needed health services. Third, there was
growing political pressure from the public and the provinces for a national program.
At the same time, there remained some important constraints, which included financial
considerations and possible opposition from the Canadian Medical Association and the
Canadian Hospital Association, both of which continued to argue for voluntary, private
schemes with government subsidies for the needy. Finally, there remained the complicated
constitutional issues.
rTe National Hospital Insurance Program (1956)
Despite these obstacles, the federal government offered in 1956 to pay one-half the national
cost of diagnostic services and inpatient hospital care. Certain conditions were attached:
coverage was to be universally available; within an agreed time period diagnostic services
were to be covered for outpatients; coinsurance or "deterrent" charges were to be strictly
limited; capital costs were not included; mental hospitals and tuberculosis sanatoriums
(which were already fully funded by provincial governments) were not included; and the
federal contribution would be 25 percent of each province's sharable costs plus 25 percent
of the average per capita cost for the whole of Canada (so as to permit poorer provinces to
benefit more than the richer provinces).
These provisions were embodied in the federal Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic
Services Act, passed in 1957, under which federal payments began to flow to provinces with
conforming plans. Ontario, the largest province, launched its plan for hospital insurance in
1959. Although nominally "voluntary," the Ontario plan was sufficiently favorable that
within one year it covered 92 percent of the population and within two years 99 percent. In
effect, the Ontario approach was quite similar to the Saskatchewan plan, achieving de facto
universality without explicit compulsion.
One important difference at the outset was that at the time of its introduction, about
two-thirds of Ontario residents had at least some protection against the costs of hospital
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care, mainly through the Ontario Blue Cross Hospital Plan, a subsidiary of the Ontario
Hospital Association. One provision of the government plan was that it would take over
the administrative staff and equipment of that organization, and it spent two years in
strengthening that mechanism before launching the public plan. The Ontario Hospital
Association agreed to limit its insurance activities to coverage for supplemental bene-
fits such as the extra costs of private and semiprivate accommodation. In order to appease
the Ontario Medical Association, the plan did not cover outpatient diagnostic services,
nor did it include the innovative home care component that had originally been con-
templated.
Because of the accumulated knowledge of the Saskatchewan program and the Blue Cross
plan, the original cost estimates were much easier and more accurate. Standardized hospital
accounting procedures made the calculation of payments to hospitals much more straight-
forward than had been the case in Saskatchewan.
THE RESULTS. By 1961 all provinces had launched programs. With uniform conditions of
residency, the same waiting periods for eligibility of new residents, and uniform benefits,
ten provincial programs were melded into the reality of a national program.
To the surprise of many experts, public insurance did not accelerate the growth in hospital
use. The rate of hospital inpatient days per capita rose only 13.7 percent between 1956 and
1966, compared with 27.2 percent between 1947 and 1956 (Barer and Evans 1986). Clearly
the main increase in utilization had already taken place-probably because of the voluntary
plans in the larger provinces.
On the other hand, the decision to introduce hospital care as the first public insured
benefit, and the failure to provide support for less expensive alternatives such as nursing
homes, home care, or ambulatory services led to the perpetuation and extension of the
pattern of inpatient use that had developed with the support of the private plans. By the
mid-1960s, there was a growing recognition that a substantial proportion of inpatient use
in Canada, as in a number of other countries, was inappropriate and unnecessary. Some
services could be provided at less cost and equal or greater benefit in other settings; others,
like excessive lengths of stay or inappropriate procedures, were simply unnecessary activ-
ity-pure waste. The public plans did not create this problem, but they did for a number of
years ignore it.
Program financing, however, quite soon shifted away from the insurance model. By 1973
only two provinces, Alberta and Ontario, continued to require the payment of premiums as
a condition for entitlement to hospital benefits.2 Today, only Alberta still levies premiums
for hospital care, and as noted below, federal legislation now clearly provides that coverage
must be universal and cannot be conditional upon payment (but see note 3 below). The other
provinces finance their programs from general revenues collected through various combi-
nations of income tax and sales tax. In effect, the hospital "insurance" programs in most
cases had become hospital "services" programs for residents.
The Saskatchewan Medical Care Insurance Plan (1961)
Once again the action shifted to Saskatchewan. The primary motivation for action was
undoubtedly the philosophical commitment of the government, particularly of the premier,
to the concept of health services as a fundamental human right. And the introduction of the
federal hospital insurance program had produced a financial windfall for Saskatchewan.
Furthermore, a local experiment in prepayment for medical care (the Swift Current region
medical plan) had demonstrated the feasibility of a universal tax-financed program. In fact,
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it had resulted in the highest doctor-to-population ratio in rural Saskatchewan, where there
remained severe shortages of physicians.
The major constraint, apart from the perennial problem of limited provincial financial
resources, was the opposition of the medical profession, whose members "favoured health
insurance but not state medicine" (Taylor 1978). They considered themselves, through their
college, the body responsible for medical care in the province. Because of the chronic
shortage of doctors and the mobility of physicians, they were in a very strong position
politically.
THE PHYSICIAN-SPONSORED PLANS. Saskatchewan, like other provinces, had physician-
sponsored medical care insurance plans. These plans played an important role in the
development of medical care insurance in Canada. They were voluntary, comprehensive
plans that were often offered to individuals through their places of employment (with the
result that they tended to cover the healthier members of society). Most of the plans were
of the "service" rather than the "indemnity" type; that is, the doctor billed the plan directly,
not the patient. Payment by the plan according to the fee schedule was generally accepted
as payment in full; except in Ontario, physicians rarely billed patients for extra amounts.
These plans institutionalized the fee-for-service system as the preferred payment method
for the profession.
The Saskatchewan Medical Care Insurance Act
Despite the concerns about the possible reaction of the doctors and the press (which tended
to be antigovernment), and uncertainty about public reaction (since about two-thirds of the
population had at least some voluntary coverage, Saskatchewan's leaders wondered
whether the public would countenance a major confrontation with the medical profession),
the premier announced in December 1959 that the government would introduce a provincial
medical care insurance plan.
There ensued two years of mainly acrimonious discussion and debate over the proposed
legislation, but in late 1961 the legislation was finally passed. Under its provisions, the intent
was to pay for services; the administration was to be the responsibility of a commission of
six to eight members, at least three of whom were to be physicians; there was to be an
advisory council representing professional and other interested organizations; there was to
be a medical advisory committee with members approved by the college; the program was
to be universal and compulsory; the plan was to be financed by premiums and general
revenues; insured services were all services of physicians and surgeons in office, hospital,
or home; with some minor exceptions, the plan payments were to be accepted as payment
in full; and the patient was guaranteed the freedom of choice of doctor and doctors were
given the right to free acceptance or rejection of the patient. Despite its preference for a
capitation system of payment for general practitioners, the government, in an attempt to
appease the doctors, agreed to a fee-for-service approach.
It is impossible in this brief overview to discuss all of the debate that followed and the
numerous proposals and counterproposals that were developed by both sides during the
next six months. The outcome was the worst episode in the history of health insurance in
Canada. On July 1, 1962, the doctors began a strike that was to last for twenty-three days
and that produced bitterness and rifts among the citizens of Saskatchewan that took a
decade to heal.
The government had prepared for the possibility of a strike by recruiting sympathetic
doctors from outside the province, mainly from Britain, but also from other provinces. The
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striking doctors were supported not only by the CMA and much of the provincial press
(whose oppoEition was to the compulsory nature of the program), but also by many citizens,
who through fear of losing their doctors or ideological conviction, organized "Keep Our
Doctors Committees."3 These committees almost succeeded in forcing the government to
concede defeat. In contrast, much of the national media was favorable to the position of the
government.
In the face of this impasse the government invited Lord Taylor, a British doctor who had
been involved in the start of the British National Health Service, to come to Saskatchewan.
He concluded that the plan was basically a good one but that there had been insufficient
early contact with the doctors, whose major concern was that they might become, in effect,
public servants. After negotiations that involved not only the provincial government and
college representatives, but also representatives of the CMA, Taylor proposed a compromise
that was finally accepted by both sides: the prepayment plans would remain in existence.
Doctors would have the option to enrol directly with the government plan and be paid by
it or to bill a voluntary plan that would in turn bill the government, or to practice entirely
outside these plans (in which case their patients would be reimbursed by the government
commission if they billed in accordance with the fee schedule or not at all if they did not).
Initially, most doctors did bill through the prepayment plans, but over time the tendency
was to bill directly to the commission.
THE RESULTS. In the immediate aftermath of the strike, there was a significant exodus of
doctors from the province, but within two years the physician/population ratio was the
highest ever, and physicians' incomes had risen dramatically.
Once again Saskatchewan had demonstrated that a universal program was feasible, albeit
difficult to implement.
The National Medical Care Insurance Program (1966)
During the early 1960s another important event in the development of Canadian health
insurance took place: the Royal Commission on Health Services was formed, chaired by the
Honorable Emmett Hall, Chief Justice of Saskatchewan (Canada 1964). The commission
released its report in 1964, recommending that there be a "comprehensive, universal Health
Services Program for the Canadian people, based upon freedom of choice, and upon free
and self-governing professions; and financed through prepayment arrangements." The
report was a landmark document that spelled out in some detail what form the program
should take.
Again there were uncertainties about costs, provincial response, opposition by the doc-
tors, and response by the business community. And again political leadership was an
important factor. The prime minister, Lester B. Pearson, who had a strong personal com-
mitment to the concept, was determined to have the program in place before Canada's
centenary on July 1, 1967. Accordingly, the federal government introduced its program in
1966. The legislation embodied four principles that had been presented by the prime
minister to a federal-provincial conference in 1965 (Taylor 1978). The provincial plans must
be universal, cover all medically necessary services of physicians, be publicly administered,
and provide for portability from one province to another. These "Four Points" evolved into
the five basic standards applied today and explored in detail below.
THE RESULTS. The legislation was not well received by some of the provinces, notably
Ontario and Quebec, both of which objected on the grounds that the conditions (like those
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of the hospital insurance program) amounted to a federal intrusion into an area of provincial
constitutional jurisdiction. Nevertheless, by 1971 all provinces had joined the program. The
transfer of financing from private to public sources necessitated the imposition of new
federal and provincial taxes.
An important feature of the system as it developed was that private insurance for publicly
insured services was prohibited in most provinces, making the emergence of a private
system virtually impossible.
The Established Program FinancingArrangements (1977)
Despite the success and popularity of the hospital and medical care insurance programs,
the federal and provincial governments had concerns about the financing arrangements.
The federal government was frustrated by its lack of ability to control, or even to accurately
predict, its expenditures on the two programs, since federal contributions were responsive
to provincial expenditures. Moreover, the expected increases in public expenditures due to
the end of uncollectible accounts and some increased utilization, were aggravated by factors
that the insurance plans treated as beyond their contrel, including the steadily rising
physician-to-population ratio, expanding technology, and particularly rapid increases in
the use of services by elderly people. Administrative costs, however, remained low.
At the same time, the provinces were demanding greater flexibility in the allocation of
the federal funds. Discussions began in 1976 between the federal and provincial health
departments about the possibility of extending the cost-sharing arrangements to "lower cost
alternatives," such as nursing home care and home care.
In the same year negotiations began between federal and provincial finance ministers to
develop new financing provisions. Eventually there was agreement on the fundamental
change from cost-sharing to block funding, but not on the specific details. Finally in 1977
the federal government forced the provinces to accept the Established Programs Financing
Act (EPF), which ended the cost-sharing and provided for the provinces to receive a
combination of tax points and cash payments to the provinces. In return the provinces
would have the freedom they had been seeking to spend the federal contributions as they
wished, provided that the basic conditions of the programs (universality, comprehen-
siveness, accessibility, portability, public administration) were met. In addition, the prov-
inces were given unconditional per capita grants for "extended health services."
Several provinces improved the availability and accessibility of home care and nursing
home services; since the mid-1970s or earlier there has also been a slow decline in inpatient
use. But in the subsequent years the federal government has three times moved unilaterally
to reduce its obligations under the EPF formula, and in legislation passed in 1990 implicitly
established a schedule for phasing out its cash contributions entirely. This will not eliminate
the federal contribution, at least in form, since the EPF arrangements of 1977 provided for
transfers of both cash and a share of income tax revenues. Only the former is being phased
out, but this may well have the effect of removing the federal government's ability to enforce
national standards.
The Canada Health Act (1984)
In 1979, the federal minister of health became concerned about several aspects of the
functioning of the provincial health insurance programs. She charged that the provinces
were "diverting" funds provided for health care by the federal government through cash
and income tax shares to nonhealth expenditures. 4 Moreover, she feared that the imposition
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of user fees by provinces for hospital services, and extra-billingby physicians (direct charges
to patients over and above the negotiated fee schedules) had reached the point where they
were interfering in "reasonable access," one of the basic conditions of the federal program.
The federal government commissioned an independent review, again conducted by the
Honorable Emmett Hall. This review rejected the claim that the provinces were "diverting"
funds from health care but supported the concerns about user fees and extra-billing. The
government then introduced new health legislation to cover both hospital and medical care.
It provided for financial penalties for provinces that permitted extra-billing or user charges,
penalties that led to the effective elimination of both practices. It also consolidated and
clarified the conditions of the earlier legislation.
Once again, there was an angry debate involving the provinces and the doctors in
opposition to the federal government.5 But the Canada Health Act was finally passed in
1984, with the unanimous support of the federal Parliament. The extraordinary decision by
the opposition Conservative Party to support this legislation was a bitter surprise for both
doctors and provincial govemments and reflected the opposition's reading of the very
powerful popular support for Medicare. After all, the normal duty of Her Majesty's Loyal
Opposition is to oppose.
The Ontario and Canadian Medical Associations later launched a legal challenge to the
legislation on the grounds that it was an unconstitutional intrusion into provincial jurisdic-
tion but withdrew the action in 1990 without coming to trial.
The implementation of a ban on extra-billing in Ontario led to a doctor's strike (the second
in Canada), which lasted for twenty-five days in 1986. The lack of public support for the
doctors finally caused them to abandon the strike, which had in any case not been well
supported by the doctors themselves.
The major purposes of the Canada Health Act-the elimination of user fees and extra-
billing-have thus been achieved, but its more ambitious objective of "protecting, promot-
ing and restoring the physical and mental well-being of Canadians" will require more than
the assurance of access to health services without financial barriers, as the continuing
disparities in health status among socioeconomic groups illustrate.
Lessons from the Canadian Historical Experience
From the point of view of the general population, the Canadian health care funding system
has been in existence in essentially its present form for more than twenty years. For many,
it has "always been there": a majority of the present population were born within the
universal hospital insurance programs. Over this period, the evolution of policy and
legislation has had little impact on the individual patient or provider, or at least that they
could observe.
The health care system does receive a great deal of public and political attention; there is
always some sort of health "crisis" in the media. But this attention usually focuses on the
immediate situation and provides a misleading or erroneous view of the underlying forces
at work. Providers of care constantly hammer the theme of "underfunding," meaning little
more than that they would like more money, while provincial payers bemoan "cost
explosions" and imminent bankruptcy of the system. All of this makes wonderful theater
and sells newspapers; it is also ideal for the exciting but meaningless two-minute television
clip showing blood, emotion, and complex machinery.
The next section of this chapter provides a somewhat more detailed assessment of the
state of health care finance in Canada at the beginning of the 1990s, now a mature, but
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evolving svstem. The discussion focuses on the strengths and weaknesses, threats and
promises, relative to the objectives of its architects and those of today. But certain lessons
also emerge from the historical record itself, independently of the current state, and it may
be worth drawing these out first.
. Thinlgs take a long time. It was roughly fifty years from the first serious discussions of
health insurance at the national level in 1943 until the last province entered Medicare
in 1971. The process was very slow and contentious and sometimes seemed to reach a
dead stop.
* The present tends to be nmtchi like the past. What was from one perspective a "radical" shift
from private to public funding can also be seen as a natural extension of well-estab-
lished patterns of reimbursement (the original Blue Cross model of nonprofit, service
benefit, comprehensive coverage) to cover the whole population, within the same
framework of private fee-for-service medical practice and independent nonprofit hos-
pitals. In contrast to the American experience, the Canadian public funding system has
turned out to be highly "conservative" of the system of delivery.
* If it is not fixed, it stays brokeit. When the Canadian provinces established universal
hospital insurance, they inherited and extended excessively high rates of inpatient use.
Changing the identity of the payer had no effect. Forty years iater, while substantial
progress has been made, there is still much overuse. The same inertia is observed in
medical education. As explained below, Medicare began with a serious overbuilding
of medical school capacity, which has yet to be reversed. And of course physicians
themselves continue to be reimbursed primarily by fees for service, just as before.
* Giving people things is easier titan taking them away. This observation applies particularly
to providers of care, and of education. The right to serve (and be paid for it) seems to be
an even more powerful political force than the right to be served. Thus it is much easier
to expand a system than. to modify and manage it.
. Tlhus titere is an implementation dilemma. Getting through the slow and contentious
process of acceptance and implementation will be easiest if minimal changes are made
to existing arrangements. ("Revolutionary" approaches fail, at least in Canada.) But
that strategy then freezes in place all the problems of the existing system.
. History does not stop. While to the user the Canadian funding system has been stable,
the legislative, administrative, and funding bases have gone through major changes
and continue to evolve. And at each stage the system has been attacked by the same
economic and professional interests that resisted it from the beginning: physicians,
conservative provincial governments, medical insurers, well-off individuals. The same
old arguments recur and must be refuted again and again. But since these arguments
are rooted in a realistic appreciation of private interest, they will never go away.6
Central Features of the Present Situation
The Canadian funding system is, strictly speaking, not a national but a federal-provincial
system, run cooperatively by the federal and provincial governments. The federal govern-
ment has, with limited exceptions, no constitutional authority over matters of health. Thus
the public insurance plans are actually operated by each of the provincial governments,
which have full administrative and fiscal authority and responsibility. But the federal
government makes substantial financial contributions to the provinces in respect of such
plans (currently about 40 percent of total costs), on condition that the provincial plans
conform to certain broad federally defined standards. It is thus possible to speak of, and
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describe, a "Canadian" system, even though each of the ten provincial plans has some
distinctive features.
As described above, Prime Minister Lester Pearson in 1965 laid out four general principles
that characterized the existing hospital insurance plans and should apply to coverage of
physicians' services as well. These have over time become refined and summarized as the
five federal standards to which each provincial plan must conform, in order to qualify for
federal contributions.
These standards-universality, comprehensiveness, accessibility, portability, and non-
profit administration-each represent a general principle whose intent is clear enough but
whose detailed application is open to considerable interpretation. They have been the
subject of much discussion and some evolution over tirme. The Canada Health Act of 1984
has replaced and modified the earlier federal legislation (the Hospital Insurance and
Diagnostic Services Act of 1957 and the Medical Care Act of 1966), which originaUy served
as the basis for the federal contributions, and it is the current source for interpretation of
these principles. They serve as useful headings under which to describe the present system.
Llniversal Coverage
Universality was initially defined, when first the hospital and then the medical insurance
programs were being phased in province by province, as "almost" all provincial residents
(95 percent, rising over time to 99 percent). But it now requires 100 percent coverage of
provincial populations. This is of particular importance in the two remaining provinces that
still require their residents to pay premiums as part of the public health insurance system.7
Each provincial government is legally empowered to raise funds for the program any way
it chooses, including through premiums. But the federal standards require that everyone in
the province be insured. Thus no one can be denied services, or even charged for them, for
failure to pay premiums.8 (Payment is legally required, and unpaid premiums are subject
to collection, but payment is not a condition of coverage.) Hence the "premiums" are simply
a form of poll tax, and the national income accountants have always treated them as such.
In the early years, however, there was some concern that very low-risk individuals might
still find it worthwhile to carry private insurance and stay out of the public plan. Since this
would tend to defeat the purpose of risk-spreading over the whole population, by "cream-
ing-off" the good risks, private insurance coverage for services covered under the public
plan was not permitted. Private insurance persists for services not included under Medi-
care-dentistry, prescription drugs out of hospitals, and costs outside Canada above those
reimbursable by the public plans-but (except for dentistry) these are relatively small
amounts.
Nor is there any "private" system of health care delivery operating side by side with the
public plan. All physicians and hospitals, like all patients, work within the public payment
system, but the delivery system is still from most points of view "private."
In some provinces it is still technically possible for a physician to withdraw from the
public plan and to see patients on a purely private basis, with neither being reimbursed by
the public plan. A group of physicians could even set up their own, purely private, hospital
or diagnostic facility, on whatever economic terms they chose. But their patients would have
neither public nor private insurance; such care would thus appeal only to a very select
group. Furthermore, the physicians in this situation could not simultaneously provide
services to patients under the public plan. They must be "all in" or "all out." Thus private
providers would have to be able to make a living purely in a private market, rather than
playing both sides of the street, as is common in European systems with a private system.
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In consequence, no private market has developed, even where it is permissible. This
suggests a more general principle, that "private" markets in medicine can persist only where
they can be supported directly or indirectly by a public system.
Comprehensive Coverage
Comprehensiveness requires that provincial plans cover "all medically necessary" services.
Such services as semiprivate or private hospital accommodation, when not necessitated by
the patient's medical condition, or elective cosmetic surgery, are not included under the
public plans. Similarly, the services of nonphysicians-optometrists, naturopaths, chiro-
practors, and other practitioners-are implicitly excluded from the federal definition of
"medical necessity," and need not be covered. A province may cover other professional
services of whatever type and on whatever terms it chooses; but the federal government
imposes no conditions and makes no contribution toward such care.
The increasing interest in the effectiveness, or lack of it, of much contemporary medical
care could conceivably infuse more content into the idea of "medical necessity." Many of
the services provided by medical practitioners, and associated stays in hospital, appear to
be in part or whole unnecessary. Strictly speaking, then, they should not be covered by the
public plan. In practice, however, the test of necessity of a service has been (with very limited
exceptions) that a properly licensed physician was willing to provide it and a patient to
accept it.
The concept of "medical necessity" might receive further consideration in the future, if
provincial governments decided simply to "deinsure" services of no demonstrable health
benefit. Physicians might still offer such services as carotid endarterectomy or cardiac
by-pass grafts for one- or two-vessel disease, but patients would be required to pay the full
costs themselves.
At present, however, the trend is rather to try to develop improved regulatory mecha-
nisms to deal with these issues, in cooperation with the leadership of the medical profession,
rather than to raise the host of difficult and potentially explosive political and professional
issues implicit in such a "market" approach. 9
Provincial governments have for years established temporary or permanent expert advi-
sory committees, composed of both professionals from the community and bureaucrats, to
review new technologies and make recommendations as to which new programs should be
started, when, and where. Decisions as to how much capacity to add, become in effect
decisions about the content of medical practice, since practice always presses against the
limits of capacity. This form of "steering" of medical practice is as old as the public plans
and older.1
But increasingly such committees are being asked to make explicit recommendations
about medical practice itself: guidelines for periodic health examinations, for Caesarian sections,
endarterectomy, or cholesterol screening, to take some recent examples. Some provincial
professional bodies are beginning to seek an active role in this process, others are hanging
back, but it seems almost certain that the development of professional protocols, through
some form of government and professional cooperation is going to be an expanding field.
The process is still at too early a stage to have much identifiable hard output. But there
may be some emerging success stories. It seems increasingly likely that this consultation
process will spare Canadians the gross excesses of cholesterol testing and therapy that are
at present a growing threat to the health of the American population. On the other side of
the ledger, careful evaluation by such a committee contributed to the rapid spread of
effective therapy for hypertension.
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What has not yet been addressed is the issue of implementation. What does one do when
the protocols are not followed? No one, yet, has grasped this nettle, although there have
been a number of suggestions of professional and economic incentives.
Reasonable Access on Equal Terms and Conditions
Accessibility has been a particularly contentious area, encompassing two major disputes
between physicians and governments: extra-billing and hospital capacity. Do direct charges
to patients impede access to needed care and violate the principle? And do attempts to
moderate the expansion of beds and technology constitute a form of "rationing," which
effectively does the same, even if care is "free." To date, the short answers given by Canadian
opinion and practice to these questions are, "Yes," and "Not necessarily." The former
question appears, for the moment, settled, but the latter is wide open and takes up a major
share of Canadian political debate.
EXTRA-BILLING BY PHYSICIANS. On the first point, practice originally varied from province
to province, depending on the political strength of the medical associations at the time the
medical insurance plans were introduced.'1 In Quebec, at one end of the spectrum, physi-
cians who billed patients for amounts above the negotiated schedule were not reimbursed
at all by the public plan, nor were their patients. At the other, in Alberta, physicians were
free to collect their official fees from the public agency and then extra-bill their patients in
any amount they wished, which was literally double-billing. Other provinces permitted
some form of extra-billing but on more or less restrictive terms.
The Canada Health Act, however, provided that any provincial government that either
charged patients for covered services or permitted anyone else to charge for them would
lose an amount from its federal grant equal to the estimated total amount of such direct
charges. Since that time, all provinces have negotiated or imposed an end to extra-billing
and removed any other direct charges for covered services.12 The act responded to growing
concerns and some evidence (hotly disputed by physicians) that extra-billing was beginning
to spread and was becoming an increasing impediment to access to care for those in greatest
need.
How MUCH ACCESS IS REASONABLE? The second issue is conceptually more difficult.
Canada has historically had a relatively large supply of hospital and other institutional beds,
and a correspondingly high rate of use. Nationwide, there are about 6.75 public general
hospital beds per thousand population, two-thirds in short-term units and one-third in
long-term units or extended care hospitals. Days of care provided are about 2,000 per
thousand population, with just over 60 percent in short-term units, a smaller proportion of
days because occupancy rates in short-term units average about 80 percent; in long term
facilities they are over 95 percent.
Students of health care utilization have generally concluded that the Canadian pattern
represents overuse in relation to medical need, and public policy in all provinces has been,
on balance, directed toward reducing hospital use. 13Similarly, the introduction and disper-
sion of expensive new technical facilities and procedures has been restrained, through the
public control of both capital and operatingbudgets in hospitals, and the negotiation process
that determines what shall be included in the fee schedule.
Yet the supply of physicians has increased steadily, and this increase interacts with the
rapid extension of technology to create a constant pressure for more and newer "tools of the
trade." Physicians' incomes, in a fee-for-service environment, depend on their billing
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opportunities, and that in tum, for many specialties, depends on their access to (publicly
provided) capital and associated (publicly paid) nurses and technical staff. To this interest
is now added a very powerful pressure from nurses and other hospital workers, for whom
hospitals represent jobs and opportunities for professional advancement. These groups
have become the loudest public voices demanding more beds and larger budgets, and
warning the general public of the threats to their health from "cutbacks." One observer has
coined the phrase the "job fortress" to describe the Canadian hospital. Canada has in fact
the world's highest rate of expenditure per capita, after the United States (figure 5-1), and
outlays have been rising more or less in line with national income over the past twenty years
(see figures 5-2, 5-3). But this is not enough for the providers of care, who look with envy at
the ever-expanding share of income claimed by their counterparts next door in the United
States.
It is generally agreed that "access" means not the provision of all services imaginable for
everyone, but rather services according to need. The political struggle is then over the
processes by which need is to be defined. To the medical profession, need is whatever a
physician says it is. If that requires more and more costly services, then so be it. Someone-
the government, the patient, the rest of the community-should raise the necessary funds.
Governments, on the other hand, are increasingly arguing that the test of necessity is the
demonstrable effect of intervention on health outcomes, effectiveness, not merely a
physician's opinion, professional or otherwise. Furthermore, they are becoming increas-
ingly aware of the large and growing body of research evidence that indicates that there is
often little or no connection between the physician's opinion and the demonstrated effec-
tiveness (or lack of it) of the services provided.
Since this conflict between professional autonomy (and economic self-interest) and
payers' concern for value for money (and economic self-interest) is a central issue in virtually
every developed country in the world. Thus the application of the principle of access in the
Canadian system is likely to remain contentious for a very long time to come.
Portability of Coverage within Canada
Portability of benefits is an important principle in terms of its symbolism for national unity,
but has not been particularly contentious. It is largely a technical problem. Political issues
have arisen only in the one or two cases in which a metropolitan region spans a provincial
border, or a significant region of one province receives its tertiary care from a large city in
another. If the fee schedules are markedly different, either providers or payers may object
to the financial transfers involved.
More potentially troublesome is the issue of payment across the border in the United
States. As noted in the discussion of accessibility, provincial governments limit the prolif-
eration of hospital capacity and particularly of expensive diagnostic equipment, by funding
them through hospital capital and operating budgets, not through fees per item of service.
A hospital that wishes to acquire an MRI machine, for example, or a lithotripter, must not
only receive planning approval from its provincial Ministry of Health but it must also
convince the ministry to provide the capital funds.14 Private physicians can in principle
purchase and use such equipment, but if there is no corresponding procedural item in the
fee schedule, they cannot be reimbursed (by the government or patient) for its use.15
The result is that physicians claim a shortage of major diagnostic equipment, in relation
to the much greater capacity and use in the United States. (The price, however, does not fall
in the United States.) Whether this represents a shortage in Canada in relation to the needs
of the population, or a surplus in the United States, or both, is another matter.
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Figure 5-1. Health Care Expenditure per Capita International Comparison,
1980 and 1989
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Figure 5-2. Total Health Expenditure as a Share of GNP, Canada and the United States,
1948-89
Percentage
12 Fedral J Federal i | U.S. NHE.
Hospital j Medical i
Insurance Act Care Act!
passed, effectve, ,10 1957 11968
9 _ All i'' /Canada NHE
8 provinces I
7 _ i ~~~~~included, 
7 16
6 ~~~~~~ 8 k ! ~~~~~~~~~~Canada HPDP only
5
4 '~~"~~~'~~ l , 1 l t provinces
3 - | i17
... 1..I. 971
48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 8889
Year
Note: 1987-89 data area prelimninary. HPDP = hospitals, physicians, dentists, and prescription drugs.
Soiurce: U.S. GAO (1991).
The Canadian Health Care Systenm: Where Are We and Howv Did We Get Here? 95
Figure 5-3. Hospital and Physician Expenditure as a Share of GNP, Canada and the
United States, 1948-89
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One could imagine, then, an increased flow of patients across the border in response to
the increasing gap between Canadian and American patterns of care. This would place
provincial governments in the difficult position of either paying for such additional care,
and thus losing control of their total outlays, or permitting the development of a de facto
private system of care alongside the public, for those who can afford to pay the American
price.
In practice, however, this does not seem to be developing as a significant problem, with
the exception of one or two border cities, and one or two particularly contentious proce-
dures. The reality of care use is that patients do not in general "demand" particular
procedures; they seek the recommendations of their physicians. These latter can, and do,
sometimes refer patients to the United States and then energetically publicize the incident
as part of a continuing struggle with provincial governments over the availability of health
resources. But this sort of political theater does not correspond to any large movement of
patients or dollars.16
Administration of Coverage by Nonprofit Agencies
Nonprofit administration, the final principle, has drawn little subsequent commentary in
Canada, because in most parts of the country the private health insurance industry was
relatively underdeveloped at the time the public plans were introduced. In each of the
provinces there were not-for-profit insurers, sponsored originally by the hospital and
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physician associations, similar to the Blue Cross plans in the United States. The hospital and
medical insurance business of these plans was simply taken over by the public agencies. In
some cases the provincial plans continued to work through the previous carriers as inter-
mediaries, but this arrangement was found to be both unnecessarily costly and inefficient
and was soon terminated.
The historical and customary support for nonprofit administration was strongly rein-
forced by the recornmenditions of thie report of the federal Royal Commission on Health
Services (Canada 1964), the massive investigation that predated the extension of public
coverage from hospital care to physicians' services. Justice Hall observed that the private
insurance plans were paying out relatively low proportions of their premiums in benefits.
Studies for the commission indicated that in the early 1960s administrative overhead
absorbed about 22 percent of all premiums for private health insurance in Canada. This ratio
was, of course, lower for the dominant group plans (20 percent) than for nongroup plans
(30 percent). But the plans offered by commercial firms that were just beginning to penetrate
the market, providing more limited coverage and selecting the low-r risk groups, had
overhead rates of 30 percent for their group contracts and a whopping 55 percent on the
nongroup (Canada 1964:chap. 18). This appeared not only inefficient, but unjust.
But the raison d'etre of a private company is to make profits, not to pay claims. A private
insurer refers to the ratio of claims to premiums as the "loss ratio," which is to be minimized;
profits and other expenses must be found out of the overhead share. To the rest of the
community, however, the "loss ratio" is the proportion of total payments to the insurer that
actually goes to pay for the desired services, as opposed to being taken up in overhead costs.
Thus Justice Hall referred instead to the "retention ratio," that is, the percentage by which
the basic cost of medical services must be increased to achieve the advantages of insurance.
A "good" plan, from the perspective of both providers and patients, is one that minimizes
the retention ratio, the cost of insurance per se; such a plan also maximizes the loss ratio.
The commissioners concluded that private, for-profit insurers operated under incentives
that tended to increase this form of overhead cost, adding to the expense of health care
without adding to the resources available to provide it. High retention ratios (low loss ratios)
were not an aberrant result of inefficiency, or a transient effect of small scale, but a
fundamental characteristic of (successful) private insurance. This inherent tendency is
strongly reinforced in a competitive environment with multiple insurers, in which the costs
of intensive marketing and of increasingly careful risk selection must also be found out of
the retention ratio (see also Evans 1983). Regarding the costs of the insurance mechanism
as unproductive overhead, they recommended centralized, nonprofit administration in
order to minimize them.
This recommendation has turned out to be quite perspicacious. The overhead costs of
administering the public system in Canada are difficult to determine with precision but are
generally agreed to be in the neighborhood of 5 percent or less of payments to providers.
As a proportion of national income, the costs of health care prepayment and administration
have remained roughly constant for the past thirty years.
In the United States, by contrast, the costs of the insurance mechanism itself have escalated
dramatically (figure 5-4). The American payment process has become increasingly complex,
as payers are making increasing efforts to minimize their own outlays by passing the costs
on to someone else. Governments have pushed more of the costs onto employers; employers
and insurers are trying to push costs back onto patients; the "uncompensated" costs of
indigent care that hospitals have traditionally pushed onto private insurers are being
pushed back to them; and payers and providers are struggling over the price and use of
services in individual cases in a costly, frustrating, and mostly ineffective process. It has
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Figure 5-4. National Health Expenditures as a Percentage of GNP, 1960-88
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become correspondingly more and more expensive just to push around the pieces of paper
associated with providing and paying for care, to the considerable profit of lawyers,
accountants, consultants, and administrators.
Nor do the administrative costs of insurance and prepayment tell the complete story. The
administrative costs borne by hospitals and physicians' offices have gone up rapidly as they
attempt to cope with an increasingly complex payment and regulatory environment. Thus
a significant proportion of the recorded expenditures for hospital and medical care are in
fact costs generated by the payment mechanism, though not included as explicitly reported
costs of prepayment and administration. An increasing share of the sums Americans think
they are spending on hospital and medical care are going in fact to pay for administrators,
accountants, lawyers, public relations specialists, and other persons whose services are not
usually considered as contributing to the health of patients. The most recent estimates of
the extra cost of administering the American system in relation to a Canadian-style approach
are between $90 and $120 billion per year (Woolhandler and Himmelstein 1991).
These ballooning costs of the insurance process-all those accountants and lawyers-are
leading increasing numbers of American physicians, as well as payers and patients, to believe
that they might be better off under a Canadian system. Health expenditures in the United
States keep going up, but providers feel-rightly-that their share is not going up as fast.
Yet they are bearing the full brunt of the various measures intended, so far unsuccessfully,
to limit cost escalation.
Of course providers have always preferred nonprofit administration. The Blue
Cross/Blue Shield plans were originally established by hospitals and medical associations
in the United States. What they did not want, however, was a single nonprofit payer,
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negotiating on behalf of the public generally rather than under provider control. And
officially, they still do not (Todd 1989). The Canadian form of nonprofit administration
comes in combination with "socialized insurance": sole source payment, by an agency with
both incentives and authority to try to keep down the costs of care (provider incomes) as
well as the costs of insurance.
But if the alternative, a fragmented payment system, inevitably leads to escalation of total
health expenditures and even more rapid escalation of the costs of the insurance mechanism,
combined with ever more onerous interference from regulatory agencies and private payers,
and a less and less satisfying practice environment, then perhaps the Canadian form of
payment might not be so bad. An increasing number of Americans-public bodies, private
individuals, and even physicians-are coming to support some form of universal public
insurance (Blendon 1989; National Leadership Commission 1989; U.S. GAO 1991). The
American Medical Association may still be bitterly opposed to what it continues to describe,
incorrectly, as "socialized medicine," but the American College of Physicians-the second
largest organization-now favors public insurance.
On the other hand, some in Canada are beginning to ask whether administrative expenses
might not be too low; one observer has coined the term "administrative anorexia" to describe
the attitude of provincial governments and their agencies toward spending on management.
A recent analysis of the Canadian system advances the thesis that, while not underfunded-
indeed in total almost certainly overfunded-it is seriously undermanaged (Rachlis and
Kushner 1989). Still others refer to it as "overadministered but undermanaged." The
distinction is important.
Traditionally, insurers simply paid whatever bills were generated by the health care
system (or refused to pay them, leaving the "insured" individual with the liability). Physi-
cians and other professionals determined the care that was needed by "their" patients and
either provided it or directed others to do so. Administrators ensured that the necessary
facilities, equipment, and personnel were available to carry out the directions of the
professionals. But they did not "manage" in the sense of deciding what care should be
provided, or how, or how its effects should be evaluated; these were professional questions.
Administrators were senior support staff; they did not define or direct the fundamental tasks
of the organization. The payers simply wrote checks as requested and raised their premiums
as necessary.
Management, by contrast, involves deciding what care should be provided, under what
circumstances, by reference to its expected or observed effects. It also involves determining
how the organization will carry out its tasks, what is the most efficient mix of personnel,
equipment, and facilities. Who shall do what, and with which, and to whom? These
decisions are jealously guarded by professionals, as central to their autonomy. But they are
often made by default, with no accountability to anyone else, and the evidence is that they
are not made very well. A great deal of ineffective or otherwise inappropriate care is
provided and produced in unnecessarily costly ways, which adds up to bad management.
These are the same issues that underlie the debates over accessibility: Which services are
worth paying for, for whom, and what information and processes of analysis are needed in
order to decide?
It must be emphasized, however, that these are quite different from the problems facing
a private insurer, and which generate a significant part of the overhead costs of private,
for-profit insurance. The private insurer is forced by the laws of the competitive marketplace
to devote a great deal of effort to determining who not to insure: the worst risks. The private
insurance market does not, cannot, cover those in most need of care.17
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Since the universal public system responds to an explicit society-wide political choice that
everyone is to be covered, this problem of identifying individual risk status disappears, and
along with it the whole complex apparatus of rate-making and policy design. The private
marketplace generates a multiplicity of different types of coverage-far beyond the capacity
of most purchasers to comprehend-in order to minimize the extent to which those in
low-risk categories pay to support those at high risk. But the public insurance system
expresses the community's decision to do precisely that, to use the resources of the healthy
and wealthy to support the poor and ill. So the principal services of the traditional private
insurance sector are, literally, worthless, because their "product" is not what the community
wishes to buy.
In its place, however, is the problem of determining the needs and priorities of those to
be cared for and the effectiveness of the services offered. Provincial governments are clearly
responsible for purchasing care on behalf of their populations. Achieving "value for money"
in this process may well require a buildup of managerial capacity and the creation of new
administrative structures, within the overall framework of nonprofit administration.
Managing the System and Coping with Change
There are several paradoxical features of the Canadian experience, not least of which is the
nature of the political controversy that seems always to surround it. On the one hand, as
emphasized above, there is absolutely no doubt about the strength of the public commit-
ment-by ordinary citizens, politicians, and even most providers-to the fundamental
principles of the system. There is no support for, and indeed there would be overwhelming
opposition to, any overt attempt to abandon or extensively revise those principles.
On the other hand, the functioning of the health care system is constantly in the forefront
of public debate, and its management is by far the most demanding responsibility, not just
in dollars but in terms of political and technical skills, carried by each of the provincial
governments. Ministers of health and premiers of provinces are held accountable in the
provincial legislatures and in the press for individual problems and misadventures that
occur in the operation of the health care system.
The management of the health care system in Canada has thus become politicized to an
extreme degree. And although the results of such political management are generally agreed
to be relatively satisfactory, it does carry with it certain characteristic limitations. At the
same time, it is not clear that any of the other industrialized democracies, even the United
States, is so very different from Canada in this respect. All such countries, except the United
States, have collective systems for financing all or most of their hospital and medical care
and thus must deal politically both with decisions as to who shall be permitted to perform
and be paid for services, what sorts of services, and for whom, and with the determination
of the relative incomes of those persons who provide health care services.
Even in the United States, the critical decisions are political; the market is much more
prominent in rhetoric than in reality. The principal difference is that in the United States the
key political decisions tend to be more decentralized and hidden, whereas in Canada they
are centralized and played out in the full glare of the media (Evans and others 1989).
European systems tend to be more similar to the Canadian, in that the political decisions
tend to be centralized, but they appear to be less open to the public than in Canada.
At present, the health care policy agenda in Canada is being driven by a set of interlocked
problems, none of which are particularly new or peculiar to Canada. On some, there is
evidence of progress, on others it is evident that present problems are the result of past policy
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failures, which, if left uncorrected, will generate continuing difficulties in the future. (But at
least the present generation's grandchildren will not be bored.)
Controlling the Escalation of Health Care Expenditures
The first problem area, cost control, is faced by every society in the industrialized world,
with the possible exception-so far-of Japan. It may be that if the modernization and
growth of a country's general economy can continue to outstrip that of its health care system,
it need not be overly concerned with health care cost control. This has not, however, been
the situation in North America or Western Europe, where all countries have had to wrestle,
over the past decade or more, with the problem of moderating the growth of health spending
in order to protect resources for other social and private priorities. And any country
modernizing its health care system would do well to consider carefully how it will deal with
the inherent tendency of such systems to unlimited expansion in the absence of strongly
enforced external constraint (Evans 1990, 1991).
Within the past five to ten years, however, all such societies except the United States
appear to have found some response, if not necessarily a permanent solution, to this problem
(Schieber and Poullier 1991). Several countries have actually reduced their shares of national
income spent on health care, in some cases quite significantly. 18 In each of these countries
the process of control has been accompanied by considerable difficulties and political
conflict, and it is always possible that the health care system will succeed in breaking out of
the controls that each society has placed on it, but for the moment a degree of stability
prevails.
The processes by which the provincial governments in Canada have imposed these
controls, over a period of nearly twenty years with the exception of the "recession breakout"
of 1982, are three in number.
First, as noted above, the nature of the Canadian payment system permits it to function
economically in terms of administrative costs, and these have not been rising over time.
Ironically, it appears that the American attempt to create more "competition" in health care
has added significantly to these unproductive expenditures.
Second, the fee schedules negotiated between the medical associations and governments
in each province have escalated at a slower rate than fees in the uncontrolled American
environment. At the same time, the elimination of extra-billing has prevented physicians
from exploiting this alternative form of fee inflation. Over time, fees in Canada have risen
at a rate more or less in line with general price inflation; when physicians can set their own
fees freely, fees rise substantially faster.
In response, physicians in Canada do appear to have increased their volumes of billings
per physician somewhat faster than in the United States, but they have not been able to offset
fully the slower increase in fees (Barer, Evans, and Labelle 1988). An important contributor
to the control process appears to be the fact that fee schedules limit the reimbursement of
diagnostic services outside hospitals-most physicians cannot simply set up their own
laboratories, for example-and also prevent implicit "fee splitting" between laboratories
and referring physicians (Reinhardt 1987).
These controls over the tendency of physicians to engage in "procedural multiplication"
and "strategic billing," particularly when fee inflation is contained, are by no means
complete, and any particular form of control tends to erode over time. Canadian provincial
governments are increasingly exploring ways of imposing more explicit "caps" on total
outlays for physicians' services. Two provinces-Quebec and British Columbia-have
already done so, and it is likely that more will follow (Lomas and others 1989).
Tle Canadian Health Care Systen: Where Are We and How Did We Get Here? 101
Such caps can take a variety of forms. The simplest, direct pro-rating, establishes a fixed
total of funds to be paid to physicians in a given time period. This is then compared with
the total dollar value of billings or reimbursement claims submitted by physicians for
services provided during that period, and the ratio between money allocated and total
claims submitted is multiplied by the value of each physician's claims to determine how
much he or she will actually be paid. The payments will be greater or less than the amounts
submitted, depending on whether the total of claims is less or greater than the amount
budgeted. A version of this process has been used for a number of years by the German
sickness funds; and cost escalation in Germany has been less rapid, over the past decade,
than in most other OECD countries.
Pro-rating has certain technical problems, which are not too difficult, but global pro-rating
also has some serious incentive problems, insofar as it tends to penalize more conservative
and cautious physicians who fail to exploit the system to the utmost. A more elaborate and
sophisticated system with separate but linked regional and specialty caps has been devel-
oped that has positive incentives for regional allocation of services, for conservative use of
referrals, and for collective decisionmaking by physicians over the appropriateness of care
(Evans 1988b), but this has yet to be tried in practice.
The caps imposed in the Canadian provinces involve setting upper limits for the increase
in use in each time period, at the time of the negotiation of the fee schedule. If actual use of
services-amounts billed at the new fees-increases more rapidly than the target rate, the
excess is deducted from payments in the next period (Barer and others 1988; Lomas and
others 1989). But the caps have not always been completely "hard," because the agreements
often provide for only part of any excess above targets to be paid back by physicians, and
because the payback process becomes entangled in the negotiations for the next fee agree-
ment, rather than being automatic.
But the control of costs is also directly linked to manpower policy, because the volume of
physicians' services billed rises more or less in proportion to the increasing numbers of
fee-for-service physicians. As noted below, manpower policy has worked in opposition to
cost control, by supporting a growth in physician supply well in excess of the rate of the
growth of the population. This places continuing upward pressure on costs; but it has been
extraordinarily difficult to mobilize political support for reducing the number of training
places.
Another important part of the control of health care costs has been the system of global
budgeting for hospitals, which enables this component of the health budget to be subjected
to absolute "cash limits. " The result has been a steady decline in acute care utilization, which
nevertheless remains high in relation to that in the United States, and a much less rapid
proliferation of new and expensive high-technology interventions. Canadian provinces do
acquire the most recent technology, but such equipment tends to be confined to the teaching
hospital centers and does not proliferate throughout the regional hospital system or into
free-standing facilities. Thus the availability per capita of such equipment tends to be lower
than in countries such as the United States, Germany, or Japan, and this helps to moderate
the escalation of costs.
Health Care Use by the Elderly
The aging of the population is perhaps the most frequently cited source of serious problems,
now and particularly in the future, for the Canadian and most other health care systems.
Yet it is the area in which the rhetoric is in fact most misleading. The usual argument is that
on average elderly people require more, and more costly, health care services than do
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younger people. At the same time, it is notorious that the proportion of elderly, and
particularly very elderly, people in the population is growing, as birth rates have fallen and
life expectancies have risen. Both these observations are true. But the common conclusion,
that the costs of caring for the elderly will therefore necessarily exceed the willingness or
ability of industrialized economies to pay for them, does not follow. It is particularly
misleading, indeed flatly false, to claim that such demographic trends are the source of the
cost pressures being felt in health care today.
A good deal of research has been done on the changing patterns of care of elderly people
in Canada, and it is all consistent. The aging of the Canadian population, and in all likelihood
of all other populations in the industrialized world, is an important phenomenon over a
time span of decades. But its effects on health care use are slow. In Canada, the aging of the
population would add about 1 percent per capita per year to health costs if the utilization
pattems at each age remained unchanged and only the population age structure changed
(Woods, Gordon 1984). Over thirty, or fifty, years, this is a substantial impact. But 1 percent
per capita per year is well within the normal, or at least historical, economic growth rates
of industrialized economies, and could easily be accommodated with a constant share of
such growth being devoted to health care.
But the age-specific use rates are not remaining constant (Barer and others 1987). Hospital
inpatient days per capita, for example, are increasing for elderly people while dropping
rapidly for the rest of the population (Evans and others 1989). Average physician billings
per person are rising for the whole population, but much faster among the elderly than
among the rest (Barer and others 1989). Inhospital procedures are likewise rising fastest in
this age group. And these changes in relative use rates by the elderly and nonelderly
populations are observed after adjustment for the changing age mix within each group; they
are not an artifact of the increasing average age of the elderly themselves.
Thus elderly people are accounting for an increasing share of health care effort and
resources. But their growing numbers-and average ages-make a relatively small contri-
bution to this increase. The much more important factor is that, over time, ever more is being
done for, or to, each elderly person. They are being subjected to many more, and more
intensive, interventions. And the effectiveness of these interventions is often unproven,
particularly for the older age groups that are less often enrolled in clinical trials.
Thus the "aging of the population," which claims priority of place in so many discussions
of health policy, is largely a false issue. The real question is what benefits are being derived
from the services that are being applied in increasing numbers to the care of the elderly.
That leads to the questions of technology, of effectiveness and appropriateness of care, and
indirectly to issues of manpower or personnel. The demographic transition, at least as it
applies to the past decade and the next, is in fact a smokescreen that obscures more
fundamental questions of the basis on which utilization decisions are made, and the costs
and benefits of the results.
Absorbing New Technologies: When, Where, andfor Whom?
Coping with the extension of technology is simply part of this more general set of issues.
Technology per se is neither good nor bad; new knowledge and capabilities in principle
merely expand society's range of choices. The rhetoric surrounding technology often
suggests that people are somehow compelled to apply whatever is discovered, at whatever
expense. But the technology does not define its own range of application. Many, though not
all, new technologies have the capability to reduce significantly the costs or other burdens
associated with particular health problems, if conservatively applied and limited to areas
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of demonstrated effectiveness. The real problem of a tradeoff between technological "ad-
vance" and cost control arises when new and expensive techniques (or for that matter old
and not so expensive techniques) are employed and paid for in circumstances in which there
is no evidence that they will do any good.
Thus the problem posed by new technology is primarily evaluative and organizational,
rather than economic. First, can providers and patients determine whether the technique
does more harm than good, and for which patients? This requires careful analysis of the
biological effect of the associated interventions, but also requires developing techniques for
eliciting the preferences and values of potential patients. Whether an intervention does more
harm than good depends on both: what is right for one may be inappropriate for another.
(But no one needs interventions that do not work.) And second, once such information is
available-"technological assessment" in a broad sense-how can society ensure that utili-
zation decisions by providers and patients actually reflect this information?
A number of students of the benefits and costs of new technology have concluded that
there is ample capacity in the health care systems of industrialized societies to support all
the new technology that one might want, if one could get rid of the minimally effective,
useless, and harmful interventions now being provided and paid for. The problem is to find
an organizational framework and decision processes that will lead to this result.
Coming back to the Canadian experience with cost control, it has been noted that the
intensity of servicing, or the inflation-adjusted expenditure per person, has risen relatively
slowly in Canadian hospitals. The control of hospital costs through global budgets has been
associated with a slower rate of increase in the number of procedures performed, or their
expense, than in the United States. Technology has proliferated more slowly in Canada.
This raises the question of the appropriateness and effectiveness of the care being
provided. Are Canadians being denied potentially effective treatments that would increase
the length or improve the quality of their lives? Or are they being protected against the
overenthusiastic application of interventions that would be useless at best, quite possibly
harmful, and certainly expensive? One can find advocates of both points of view.
What can reasonably be said is that the control of global budgets rests on the assumptions
(a) that physicians and hospital administrators, when they do not have enough resources
to do all that they would like to do, for whatever reason, react by eliminating the least useful
or most harmful services first, and (b) although they will always claim the contrary, they
really do have enough resources to do all that is worth doing, and probably more besides,
and (c) if (b) should cease to be true, other sources of information will bring this fact into
the open, so that budgets can be adjusted as needed.
On the other hand, it must be admitted that detailed information on the effects both of
the care that is being provided in Canadian hospitals and of the care that is not being
provided is remarkably scarce (as it is in most other countries) and it might be wise to study
this area much more closely, which is the same point that emerges when one looks closely
at the changing patterns of care of the elderly. But the growing evidence of substantial
inappropriate, and actually harmful, use of "high-technology" procedures in the more richly
endowed United States emphasizes that the relative limitation placed on the diffusion of
technology by the Canadian funding system may very well be a benefit of that system,
although critics present it as a negative feature.
Health Care Personnel: Capacity and Need
Health care policy in Canada has been least successful in the formulation and execution of
manpower policy. It is widely, though not universally, believed that Canada has a surplus
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of physicians and a shortage of nurses; the difficulties in both areas are traceable to the
inability to respond to obvious and well-documented facts.
There are at present about 60,000 physicians in Canada, roughly one for every 450 people.
The ratio of physicians per capita has doubled in the past thirty years, and is currently
increasing about 2 percent per year. This expansion places continuing upward pressure on
expenditures for physicians' services. Independent private practitioners reimbursed by fees
for their services always appear to be able to identify enough unmet needs, such that total
billings (adjusted for inflation) have risen at or somewhat above the rate of increase in
physician supply. There is no evidence, in the aggregate data, of a saturation point beyond
which additional physicians result in falling average workloads and incomes.1 9
But the increase in physician numbers also places pressure on the available hospital bed
space and associated facilities that physicians use in their practice, and without which their
billing opportunities are much reduced (Barer, Gafni, and Lomas 1989). As the "physicians-
per-bed" ratio rises, each physician perceives a more severe shortage of capacity, available
to him or her, even though the capacity per person cared for remains high.
The problem here is that bad forecasts have made bad policy. No one planned this massive
expansion; it was an accident resulting from a forecasting error followed by a stubborn
refusal to change course. Population forecasts made in the early 1960s were the basis for a
large increase in medical school capacity over the next decade. But those forecasts were
made just before the historic collapse of the birth rate. By the early 1970s it was obvious that
Canada's medical school capacity was far beyond the needs of a low-fertility society. But
there were too many powerful interests at stake to permit a reduction. Instead, medical
school representatives clouded the political landscape with a variety of false claims (docu-
mented and demolished in Lomas, Barer, and Stoddart 1985). By 1991, the actual Canadian
population was nearly ten million people lower than the forecast level for which its current
training capacity was built.
The status quo thus has no logic or legitimacy in its origins, but it is entrenched.2 0 Some
reductions in training places are now occurring, but slowly and painfully. Universities in
Canada are directed by independent boards of governors, and while they derive most of
their funding from government, it does not come primarily from ministries of health.
Medical schools must be bribed or browbeaten into reducing their training places, probably
with guarantees that their budgets will not be cut, and perhaps with increased research
funding. But this requires interministerial cooperation.
The benefits of reduction, in terms of costs saved by payers, accrue over years or decades,
and may accrue in another jurisdiction, since physicians can move freely from province to
province. But the political costs are immediate, because the general population, encouraged
by the representatives of medical schools, do not support reductions. They just do not want
to pay for the increased numbers of doctors.
Provincial governments are, however, exploring policies to try to protect themselves from
the fiscal consequences of past increases, and this is drawing their attention to the root of
the problem (Barer 1988). Attempts to place global caps on payments to physicians imply
that they now have an increasing stake in helping to control the increase. Moreover,
ministries of health have much more influence over specialty training programs because
these are directly funded through teaching hospital budgets. By reducing funding for
residency positions, and perhaps training nurses or other personnel to provide the support
services for which fee-for-service practitioners now rely on residents, one could both hold
down the rate of specialization and also close off a "back-door" route by which immigrant
physicians still enter Canada in significant numbers.
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Interprovincial committees of health ministers and their senior staff have for some years
been working to find cooperative ways of addressing the problem, and in the summer of
1991 they received a major commissioned report (Barer and Stoddart 1991) addressing all
aspects of the physician manpower issue. Something may yet happen.
Nursing presents the opposite picture, with widespread claims of growing shortages. But
in fact, shortages and surpluses alternate from year to year, or even month to month,
depending upon the provincial government electoral and budget cycle. When funds for
hospitals are plentiful, there is usually a "shortage" of nurses to meet the new positions
created. When fiscal times are tougher, the unfilled positions disappear. The supply re-
sponse is less flexible than hospital budgets.
When nurses and their representatives refer to "shortages," however, they mean not that
positions are unfilled, but rather that hospital budgets should be increased to hire more
nurses. The "shortage" is relative to the level of servicing that nurses believe they should be
paid to provide, not the actual demand by employers.
Over the longer run, however, there are larger forces at work. The collapse of births in the
mid-1960s has led to a sharp reduction, in the late 1980s, in the age groups from which
nursing has traditionally recruited. And alternative career opportunities for females have
greatly increased. In total, nursing personnel have barely kept up with population growth,
while the aging of the population is having much more impact on the need for institutional
care than for physicians' services.
This problem is exacerbated by the persistence of traditional forms of organization in
hospitals, where nurses employed by the hospital care for patients who "belong" to the
physicians who admit them. This leads to inefficient use of both hospitals and nurses;
hospital use rates in Canada are much higher than necessary. It also limits career opportu-
nities and professional development in nursing, thereby contributing to growing labor
unrest.
In the long run, it seems inevitable that Canada will have fewer, more highly trained and
paid nurses, and that fewer people will be in hospital. But how does it get from here to there?
At present, the professional objectives and educational philosophies of nursing leadership
seem directly at odds with the needs of the health care system.
The lack of cooperation between the educational and health care systems-located in
different ministries and institutions with different cultures, objectives, and philosophies-
has led to serious inconsistencies in health personnel policy. And faulty personnel policies
can foreclose the possibilities for improved management of health care delivery, sometimes
for decades.
How to Decide What to Do
It seems that the apparently separate problems identified above-population aging, the
extension of technology, personnel-actually reduce to special cases of a more general issue:
What sorts of health care services does society wish to have produced, and for whom?2 1
These questions, as noted, ultimately turn on a combination of technical and value informa-
tion: "What will particular services actually do, in the way of good or harm?" and "What do
patients and payers want?"
To date, the Canadian health care system has addressed these questions only indirectly.
"All medically necessary" services are free, implying that effectiveness, somehow defined,
is the overriding criterion. But this has been determined implicitly as whatever a physician
is willing to offer and a patient to accept. What Canada has discovered, as has every other
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country in the industrialized world, is, first, that the indirect definition of "need" is infinitely
expansible within the relevant range, particularly for elderly people; second, that
overall utilization rises with the availability of facilities and personnel and tends always
to press against any resource constraints; but, third, that the resulting aggregate levels and
patterns of utilization are highly variable and bear no identifiable relation to any external
definition of the "needs" of the population served.
The Canadian response has been to try to impose capacity constraints on the availability
of facilities, sources of payment, and (much less successfully) personnel. The assumption,
as noted above, is that when subjected to these constraints, the providers of health care will
themselves choose to provide the services that respond to the greatest needs. Thus the payers
for services can avoid the difficult and politically dangerous task of establishing explicit
priorities and protocols; and the fiercely defended autonomy of the physician need not be
challenged.
This approach is slowly changing, however, in the face of accumulating evidence that
patterns of care use in Canada bear no more systematic relation to indicators of need than
they do in any other jurisdiction, and more important, under the increasing pressure for
more resources from the providers of health care themselves, which is a consequences of
the increase in physician supply and the extension of technology. Now that providers are
beginning to challenge the relatively arbitrary limitations on facilities and resources more
intensely, provincial governments are becoming increasingly interested in the extensive
research evidence of ineffective and inefficient care delivery as a basis for counterattack.
This last point is most important. The research evidence of inefficiency and ineffectiveness
of care provision, measured in relation to the scientific basis for judging what interventions
work and how they might be carried out, has been available for many years, though it is
certainly growing in scale and sophistication. But for most of the history of the Canadian
programs, at least, and apparently in Europe as well, the cruder forr.s of cost restraint that
raised no awkward questions about why physicians and others do what they do represented
the politically most comfortable compromise.
That compromise appears finally to be breaking down, and governments in a number of
countries, acting as regulators and payers on behalf of their citizens, are beginning to address
explicitly the question of "how medicine should be practiced." As noted above, in Canada
this process is occurring through expert committees appointed by govenuments and profes-
sional bodies to wrestle with priority setting and protocol definition, within the limits of
globally fixed budgets. This is a major step forward from the historic policy of implicit
constraint through deliberate limits on the availability of facilities, but it is too soon to tell
how successful such processes will be, and particularly whether they will be able to sustain
the inevitable political counterattack. But at least the questions are being raised at a much
higher political level than ever before.2 2
From Sickness Care to Health: Some Missing Links
Under the Canada Health Act of 1984, the objective of Canadian health care policy is "to
protect, promote, and restore the physical and mental well-being of residents of Canada,
and to facilitate reasonable access to health services without financial or otherbarriers," and
the act refers to "outstanding progress" through the system of insured health services. But
it also declares that further improvements will depend on a combination of improved
individual lifestyles and "collective action against the social, environmental, and occupa-
tional causes of disease." These themes reiterate ideas expressed in a document issued in
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1974 by the federal minister of national health and welfare, Marc Lalonde, A New Perspective
on the Health of Canadians.
Equalizing access to health care, or at least removing the financial barriers-and signifi-
cantly increasing the overall quantity of resources available-has not equalized access to,
or at least the experience of, health, across the population. There remain significant inequal-
ities in life expectancy and health status across different socioeconomic groups. Further-
more, there are obvious sources of mortality and morbidity that are simply beyond the reach
of health care services as conventionally defined. A public healthi policy, as distinct from a
lhealtlh care policy, would have to go much deeper into the determinants of health and illness,
and consider, and carry out, a much wider range of interventions than simply the expansion
(or contraction) of particular health care services.
This is clearly recognized within the federal Department of National Health and Welfare;
the Ottawa Charter of 1986 was a strong affirmation of support for the World Health
Organization Health for All initiative. Most provincial Ministries of Health have a similar
understanding, although they are so heavily involved in the day-to-day and year-to-year
operations of the health care system that they do not always have the luxury of pursuing
the broader issues. In general, however, these broader issues of inequalities in and determi-
nants of health have been honored with much rhetoric-and a nontrivial amount of careful
thought-but very little financial support.
The problem is simply that the relentless pressure for expansion from the health care
system, independently of any contribution it may or may not be demonstrated to make to
the health of the population, absorbs the lion's share of both current resources and any
additional amount that may become available. Thus cost containment in health care be-
comes a precondition for any new initiative in other areas of health. By a cruel irony, an
overextended health care system may become a threat to health.
Nevertheless, despite its relatively limited constitutional role, the federal government is
clearly pressing ahead with its concerns for the promotion of health, whether in or particu-
larly outside the health care system. In particular, it has launched a number of surveys to
accumulate a much wider body of data on the health status of the Canadian population;
until recently a great deal was known about utilization and the costs of care but very little
about health. Provincial governments' concerns for improved efficiency and effectiveness,
though driven primarily by cost concerns, also lead quite naturally into questions about the
relative effectiveness of health care as against other public interventions in pursuing the
central objective: the health of Canadians.
Conclusions
In summary, the Canadian approach to health care funding has succeeded in equalizing
access to health care services, though less so to health. This appears to be a common finding
in the industrialized countries, reflecting the fact that population health is not determined
simply by the availability or use of health care. The health status of the Canadian population,
insofar as that is known (which is not very far) compares well on the usual indicators of life
expectancy and infant mortality with the rest of the industrialized world and continues to
improve.
The public insurance system has not only improved access to health care, it has alsoplayed
an important role in "nation-building" and community solidarity, as it emphasizes a
fundamental equality among citizens. Greater wealth or position buy many things, but they
do not buy more or better health care; in that all Canadians are equal. Moreover the economic
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burden of this system is shared, through the general tax system, according to the ability to
pay of citizens. Since there are no direct payments, people who must bear the burden of
illness and injury do not have to carry an additional economic burden as well. No one in
Canada fears economic ruin from the cost of health care, and no one depends on "charity,"
whether public or private. The financing problems, and associated negotiations, are com-
pletely removed from the shoulders of individual citizens.
Going beyond ensuring access and improving the lives of individual citizens, the Cana-
dian system has also managed to contain the costs of health care for an extended period of
time. This is a crucial test of the sustainability of a funding system; disequilibrium requires
change. Furthermore it has done so in a way that has reconciled the interests of citizens as
payers, and citizens as patients, and is consequently overwhelmingly popular politically. It
is less popular with physicians, at least officially, though strongly supported by hospitals
and other health occupations.23
The political price of cost containment, however, is rising. The severe recession at the
beginning of the 1980s was associated with a sharp increase in the share of national income
going to health care, because income fell and health spending did not. Stability has been
reestablished, but in the new low-growth environment this requires even tighter controls.
A stable share of a constant total income is much less acceptable to providers, and the
pressure for more is becoming increasingly acute.
But on balance, after more than twenty years of experience, it appears that even most
physicians working in the Canadian system prefer it to the known alternatives; they would
just like more money (and more hospital facilities and more equipment, and the right to
extra-bill patients, and ... .). Similarly, nurses and other hospital workers strongly support
the existing system but believe that its funding should be greatly increased. Taxpayers are
less enthusiastic. (Patients generally believe whatever they are told by providers.)
On the basis of this experience, which is not so different from that of a number of European
countries, we conclude unequivocally that centralized, public funding systems "work,"
although they will require an increasing degree of explicit collective intervention in the
determination of the content of medical practice. Whether this will be "public" or "private,"
or more realistically what the balance should be between the two, depends upon whether
the medical profession can bring itself to develop and enforce scientifically based standards
upon its members, or whether the public sector will have to take on this role by default.
On the other hand, we conclude equally unequivocally from the comparative United
States experience that private, or "pluralistic" funding systems do not "work"; they produce
neither effective health care, nor equity, nor public satisfaction and cannot meet even the
most fundamental test of stable and sustainable cost. One cannot rule out the possibility that
some pluralistic system might be developed in the future that would be capable of harness-
ing competitive forces to improve health care system performance. But at present most such
systems exist only in the imaginations of those with an overriding ideological commitment
to the private marketplace; they cannot be shown to have been seriously tried, much less to
have succeeded, in the real world.
There are, of course, examples of thoughtful and carefully worked out competitive
proposals that take into account the sources of failure in ordinary conceptions of "market"
systems and attempt to develop realistic ways of dealing with them (for example, Enthoven
and Kronick 1988). These may be attractive where the status quo is considered intolerable,
but such admittedly imperfect but battle-tested systems as the Canadian are ruled out on
ideological grounds. But even these are untried alternatives; moreover, the feasibility of their
full implementation in a highly adversarial environment is very far from clear.
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Where the Canadian system has most clearly fallen short is its inability to develop a
coherent and consistent personnel policy, and this is an expensive failing. Nor has it yet
made much progress in the promotion of efficiency and effectiveness. The United States
appears to be far out in front of the rest of the world on these issues (yet unable to draw the
benefit from its superior knowledge and technique). Rachlis and Kushner's (1989) assertion
that the system is undermanaged is undoubtedly correct, so that waiting lines exist and
patients sometimes suffer, not because of a scarcity of overall resources, but because those
available are misused. This is in part the price of professional autonomy.
Along with most of the rest of the world, Canadians do not yet know nearly enough about
the determinants of health, and why some people are healthy and others not. But they
recognize the problem, and they are working on it.
Notes
1. The commission rejected, however, the notion of large conditional federal grants directed to areas
of provincial j urisdiction. Yet these conditional grants-50 percent cost sharing by the federal govem-
ment-were to be an essential component of both the hospital and the medical care insurance
programs. In 1977 the federal contribution ceased to be based on program costs, but it remains
conditional on the conformity of the provincial plans to national standards.
2. British Columbia abandoned hospital premiums in 1954 but continues to levy premiums for
medical care. As of the end of 1991, a shift from premiums to some other form of tax is under active
discussion.
3. There was also considerable support for the doctors from south of the border. "The American
Medical Association was at this time hysterically opposed to Medicare; and it endeavoured, not
without some success, to communicate its hysteria to the doctors and the public in Saskatchewan"
(Taylor 1978). A successful public program in Canada might spread. The United States did launch its
Medicare and Medicaid programs in 1965; and thirty years later, American interest in the Canadian
system has again become intense.
4. The provinces would of course have been entirely within their rights to do so. The change from
cost sharing to block grants, forced by the federal government in 1977, placed no restrictions on how
the provinces used their funds. They thus interpreted the federal claim as an attempt to embarrass
them politically.
5. Taylor (1978) quotes a former federal minister of health, Judy LaMarsh, at the time of the debates
over the federal Medical Care Act in 1966: "The opponents of medicare ... came out from their lairs
again: the medical profession, the provinces, the medical care insurers, all of them." The same interests
objected to the Canada Health Act in 1984.
6. Private insurers have larger and more profitable markets in a private system, physicians make
more money, and wealthy individuals can buy preferred access when there are user charges.
7. "Premiums" have a rather peculiar history in the Canadian system. It was obvious to the designers
of the public insurance system that universality was essential for a number of very good reasons, and
they have of course turned out to be right. But this seemed to imply a compulsory system. The general
population was in favor of universality-multiclass medicine and dumping the poor have never had
much support in Canada-but were very ambivalent about compulsion and on balance seemed to be
opposed to it. Physicians were, of course, ambivalent about universality and bitterly opposed to
compulsion.
The compromise was a premium-based system in which provinces were committed to achieving
"almost" universality by a combination of regulation and tax incentives. Premiums were uniform, not
risk-related; all employers over a certain size were required to enroll their workers; competitive private
coverage was not permitted; and the premiums were set well below actual cost, with the difference
made up from general revenue. In this way, de facto universality was reached without formal
compulsion.
It was apparent almost immediately that premiums in a universal system were simply a regressive
poll tax, costly to collect, covering only a small proportion of health costs, and moreover with certain
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technical disadvantages for provincial income tax collections. Thus by the early 1970s most provinces
had scrapped them, and relied wholly on other tax revenues.
Three provinces with relatively right-wing govemments retained premiums, however, and tinkered
with them to make them less regressive by providing premium subsidies to lower-income fanilies.
But they were never able to present any plausible reason for retaining this relatively expensive way
of collecting taxes. The real reason may be ideological symbolism: some of their members and
supporters were never reconciled to a truly "public" system, but could not say so openly. A change
of government, from Conservative to Liberal, led to the abandonment of premiums in Ontario in 1990,
and British Columbia is quite likely to do so within the next year or two, which would leave Alberta
in isolation.
8. The federal law on this point is clear, but provincial practice is not. Most residents of the two
provinces still levying premiums are unaware that they cannot legally become "uninsured"; and
physicians are not reimbursed for services provided to those whose premiums are not paid up. Thus
the premium system ltas become to some degree a barrier to access for certain groups in the population,
despite the explicit requirements of the federal statute.
9. Certain services have always been excluded from the definition of "medical necessity," elective
cosmetic surgery for example, or health examinations for administrative reasons. Annual health exams
are also known to be of no medical benefit and are excluded from coverage for the general population;
certain types of immunizations are also covered only for high-risk groups. But when both patient and
provider have an economic incentive, it is not very difficult to find some other reimbursable classifi-
cation for such a service, an ordinary office visit, for example. Exclusion of inappropriate services
would require one to delve much more deeply into the patient's condition and second-guess the
physician's decisions in individual cases, in a way that has rarely been done in Canada.
One might limit the reimbursement of physicians or hospitals when there is evidence of marked
deviation, on average, from external standards. Provincial pattems of practice among review commit-
tees already do this, in a small way, and the move to funding hospitals on the basis of the populations
they serve would carry implicit penalties for overservicing. But the public identification of a doctor's
decision as wrong, to the patient, among others, is political dynamite.
10. The constraints on capacity imposed by the provincial governments are twofold. They supply
(or do not) both the capital funding for new equipment, and the operating funds for hospitals to use
it. Contrary to the common allegations in the American press, these constraints do not lead to a failure
to keep up with leading-edge technology, but they do limit its proliferation. The new and expensive
equipment or program will be established in one or two sites, usually at a large health sciences center,
and access will be limited to those most likely to benefit.
Some physicians, and patients, who would like the new service, will not get it. There are not CAT
scanners on every street corner or in mobile vans set up at shopping centers. But one hears a great deal
from those who are denied access, whether or not the service would have been appropriate for their
condition. One does not hear from the Americans who were provided with useless or harmful services;
they do not know who they are. Again, the fundamental question is not "Who has most?" but "What
care is appropriate?" That question is not emphasized, however, either by those who sell machines or
by those who are paid to use them.
11. Physicians have consistently sought the right to extra-bill above the fee schedule and to impose
other forms of direct charges on patients. Their objective is explicitly to increase the cost of a system
that they claim to be underfunded. Yet simple-minded economic models assume that such charges
will reduce overall rates of utilization and costs, and lower the incomes of the physicians who advocate
them. Both physicians and neoclassical economists are very wrong in their understanding of the
determinants of health care use.
The comparison between the United States and Canada is suggestive, since the former has the
highest charges to patients, in the OECD world at least, and the latter among the lowest. Yet it is in
the United States that costs are "exploding."
12. There is a significant exception to this penalty. Patients in long-term care are provided with room
and board, which they would otherwise be paying for out of pocket. (Patients in acute care do not
usually give up their residences.) Since almost all such patients are elderly, and on some form of public
pension, the allowable charges are set at a level to recoup most of the public pension, leaving a basic
"comfort allowance." The charges bear no relation to the actual cost of providing care, which is met
from public budgets.
"Prices" in this case are used as income distribution mechanisms, not as ways of influencing use.
Their focus is equity, not efficiency in the economist's sense.
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13. Certainly the Canadian rates greatly exceed the corresponding American averages, which are
themselves well above the experience of populations served by American health maintenance orga-
nizations. Yet Canadian physicians continue to claim that they need more beds, and occupancy rates
are near the limits of de facto capacity. There are similar concerns about overuse of hospital beds in a
number of European countries, and similar efforts to reduce capacity.
14. In some cases, hospitals have been successful in convincing private donors to provide funds or
equipment, but then the hospital must find resources for increased operating costs within its global
budget. Ministries usually resist providing increased operating resources for an unapproved capital
expansion.
15. This is slightly too simple. Procedural fees for diagnostic services are usually divided into a
professional and a technical component. An appropriately qualified physician can claim the profes-
sional fee for interpreting the diagnostic results, whether the equipment is owned by a hospital, a
private facility, or his or her own practice. But if there is not also a technical fee component in the
negotiated schedule, to pay for the equipment, technicians, and reagents, then in effect the equipment
is not reimbursable outside the hospital. In addition, even when private facilities can be reimbursed
for diagnostic services, there will be some form of additional licensure or other restrictions limiting
those entitled to bill.
16. Such theater can, however, have powerful political consequences. Life and death events are
emotionally gripping and can have significant effects on the allocation of health care resources among
particular programs.
17. Unless they happen to be quite well off, which in general they will not be, because illness is
correlated with poverty, not wealth. The tens of millions of Americans who are uninsured, or have
grossly inadequate coverage, are not an unfortunate aberration or oversight, but rather a natural and
inevitable outcome of the operation of competitive forces in a private insurance market. This point has
been made clearly by Fein (1986), who illustrates it through the history of private health insurance in
the United States.
18. Figure 5-1 above shows Canada's relative ranking in per capita cost at the beginning and end of
the 1980s: it is far below the United States but above all other OECD countries. Certain countries-
Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands-have moved down in relative position, an indication of lower-
than-average cost escalation. But as figures 5-2 and 5-3 show, the American "cost explosion" has largely
been contained in Canada. These data have been disputed by, among others, the Health Insurance
Association of America, which is quite understandably concerned that the Canadian approach might
be adopted in the United States. But the difference is real: see Barer, Welch, and Antioch (1991), and
Evans, Barer, and Hertzman (1989).
19. One might think that this was peculiar to a fully insured environment, but in fact the same pattern
is observed even in the United States, where a large proportion of physicians' services are paid for out
of pocket by patients.
20. No one in his or her right mind has ever suggested that there is an obligation on the public to
train as a physician anyone who might wish to become one, and qualify for entry. The basic idea that
a public educational and payment system should recruit, train, and reimburse the numbers of
personnel required to meet the needs of the population is virtually unquestioned, in principle. In
practice, however, the needs have been redefined by professionals to justify a level of capacity that
arose by accident.
21. The struggle over how much producers should earn-income shares-is largely though not
entirely a separate question, though providers try hard to confuse the two. It is commonly claimed
that higher (lower) fees and wages will lead to better (worse) quality of care for patients, though the
mechanisms are not always clear.
22. In Canada, it is taken for granted that these questions will be addressed through some negotiation
between governments, representing the general public as payers and patients, and the providers of
care, also representing the public as patients and themselves as earners. New institutions may be
developed to ensure a more effective representation of both patients and the general public, but there
is little interest in private markets as ways of improving efficiency and effectiveness. The U.S.
experience is too close and too vivid.
23. It is probable that the inherent conflict of economic and professional interest-both income and
autonomy-is so sharply drawn that no system of funding that meets the concerns of the rest of the
community will ever be wholly acceptable to physicians, and conversely. Certainly the Canadian
system was established over their opposition. A search for a national system acceptable to all parties
would probably be a nonsense exercise, a proposal to do nothing.
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The Health System of the United States:
Lessons for Other Countres
Uwe E. Reinhardt
Although American policy analysts frequently speak of a national health policy, there does
not exist in the United States a health policy of the breadth and coherence characteristic of
national health policies in other countries. The United States does not have, for instance, a
national policy outlining the health services to which every American child should be
entitled as a right or, for that matter, to which every American should be entitled. Since the
days of the Founding Fathers, the definition of these entitlements has been viewed as a state
and local prerogative. Other nations typically consider the articulation of such entitlements
at the national level fundamental to their sense of nationhood. A Canadian or German, for
example, would not accept the proposition that children in different parts of the same nation
ought to have different entitlements to health care.
The Locus of Responsibility for American Health Policy
In keeping with American traditions, the responsibility for formulating and administering
the policies that govern health care in the United States is shared between the federal and
state and local governments. To the foreign observer, this practice can be bewildering, as it
sometimes is even to Americans themselves. The complexity of this allocation task can be
vividly illustrated by considering the political locus of fiscal responsibility for the treatment
of a particular diseased organ of a particular American individual. To ascertain that locus,
one must go through the following decision tree:
If the individual with the diseased organ is sixty-five years or older, the responsibility lies
with the federal government for at least part of the expenses, as the patient will then be
covered by the federal Medicare program for the aged (with few exceptions).
If the individual is younger than sixty-five years, but the diseased organ is a kidney, then
its treatment is also a federal fiscal responsibility, because since 1973 kidney disease has
been covered by Medicare for individuals of all ages.
If the individual is younger than sixty-five years and the organ is not a kidney, treatment
may be the state's fiscal responsibility if the person is poor enough to qualify for a particular
state's Medicaid program (a threshold that varies substantially across the United States).
If the treatment of the organ is not the responsibility of the state, it may be the fiscal
responsibility of a county, failing which, the responsibility lies with the individual him- or
herself. If the organ belongs to an uninsured child and the child's parents are either poor or
indifferent to its plight, treatment will sometimes be regarded as nobody's responsibility.
115
116 Country Case Stuidies
In short, as the name quite aptly implies, the "United States" is less a cohesive nation than
a somewhat loose federation of fairly sovereign states that extend over a vast geographic
expanse and embrace a variety of cultures lacking a shared social ethos. The northeastern
states, for example, have generally shown a far greater willingness to subject their health
sectors to systematic planning and price regulation than have the more entrepreneurial
states in the southern and western regions. Thus it is always risky to generalize broadly
about American customs and institutions because glaring exceptions can always be found.
At most, one can speak of central tendencies, and all subsequent comments in this chapter
should be so understood.
The Population Served by the American Health System
In 1989 the population of the United States was about 248.2 million with a median age of
about thirty-two years. During the 1970s and 1980s, that population grew at an average
annual compound rate of about 1 percent. By the standards of the newly industrialized
economies (NIEs)-where typically far fewer than 10 percent of the population are aged
sixty-five-the American population appears relatively old. By European standards, how-
ever, it is a relatively young population. In 1990 those aged sixty-five or older accounted for
close to 15.5 percent of the population in Germany, 15.1 percent in the United Kingdom,
13.8 percent in France and in Italy, but only 12.6 percent in the United States.
In 1987 the United States had about 91 million "households." Of these, 65 million were
classified as "families" of two or more related individuals living together; the remainder
were households of single individuals. Of the 65 million families, about half did not have
any children and only 2.8 percent had four children or more. The average size of the
American family is thus rather small: in 1987 it was 3.19 persons.
In America's multiethnic and multiracial society, ethnicity and race have become import-
ant variables in the formulation and tracking of social policy. Race and ethnicity are
correlated with income. In relation to "white" households, "Hispanic" households had a
substantially lower median income, and "black" households had an even lower median
income.1 These income differentials translate into differences in lifestyle, living environ-
ment, health insurance status, access to health care, and, jointly via all of these factors, into
differential health status. In 1987, for example, the average life expectancy at birth for white
males was 72.1 years, but only 69.7 years for black males. For white and black females, the
corresponding figures were 78.8 and 73.8, respectively (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989: table
106, p. 7).
On average, health status for white American infants is superior to that of nonwhite
Americans. Even for white Americans, however, the United States reports a higher infant
mortality rate than is being reported by many other nations (table 6-1).
It is, of course, risky to introduce health status indicators of this sort into cross-national
comparisons of health systems because these statistics are driven by a host of economic,
environmental, and behavioral factors. In 1987, for example, the homicide rate among white
males in the United States was 8.6 per 100,000. The comparable figure for black males was
55.0 per 100,000 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989: table 123, p. 83). Similarly, in 1986, the
percentage of births to teenage mothers was 22.8 among black mothers, 16.5 among Hispanic
mothers, and only 10.6 among white mothers. Remarkably, it was as low as 1.1 percent
among mothers of Chinese origin and 3.0 percent among mothers of Japanese origin (U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1989: table 89, p. 64). These behavioral or circumstantial differences
are not easily eliminated with a medical model of intervention. Therefore the health status
indicators they beget cannot be attributed to the functioning of the health system per se.
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Table 6-1. Health Status Indicators for American Infants, 1986
Nonwhite
Indicator White Black Total Total
Births (thousands)
All women 2,970 621 786 3,756
Younger than 19 315 142 157 472
Younger than 15 4 6 6 10
Teen births (%)
Younger than 19 10.6 22.8 19.9 12.6
Younger than 15 0.1 0.9 0.8 0.3
Low-birthweight births (%)
All women 5.6 12.5 11.2 6.8
Younger than 19 7.7 13.3 12.7 9.4
Percentage of all low
birthweight births
Younger than 19 14.4 24.1 22.6 17.3
Prenatal care (%)
First trimester
All women 79.2 61.6 63.7 75.9
Younger than 19 55.9 46.8 47.1 53.0
Third trimester or not at all
All women 5.0 10.6 9.9 6.0
Younger than 19 11.6 15.0 15.0 12.7
Adequate care
All women 72.6 50.6 51.8 68.4
Inadequate care
All women 6.3 15.3 14.7 8.0
Infant mortality (deaths per
1,000 live births)
Total 8.9 18.0 15.7 10.4
Neonatal 5.8 11.7 10.1 6.7
Postneonatal 3.1 6.3 5.6 3.6
Souirce: Hughes and others (1989), table 1.1, p. 4.
It is fair to propose, however, that in view of the large and growing "underclass" in the
United States, the nation's health system faces challenges not faced in like measure by other
nations in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.2 Indeed, in this
respect the United States probably resembles more some of the NIEs, whose local analogs
of the American underclass are also still quite sizable. As will be seen later in this discussion,
it is fair also to assert that the American health system has so far failed to rise to that challenge
as well as would easily be technically feasible and economically affordable. That failure is
one of the system's sorrier shortcomings.
The American Health Care Delivery System
According to the Statistical Abstract of the United States (1987), the number of persons
employed in the health occupations in 1985 numbered 5.7 million. That statistic represents
only persons directly involved in patient care. It does not include the millions of employees
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and entrepreneurs who indirectly support these health workers. If "providers" or "health
workers" are defined as all persons who directly or indirectly derive the bulk of their
income-in the form of wages, salaries, fees, or profits-from the process of health care, the
total number of health workers in the United States probably exceeds 10 million. The
majority of these health workers are employees of health care facilities, insurance compa-
nies, manufacturers of health products, or an ever-growing number of consulting firms that
help Americans on all sides of the health care market think their way through the often
bewildering maze their system represents. Fewer than 1 million American health workers
are self-employed professional entrepreneurs. Among them (in 1986) are about 520,000
physicians (2.2 per 1,000 population), 140,000 dentists (0.6 per 1,000 population), and 170,000
pharmacists (0.7 per 1,000 population). Nurses constitute one of the larger professional
groups employed by others, approximately 1.5 million (6.6 per 1,000 population in 1986).
Most of these health workers, whether self-employed or employed by others, are repre-
sented in the political arena by regional and national associations of health care profession-
als (such as the American Medical Association, or the American Nursing Association) or by
associations of health care facilities (such as the American Hospital Association). The
principal objective of most of these associations is to enhance their members' economic
status, although that is rarely the ostensible goal inscribed in their charter.
By the power accorded these organized interest groups under the American system of
governance, by the force of the financial strength they build from their members' dues, and
by the sway that campaign contributions from interest groups tend to hold over the minds
and souls of American legislators, these associations have always been the prime shapers
of American health policy. Not surprisingly, that policy has served the economic interests
of providers as much, if not more, than the medical needs of the population served by the
system.3
For example, the loosely federated, nationwide network of private not-for-profit Blue
Cross health insurance plans was created not by the government to ensure the financial
security of patients, but by America's hospitals to provide for themselves a stable source of
financing. Another of their objectives was to deter the government from introducing its own
national health insurance scheme, which might confroat hospitals with more effective
bargaining power on the payer's side.
Indeed, it is precisely because government-financed and operated health insurance tends
to concentrate monopsonistic (single-buyer) market power on the demand side of the health
care market that both the nation's medical associations and its hospital associations have
always tenaciously-and, so far, successfully-fought the introduction of government-run
universal health insurance. Instead, these provider associations have favored the highly
fragmented, pluralistic mix of private, for-profit, and not-for-profit health insurance system
that is currently composed of more than 1,000 independent carriers. Each insurance carrier
within that system lacks sufficient market power to bargain effectively with providers over
prices and other terms of compensation. From a provider's standpoint, that allocation of
market power is, of course, always the preferred approach.
Physicians are at the apex of the U.S. health care system. Of the 519,000 professionally
active physicians in 1986, close to 89 percent were engaged primarily in the delivery of
patient care-about 63 percent in office-based practice and the remainder in hospital-based
practice. Only about 9 percent of professionally active physicians were full-time staff
members of a hospital. The remainder of the hospital-based physicians were residents or
fellows in training (see table 6-2).
Contrary to widely held impressions, the traditional solo practitioner is far from a dying
breed in the United States. Although their number has decreased over time, in 1988 an
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Table 6-2. Trends in the Active U.S. Physician Population, Selected Years, 1970-86
Percentage change
Category 1970 1980 1985 1986 1970-86 1980-86
Total active physician
populationa 312,040 435,545 511,090 519,411 66.5 19.3
Active physicians per 1,000
civilian population 1.53 1.93 2.15 2.16 41.1 11.9
Postresidency patient care
physiciansb 231,121 328,715 383,296 391,300 69.3 19.1
Postresidency patient care
physicians per 1,000 civilian
population 1.13 1.39 1.57 1.59 40.5 14.9
Major professional activityc
Patient care 279,766 376,512 448,820 462,126 65.2 22.7
Residents 49,353 62,042 75,411 80,476 63.1 29.7
Fellowsd n.a. n.a. n.a. 8,264 - -
Office-based 195,395 272,000 330,197 326,978 67.3 20.2
Hospital staff 35,018 42,470 43,212 46,408 32.5 9.3
Nonpatient care 30,852 38,404 48,320 43,624 41.4 13.6
Medical teaching 5,738 7,942 7,832 7,721 34.6 -2.8
Administration 11,874 12,209 13,810 14,399 21.3 17.9
Research 10,670 15,377 23,268 17,847 67.3 16.1
Other 2,570 2,876 3,410 3,657 42.3 27.2
Not classified n.a. 20,629 13,950 13,661 n.a. -33.8
n.a. not applicable.
- not available.
a. Excludes inactive and temporary foreign physicians, as well as those with uncertain addresses.
b. The population of postresidency patient care physicians includes office-based physicians, hospital
staff, fellows, and part of the nonclassified category, which we estimate to be in patient care.
c. Complete data for "not classified" category were not available until 1972. Total for 1970 includes
358 "not classified" physicians.
d. Fellows were counted as a separate category in the 1986 master file. For our purposes, fellows are
included in the postresidency physician population rather than the resident population. The significant
drop in research physicians in 1986 may be a consequence of taking research fellows out of the research
category.
Soutrce: Marder, Kletke, and others (1988), table 2.1, p. 8.
estimated 35.6 percent of self-employed American physicians still were private, office-based
solo practitioners. The remainder were in group practices of various sizes, about three-quar-
ters of them in group practices with eight or fewer physician members (Gonzales, Simmons,
and Slora 1988: table 52, p. 85).4 The number of female physicians in the United States is
growing rapidly, and it will continue to do so in the future. In academic year 1986-87, 35
percent of all first-year medical students were female. The corresponding number was only
9.2 percent in 1969-70 (Marder and others 1988: table 2.11, p. 28).
On average, Americans see a physician between 5 and 6 times a year. In 1986 the average
number was 4.5 for males of all ages and races and 6.2 for females. White Americans had
an average annual visit rage of 5.5, compared with an average of 4.6 for black Americans.
Americans saw a dentist about twice in 1986. The rate was 1.9 for males, 2.2 for females, 2.1
for white Americans, and 1.4 for black Americans (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989: table
153, p. 99).
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Table 6-3. Selected Characteristics of the American Hospital Sector, 1986
Clraracteristic Numniber
Total number of hospitals, all types 6,841
Average number of beds per hospital 188
Beds by type of hospital and ownership (thousands) 1,283 (100.0)
Federal hospitals 111 (8.7)
Nonfederal hospitals
Short-term only
Private, not-for-profit 686 (53.0)
Private, for-profit 106 (8.2)
State and local government 184 (14.3)
Long-term facilities 30 (2.3)
Psychiatric hospitals 165 (12.9)
Nuember of beds per 1,000 popiulation
All hospitals 5.4
Short-term hospitals 4.1
Personnel per 100 patients
All hospitals 413
Short-term hospitals 481
Admissions in nonfederal, short-term hospitals
Admissions per 1,000 population 136
Days of patient care per 1,000 population 913
Admissions per bed 33
Average length of stay (days) 7.1
Outpatient visits per admission 7.2
Outpatient visits per 1,000 population 983
Surgical operations per admission 0.6
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages.
Souirce: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1989), tables 158, 160, and 161.
The American hospital sector is a mixture of publicly and privately owned facilities.
Private, investor-owned, for-profit hospitals own only about 10 percent of all short-term
and psychiatric hospitals. The great majority of American hospitals are either government
owned or privately owned not-for-profit entities (table 6-3).
The United States has fewer beds per capita than do the other nations in the OECD, which
have 8-12 beds per 1,000 population. The average length of stay in short-term acute-care
hospitals in the United States is 7.1 days (it is 9 days for all types of hospitals), which is the
lowest such stay in the OECD countries. For most other nations, the average is between 12
and 24 (Schneider and others 1989: 61-65). On the other hand, Americans beds are more
heavily staffed than beds elsewhere, partly because the typical patient stay in the United
States is shorter and thus the typical American patient day is more resource-intensive.
One of the many reasons that the average length of stay per case in American hospitals
is so low is that there are many nursing homes and related facilities for the aged. In 1986
these facilities numbered 25,646, with a complement of slightly more than 1.7 million beds.
In addition, there were 7,262 skilled nursing facilities with about 600,000 beds. Close to 80
percent of these nursing homes and skilled nursing facilities are privately owned, for-profit
entities. Another 18 percent are private, not-for-profit entities, and the remainder are
publicly owned.
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If self-employed physicians, dentists, pharmacists, and other private purveyors of health
services and products are classified as private, profit-seeking entrepreneurs, then it is
reasonable to assert that about two-thirds of all outlays on health services and supplies in
the United States go to for-profit entities.5 The remainder is paid to so-called not-for-profit
entities, chiefly not-for-profit nursing homes and hospitals, including government hospitals.
The term "not-for-profit" is quite misleading in this context, however. As Rosemary
Stevens has convincingly argued (1989), the typical American not-for-profit hospital has
traditionally been operated along business lines and normally books sizable profit margins.
The term "not-for-profit" merely means that the hospital does not distribute the profits it
books to outside owners but instead recycles them into the hospital's operations. It does not
mean that the hospital's management lacks motivation to ensure positive operating sur-
pluses from managing the hospital's clinical and economic affairs.
Many not-for-profit hospitals in the United States are currently eliminating "product
lines" (health services) that do not appear profitable (such as obstetric units or neonatal care
departments that act as conduits for uninsured and poor patients) and are replacing these
with more profitable services (such as sports medicine or health clubs). Furthermore, many
of these hospitals have begun to divert uninsured patients away from their doors toward
government-owned hospitals. They can do this simply by telling ambulance drivers to go
to public hospitals or, more delicately, by letting it be known that the hospital has closed its
emergency department. The latter practice is spreading in the city of Los Angeles and in
parts of the South. In the jargon of hospital administrators, the motto of some hospitals is
"No margin, no mission." As always in the United States, one must not generalize recklessly
on this point. The behavior of its not-for-profit hospitals spans the entire spectrum from
extraordinary charity to unbridled commercialism. In the end, one must concede that even
a saint, faced with a huge payroll, fixed interest payments, and a market-constrained
revenue budget, must at some point say no to uninsured patients. In some states, there exist
hospital-financed revenue pools from which the individual hospital is compensated for care
rendered free of charge to indigents. The state of New Jersey has such a system in place, as
do many other states, particularly in the Northeast.
The American Health Insurance System
In 1988 Americans collectively transferred $540 billion (11.1 percent of the GNP, or $2,124
per capita) to the direct and indirect providers of health care. Of this total, some $20 billion
was allocated to research and construction, and another $26 billion to public program
administration and the net administrative costs of private health insurance. A total of $478
billion was spent directly on personal health care. Of this last amount, the hospital sector
received about 44 percent, physicians about 22 percent (in the form of gross practice billings),
dentists about 6 percent, drugs 9 percent, nursing homes 9 percent, other independent health
professionals about 5 percent, and other services 5 percent.
Roughly 24 percent of total national outlays for personal health care flowed directly from
patients to the providers of that care. That degree of cost sharing by patients at the point of
service is quite high within the industrialized world. Third parties accounted for about
three-quarters of total spending on personal health care in 1988. Among the third-party
payers, federal, state, and local governments accounted for about 41 percent of total
spending. Private health insurance carriers covered close to 33 percent, and other sources
(chiefly philanthropy) the remaining 26 percent.
Figure 6-1 shows how these shares have changed since 1960. The share paid by patients
directly at the point of service has gradually declined over time, whereas the shares of both
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Figure 6-1. Sources of Funds for Personal Health Care as a Percentage of Total
Spending, 1960-88
Percentage
60
' --- Patients, out of pocket
50
'__ Govemment
40
30 - - - - - - - - - - -
20 Private health insurance
10
Other sources
0 T- 7 7 7 7. I , 7 7 7 7. I, I, I I I I I, I 7 
60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88
Year
Source: U.S. DHHS (1990).
government and private health insurance have increased. The most dramatic shift occurred
in 1965-67, after the introduction of both the federal Medicare program for persons aged
sixty-five and older and the federal-state Medicaid program for poor families. These
programs obviously relieved large numbers of Americans of financial responsibility for
much of their health care. It also made some inroads into the economic turf of private health
insurers, which explains why that industry has always staunchly opposed broadly based
health insurance programs of this sort.
Private Health Insurance
Americans have historically viewed private health insurance as the proper financial corner-
stone of their health system. That cornerstone appears to have become increasingly brittle
in recent years. As a result, the population at large has become worried and disillusioned.
More than 1,200 private, for-profit or not-for-profit, health insurance companies currently
write individual and group health insurance policies to about 100 million Americans. The
national Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association embraces a loose national network of some
seventy-eight regional, not-for-profit Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, which together
cover about 70 million. Other plans cover close to 50 million individuals. Among these are
insurance programs administered by business firms themselves or by outside administra-
tors and health maintenance organizations (HMOs), which obligate themselves to deliver
to the insured a comprehensive package of specified health services against prepayment of
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an annual capitation. There are close to 700 HMOs in the United States, with a total
enrollment of about 30 million individuals (Health Insurance Association of America 1988:
table 1.2; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989: table 148, p. 97; see also DiCarlo and Gabel 1988).
As a general rule, the insurance policies sold by private health insurers are priced on strict
actuarial principles. For group insurance sold to an employer, the premium is experience-
rated over the firm's employees, which means that it will reflect the health status and health
expenditures of that firm's employees. For very large firms, that approach can border on
community-rating, under which premiums in a given geographic area (a "community")
reflect the average actuarial experience of persons living in the region. For very small
business firms, experience-rated health insurance premiums can be highly sensitive to the
health status of one or two employees. Thus, it is not uncommon for small firms to pay a
multiple of what large firms pay, with premiums currently averaging about $3,000 per
employee.
The premiums paid by small business firms are driven up further by the administrative
costs of selling insurance to small groups or individuals. For firms with fewer than twenty
employees, for example, only about 70 percent of premiums are actually paid out to the
providers of health care; the remainder is absorbed by administrative costs and profits. For
policies sold to individuals, an even smaller proportion of premiums actually goes to pay
for health benefits. Indeed, the administrative costs of such individual policies tend to be so
high that some commercial insurance carriers do not even sell such policies anymore.
Private payers-patients or their private insurance carriers-typically pay physicians,
hospitals, and other providers of health care fees charges that are set by the individual
provider, subject to whatever limits the market may place on the provider's discretion.
Roughly 60 percent of all health expenditures flow to providers through this so-called free
market, free in the sense that it is not directly regulated by the government. For repeatedly
purchased, routine well-patient care-for example, annual checkups or well-baby care-
these prices are likely to approximate those of a monopolistically competitive market (see
McCarthy 1985). For crisis interventions, such as the removal of a brain tumor or trauma
care, the limits on prices set by physicians, hospitals, and other health care providers are
less well understood.
It is possible in the United States that a physician will treat patients under several dozen
distinct private insurance contracts and literally receive dozens of different fees for the
identical service. Similarly, the actual payment the typical American hospital receives for
the same service can vary enormously, depending on the insurance carrier paying the
charge. In some respects, the pricing of health care services has come to resemble the price
discriminatory schemes used by the airlines.
The Medicare Program
Medicare is a federal program for the 30 million Americans over the age sixty-five and
certain categories of disabled. It covers physician services, hospital care, and a limited
number of days in skilled nursing facilities. Until now, it has not covered prescription drugs,
dental care, and a variety of other services, and it has always required cost sharing through
deductibles, coinsurance, and extra billings by physicians above the fees allowed by Medi-
care. Eligibility for the program is strictly age related; it is not based on income.
Congress introduced the Medicare program (along with the Medicaid program for the
poor) in 1965, after a decade of heated national debate and over the strong objections of
American physicians and the health insurance industry. They would have preferred a much
more modest government program aimed solely at low-income families. At the time, the
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proponents of a complete, universal, national health insurance (NHI) program viewed
Medicare and Medicaid as mere stepping stones toward their ultimate objective. The
opponents of NHI eventually acquiesced to these more limited programs only after viewing
it as a device to take the wind out of the sails of those pushing for full-fledged NHI. In fact,
the two programs appear to have served precisely that purpose: attempts to revive the
debate over NHI during the 1970s faltered on the argument that private health insurance,
along with Medicare and Medicaid, already did adequately protect the bulk of America's
population against the financial cost of illness and that the remaining pockets of the
uninsured could easily be taken care of through incremental stop-gap measures, such as
charity care or a gradual expansion of Medicaid.
Between 1966 and 1988, total spending on Medicare rose from $1.7 billion to $89 billion.
The program now represents close to 19 percent of total national spending on personal
health care, and it is one of the most rapidly rising components of the federal budget. Even
so, Medicare still covers less than half of the total health care expenditures incurred by the
aged. Another 13 percent is paid by Medicaid, mainly on nursing home care for the very
old and pauperized Medicare beneficiaries. Moreover, the aged themselves still cover an
average of close to one-third of their own health care expenditures with their own resources,
either through private Medigap insurance or out of pocket at the time of service.
Because the out-of-pocket expenditures borne by the aged are not income-related, their
incidence is highly regressive. They constitute a serious burden on the already meager
budgets of the low-income elderly, as is apparent from table 6-4. Unfortunately, many
elderly Americans are so frightened by the high cost of illness and so confused by the
plethora of insurance products offered in the Medigap market that many of them have
purchased duplicate policies whose benefits they may never receive. Many of these policies
operate at high loss ratios (defined as the proportion of the premium returned to the insured
in the form of covered health benefits). In 1987, for example, the average loss ratio for
commercial Medigap policies was 74 percent, although that ratio was lifted considerably by
the 83 percent ratio reported by one company, Prudential Insurance. For the remaining
commercial carriers, the loss ratio averaged only 59 percent; in other words, more than 40
percent of the premiums paid by the aged for such policies went to cover administrative
costs and the carriers' profits. For the Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, the loss ratio was
between 93 and 96 percent (Congressional Research Service 1989: 11).
The high loss ratios among most of the private commercial insurers speak volumes about
the often alleged superior economic efficiency so often claimed by such carriers for their
product in comparison with publicly provided insurance (which has a loss ratio in the 90
percent range). The persistence of these high loss ratios also speaks volumes about the social
ethic that permits the aged to be financially exploited in this way. It should be noted,
however, that the ratios had improved from even sorrier levels as a result of legislation
passed in 1980 to curb abuses in the marketing of health insurance to the elderly.
In 1988 Congress passed the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act in an effort to limit the
maximum out-of-pocket payments that Medicare enrollees face annually for covered ser-
vices. It subsequently added partial coverage of prescription drugs in excess of an annual
deductible of $500. The maximum risk exposure, however, was not income related, and it
did not apply for needed health services and appliances not covered by Medicare. Because
the costs of the new benefits were apportioned solely to the aged in higher income groups
through income-related premiums, many among the well-to-do aged were fiercely opposed
to the new law. Apparently they were not inclined to finance any redistribution of economic
privilege within their own age cohorts and would have preferred to see the added benefits
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Table 6-4. Average Individual Liability for Medical Care for the Noninstitutionalized
Elderly, 1984
Percentage of Medicare Average out-of-pocket Liability as a percentage
Per capita income in 1984 enrollees expense (U.S. dollars) of per capita income
Less than $5,000 25.6 758 21.5
$5,001 - $10,000 39.6 901 12.7
$10,001 - $15,000 15.8. 1,053 8.6
$15,001 - $20,000 11.2 1,194 3.1
More than $20,001 7.8 1,009 5.9
All noninstitutionalized
elderly Medicare enmilees 100.0 930 8.2
Sotrce: Holahan and Palmer (1987), table 6.
financed with a further intergenerational transfer from the young as a group to the aged as
a group.
This political opposition led Congress to repeal the act in late November 1989, leaving the
low-income aged more exposed to out-of-pocket health expenditures than since 1965, when
the Medicare program was established. Sooner or later the Congress will have to address
afresh the plight of the many elderly Americans who remain exposed to the risk of financial
ruin through illness.
Until 1983, Medicare reimbursed hospitals retrospectively for all costs demonstrably
incurred in treating Medicare patients. That reimbursement covered all fixed operating
costs, including depreciation and the cost of financing fixed assets. For investor-owned,
for-profit hospitals, the reimbursement also included a guaranteed rate of return to the
shareholders' equity.
The retrospective, full-cost reimbursement of hospitals was widely believed to encourage
waste, especially in the form of resource-intensive treatments and excessive lengths of stay.
To provide hospitals with incentives to minimize the cost of treatments, the Medicare
program in 1983 switched to a system of prospectively set fees per case, with distinct fees
for some 500 diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) of medical cases. Because the DRG fees are
based on the estimated full cost of the services going into a DRG unit, they represent in effect
a resource-based relatively value scale.6 As such, they could have been used by the Medicare
program as the basis for competitive bids by hospitals for the Medicare "business." Rival
hospitals would have submitted their bids simply by specifying a monetary conversion
factor for a base unit of the DRG. Remarkably, even the market-oriented Reagan adminis-
tration did not have the temerity to undertake such a bold and divisive move. Instead, the
government chose a highly regulatory approach by which the monetary conversion factor
has been unilaterally set annually by the administration together with the Congress. This
DRG update factor is subject to bargaining only indirectly, through behind-the-scenes
lobbying by the national hospital associations.
The DRG-based method of compensating hospitals appears to have helped constrain
Medicare expenditures for hospitals, in part by reducing the average length of stay and the
use of ancillary services per stay (Altman and Rodwin 1988). It is estimated that Congress
has kept the monetary conversion factor of the DRG schedule so tightly controlled that
virtually all positive average profit margins have been squeezed from the treatment of
Medicare patients.
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Since the inception of Medicare, the program has paid physicians on the basis of "cus-
tomary, prevailing, and reasonable" (CPR) fees. That is, physicians are paid the lower of
their customary charge (defined as the median of that physician's fees for the procedure in
question during the previous year) or the prevailing fee in the physicians' market area
(defined as the fee at the 75th percentile of the fees charged by physicians in their market
area for that procedure in 1975, adjusted for the growth in a medical practice-cost index
since 1975). This method is a cumbersome attempt to adapt Medicare's fees to the market.
For many procedures mainly received by the aged-for example, cataract surgery, hip
replacements, coronary bypasses-Medicare effectively represents almost all of that market.
An attempt to adapt to it through the CPR method actually is a logical contradiction. Not
surprisingly, under this system fees vary rather capriciously across regions and among
similar providers within regions in ways that cannot reasonably be justified with appeal to
either the relative costs or the relative quality of services. The physician reimbursement
system is therefore no longer viewed as equitable or economically defensible.
One reform recently passed into legislation has replaced the CPR system by a relative-
value scale (RVS) that is based on carefully estimated relative resource costs of performing
a set of well-defined procedures in a nationwide, standard fee schedule. Initial estimates of
the relative resource costs, particularly the input of the physician's time and effort, have
been developed through the cooperative research of William Hsiao and his colleagues at
Harvard University's School of Public Health and the American Medical Association (see
Hsiao, Braun, Becker, and others 1988). These estimates have since been refined (particularly
with respect to the input of nonphysician resources in the production of physician services)
by the Physician Payment Review Commission, a panel of experts established by Congress
in 1986 to advise it on policies for paying physicians under the Medicare program. In its
annual report to Congress dated April 1989, the commission recommended that a resource-
based relative-value scale be adopted, along with a variety of other physician-payment
reforms. Most of these recommendations were included in legislation passed in November
1989 (see Physician Payment Review Commission 1989).
Strictly speaking, the resource-based relative-value scale is not a value scale at all. Like the
DRG schedule for hospitals, it is merely a relative cost scale. Nothing in these relative-cost
schedules implies that a service that is twice as costly to produce than another is actually
worth twice as much in terms of the benefits it yields either to the patient or to society as a
whole. The relative-resource-cost schedules become bona fide relative-value schedules only
when Congress makes the purely political decision to base the actual payment of physicians
on relative resource costs. Then, these actual payments do serve as signals to providers on
the basis of the relative value Congress explicitly attaches to the performance of the various
procedures listed in the scale.
Absent is a superior algorithm: one that is both intellectually more appealing and practi-
cal.7 Basing a political valuation on relative resource costs strikes one as an eminently
sensible approach (see Reinhardt 1975: esp. 162-69). Its analog is widely practiced elsewhere
in the United States under public utility regulation, and most other nations that pay
physicians on a fee-for-service basis have used such an approach for many years, either
explicitly or implicitly.
From the American perspective, the main alternative to compensating physicians on a
fee-for-service basis (using resource-based relative-value scales) would be prepaid capita-
tion for comprehensive services on the model now offered by the health maintenance
organization. Prepaid capitation represents a compromise between the powerful incentive
inherent in fee-for-service to treat patients excessively and the incentive under salaried
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practices to cut corners. That arrangement has been used in the United States for almost half
a century now, although rather sparingly.
Both the Reagan administration and the American business community have long viewed
prepaid capitation as the ideal method of compensating physicians. Some prominent health
policy analysts-Alain Enthoven among them-also envisage prepaid capitation as the
most sensible of all alternative compensation bases.8 Although enrollment in HMOs grew
rapidly during the 1980s and may well do so in the 1990s, only about 30 million Americans
currently receive comprehensive health care under this arrangement, for reasons that are
easy to understand. An HMO is, after all, just a private sector miniversion of the British
National Health Service. Each HMO seeks to ration health care through a combination of
limited physical capacity and fixed, predetermined budgets. The typical American patient
and the providers of health care have yet to come to terms with that form of implicit
rationing. They have preferred the open-ended system that both the government and the
business community has been willing to finance so far.
The Medicaid Program
Medicaid is a federal-state program that currently covers some 24 million low-income
Americans of all ages, among them 3.5 million poor elderly persons and 3.4 million blind
and disabled persons. The federal government pays for 56 percent of total program costs
and the state government the remainder. Under the federal law, the states participating in
the Medicaid program are expected to provide first-dollar coverage for hospital and
physician services and care in skilled nursing facilities. Many states offer additional benefits,
including prescription drugs.
The Medicaid program is generous in the range of benefits it covers, although it is much
less so in its standards for eligibility and in the level of compensation it pays the providers
of health care to Medicaid patients. Many providers are therefore reluctant to accept
Medicaid patients for treatment, especially if there is an ample supply of better-paying
patients. Since its inception in 1966, the program has been means-tested. Eligibility has been
closely linked to the criteria for eligibility for the states' welfare programs. Because the latter
vary greatly from state to state, there are vast disparities in the level of income at which
entitlement to Medicaid coverage sets in. Only about 15 percent of persons below the federal
poverty level are covered by Medicaid in Alabama. In Michigan and Massachusetts, the
ratio is about 70 percent. Overall, only 41 percent of Americans with incomes below the
federal poverty threshold actually were covered by medicaid in 1986, while 24 percent of
those with coverage had family incomes above the poverty level (Congressional Research
Service 1988b: 269).
Although the federal government pays for more than half of the Medicaid program, it
leaves the states great leeway in establishing the methods by which providers are compen-
sated. Most states now pay hospitals and nursing homes under the Medicaid program a set
amount per day or per case, although in some states the program has sirnply joined an
all-payer system under which every private or public payer has agreed to a single method
of payment and a single charge or fee schedule. For physicians and other self-employed
health professionals, the state Medicaid programs pay either on an established fee schedule,
or the lesser of the provider's actual charge, or a maximum allowable charge established by
the state. For prescription drugs, the states typically pay the pharmacist's cost plus a fixed
fee, where the allowable cost is meant to be the least-cost drug in groups of equivalent drugs.
This practice clearly biases the system toward the use of generics.
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The compensation of providers is somewhat simpler under Medicaid than under Medi-
care. In most states, however, the rates paid by Medicaid are unilaterally set by the state
government and far below the rates paid by Medicare, which, in turn, tend to pay less than
do the private insurance carriers. This cleavage between Medicaid and other payers has led
many providers, particularly physicians, to shun Medicaid patients altogether. The precise
magnitude of the refusal rate is not known, but the available evidence suggests that the
problems is significant and pervasive (Congressional Research Service 1988b: 444-46).
Americans without Health Insurance
In 1987 close to 85 percent of Americans had some form of private or public health insurance
coverage for at least some set of health services, most of them through group health policies
provided by a family member's place of employment (table 6-5). This coverage was not
always comprehensive, however. Deductibles, coinsurance, and gaps in the range of ser-
vices covered still required high annual out-of-pocket expenditures, even for families with
health insurance. That same year, an estimated 15.3 percent of all families with health
insurance spent more than 5 percent of their family income on health services, in addition
to their outlays on health insurance premiums; and 2.7 percent of insured families spent
more than 25 percent of their family income on health services (Congressional Research
Service 1988a: 4).
According to the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey, an estimated 37 million, or
15.5 percent of the population under age sixty-five, had no health insurance coverage at all
that year (see table 6-5). In 1979 the number was 14.6 percent. This enormous gap in coverage
is unique in the industrialized world. It is one of the major stains on the American health
system. Close to half of the uninsured are working adults, about 18 percent are nonworking
adults, and about one-third are children under the age of eighteen (Chollet 1988: 11).
Roughly one-third of the uninsured live in families with incomes below the official federal
poverty line (currently about $11,700 for a family of four) and another third live in
households within 100-200 percent of the poverty line (Chollet 1988:12). For such a family,
if it were not plagued by preexisting illness or chronic disease, a standard health insurance
policy requiring a deductible of $250 per family member and coinsurance of 20 percent up
to a maximum exposure of about $3,000 per family would cost between $2,000 and $3,500
a year, depending on the insurance carrier and the family's location. Should one or more
members of such a family be chronically ill, the policy would be commensurately more
expensive, it were available at all. In short, the purchase of a private health insurance policy
would be a truly staggering financial burden for many currently uninsured low-income
families.
The phenomenon of the uninsured is not a novel experience in the United States. Because
both private and public health insurance coverage has grown only gradually, there have
always been millions of uninsured Americans. Their plight forms an integral part of
American literature. Even during the 1970s, the heyday of America's Great Society period,
some 25 million Americans remained totally without health insurance coverage.
The American health system has traditionally dealt with the uninsured as follows. For
uninsured individuals with mild to semiserious medical conditions, the system effectively
rations health care by price and the household's ability to pay. For truly critical medical
conditions, the uninsured usually have been able to receive charity care at nearby hospitals,
which then pass on the cost of that care to insured patients through hidden cross-subsidies.
In other words, for truly critical illnesses the hospital sector functions, as best it can, as health
insurer of the last resort, collecting the requisite premiums from whatever paying patient
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Table 6-5. Health Insurance Coverage of the Civilian Noninstitutionalized Population
of the United States, 1987
Percentage with private coverage
Total Percentage
popldation Employment wvith public Percentage
Popiilation chwracteristic (thoutsands) All related' coverage only tninsuired
Totalb 237,890 74.5 64.3 10.0 15.5
Age in years
< 6 21,631 67.5 62.5 15.8 16.7
6-18 45,475 71.8 67.8 11.3 16.9
19-24 22,675 63.3 55.2 6.5 30.2
25-54 98,155 78.8 73.2 5.5 15.7
55-64 22,046 79.0 65.2 7.6 13.4
> 65 27,909 74.7 35.4 24.4 0.9
Sex
Male 115,148 75.1 65.9 8.3 16.6
Female 122,743 74.0 62.8 11.7 14.3
Marital statuis
Married 105,024 83.5 72.5 5.5 11.0
Single/never married 40,532 66.1 57.0 8.5 25.4
Widowed 13,551 66.9 30.9 26.6 6.6
Divorced 14,465 65.0 55.5 13.9 21.1
Separated 4,091 49.6 43.7 25.0 25.4
Ethnic/racial background
White 182,794 80.8 69.1 6.8 12.4
Black 28,356 52.9 48.5 25.1 22.0
Hispanic 18,752 50.1 45.9 18.3 31.5
Veteran statuts
Veteran 30,812 79.7 69.0 7.7 12.5
All other 139,260 75.4 62.5 9.3 15.4
Places of residence
20 largest SMSAs 67,616 74.7 65.0 10.2 15.1
Other SMSAs 112,998 76.3 67.4 9.0 14.7
Other 57,276 70.8 57.4 11.8 17.4
U.S. Ceisuis region
Northeast 49,902 78.5 68.9 10.3 11.3
Midwest 59,442 79.7 68.1 9.2 11.2
South 80,709 69.7 59.4 11.4 18.9
West 47,837 72.2 63.0 8.5 19.3
a. From current or prior employment of self or other family member.
b. Includes persons in other ethnic/racial groups not shown and persons of unknown ethnic/racial
background, marital status, or veteran status, as well as persons under age 17 for marital status and
under age 19 for veteran status.
Soutrce: U.S. DHHS (1989), table 1, p. 6.
was unable to resist these charges. It is therefore wrong to assert that uninsured low-income
Americans do not have any access to needed health care. As a rule of thumb, they now
receive 50-60 percent of the care received by equivalent insured Americans. It is accurate to
say, however, that millions of uninsured low-income Americans receive critically needed
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health care only in the undignified status of health care beggars, on quite uncertain terms,
and that they are rationed out of the system for many less critical but important health
services, including preventive care.
Cost Control in American Health Care
Since the 1970s, the annual compound growth in total national health expenditures has
outpaced the annual growth of nonhealth GNP by about three percentage points (Fuchs
1990a: 535; see also Berk, Monheit, and Hagan 1988). In 1990, total annual health expendi-
tures were expected to reach about $660 billion, or 11.5 percent of the GNP. The projected
number for the year 2000 is $1.5 trillion, or 15 percent of the GNP.
Physicians and other providers of health care often wonder why the percentage of the
GNP going to health care attracts so much attention among policymakers when no one
seems to care what percentage of the GNP is spent on other goods and services in the
economy. The answer to that question is straightforward. For ordinary consumer goods,
every single expenditure for such ordinary commodities is subjected to an automatic
benefit-cost assessment by those who both receive the commodities and pay for them at the
point of receipt. To the extent that both parties to such transactions trade in freely compet-
itive markets and are well-informed, rational persons, one can assume that their benefit-cost
calculus is rational as well. Unfortunately, that calculus cannot be presumed for the bulk of
the transactions that determine health expenditures, first, because patients typically do not
have the technical know-how to assess the relative medical merits of alternative treatments
or their costs, and, second, because health expenditures are concentrated heavily among a
few, very sick patients who might not be able to act rationally on full information even if
they could otherwise understand it.
Yet some limit must be placed on the size of the slice that the providers of health services
are permitted to extract for themselves from the proverbial national pie, the GNP. Table 6-6
sets forth a variety of alternative cost-containment strategies that have been tried in the
United States and elsewhere. That table makes a distinction between the macromanagemnent
and the micrornanagenzent of the health system.
Broadly speaking, under macromanagement public authorities place limits on the phys-
ical capacity of the overall health system and on the money budgets flowing into it, but they
otherwise leave both patients and providers alone to optimize their treatment choices within
these constraints. Under micromanagement, one does not set physical and fiscal constraints
on the health system as a whole, but instead seeks to control costs by influencing the
individual medical treatment. The principal instruments of that approach are payment
mechanisms that encourage providers to minimize the use of real resources in the treatment
of medical conditions (for example, DRGs or prepaid capitation); the conversion of "pa-
tients" into "consumers" through high deductibles and coinsurance; and, for good measure,
the direct interference of third-party payers into the ongoing treatment of individual
patients through a process known in the United States as "managed care."
Regulation versus the Market
The preferred approach to the task of cost containment in health care hinges, once again, on
one's perception of the commodity "health care." If one thinks of health care as a private
consumption good whose financing is the individual's responsibility, then the task of cost
containment properly falls to individual patients or private groupings of patients. If,
however, one thinks of health care as essentially a social good that should be available to all
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Table 6-6. Alternative Cost Containment Strategies in Health Care
Target Micromanagenient Macromanagement
Supply-side * Encouragement of efficiency in * Regional planning designed to
strategies the production of medical limit the physical capacity of the
treatments through economic health system and to ensure its
incentives (e.g. DRGs, capitation) desired distribution among
* Legal constraints on the regions and social classes
ownership of health care facilities
Demand-side * Conversion of "patients" to * Predetermined global budgets for
strategies "consumers" through cost hospitals and expenditure caps
sharing for physicians
* Hands-on supervision of
decisions of doctors and their
patients ("managed care")
Strategies aimed * Price controls
at the market
as a whole
Soutrce: Compiled by the author.
citizens on equal terms, regardless of their ability to pay, then the task of cost containment
is ultimately the responsibility of the authority that effects the implied redistribution of
health care resources. This may be the government (as is the case in Canada) or private
entities endowed with some governmental powers (as is the case in many West European
countries).
Nations that treat health care as a social good and therefore operate some form of national
health insurance plan typically lean on macromanagement to control their health expendi-
tures. As part of that process, they limit the physical capacity of the health system through
planning and concentrate the flow of money from third-party payers to providers into one
or at most a few large money-pipes, whose valves are controlled through formal, bilateral
negotiations between associations of third-party payers and the corresponding associations
of health care providers (for example, physician associations). This approach permits these
nations to impose price ceilings on health care and, if the volume of services expands too
rapidly at fixed prices, to subject the money flow to providers to global budgeting. Figure
6-2 illustrates this approach.
Just how effective this massing of market power on the demand side can be may be
inferred from the comparison of Canadian and American physician fees shown in table 6-7.
It is possible that the data are slightly distorted by subtle differences in coding the proce-
dures listed there: for example, by the inclusion or exclusion of pre- and postoperative
services. Even after such adjustments, however, the central point to be made with the table
would remain: rightly or wrongly, and forbetter or for worse, in comparisonwith the United
States, Canadians procure medical care from their physicians at a lower transfer of money
per unit of real resource (see table 6-7). As Victor Fuchs (1990b: 884) has concluded from a
comparative study of Canadian and American health care:
In 1985, per capita expenditure [on physician services] was $347 in the United States and
only $202 (in U.S. Dollars) in Canada, a ratio of 1.72. . . . We found that the higher
expenditures per capita in the United States are explained entirely by higher fees; the
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Figure 6-2. The Canadian/European Approach
Control #2 Control #3
Prioe ceilings Expendfture caps
\X /
Provide Patients
of Care
Real Resources
t
Contro #11
LImRt capacity
Soutrce: Compiled by the author.
quantity of physician services per capita is actually lower in the United States than in
Canada.
Fuchs further observes that although American fees are more than twice as high as
comparable Canadian fees, the average net income from the practices of American physi-
cians is only about 30 percent higher than that of Canadian physicians, primarily because
American physicians are beset by much higher practice costs under their nation's complex
system of financing health care. Another significant factor is the much higher medical
malpractice premiums that American physicians pay.
Neither the American providers of health care nor, apparently, the American public have
ever been willing to countenance the regulatory interventions routinely used elsewhere in
the industrialized world to achieve an equitable distribution of health care. Unwilling to
accept either the regulation implied by perfect egalitarianism in health care or the inequities
implied by rationing health care through price and the individual's ability to pay, Americans
have, since World War II, pursued a health policy that is perfectly well described as a
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Table 6-7. Comparison of Medical Fees, United States and Canada, 1984
United States (U.S. Dollar) Ontario, Canada
Prevailingfees Median Canadian U.S.
Procedutre under Medicare fees dollars eguivalenta
Electrocardiogramb 40 35 7 6
Insertion of pacemaker 1,815 1,200 334 296
Appendectomy 734 600 259 229
Extraction of lens 1,314 - 368 326
Hysterectomy 1,393 901 503 445
Coronary artery bypass 5,200 - 1,300 1,150
- Not available.
a. Purchasing power parity, Cdn $1.13 per US $1.
b. Professional component only.
Source: Reinhardt (1985c), table 2, p. 372; and OECD (1986), p. 117.
"political stalemate between halfway competitive markets and ineffective regulation" (Al-
tman and Rodwin 1988:323).
Half-Hearted Regulation
The late 1960s and the entire 1970s can be described as the phase of half-hearted regulation.
As health care expenditures began their inexorable rise during that period, and as the public
sector's share in these expenditures steadily grew, timid attempts were made to pursue some
of the regulatory supply-side strategies adopted elsewhere in the industrialized world.
During the Nixon administration's Economic Stabilization Program in 1971-74, prices in
the health care sector were frozen along with prices elsewhere in the economy (see Health
Messagefrom the President 1971). Although that strategy was aimed solely at prices, leaving
utilization uncontrolled, the program did succeed in limiting health spending temporarily.
Spending resumed its rapid growth, however, as soon as the price controls were lifted in
1974.
On the theory that in health care the available capacity will somehow always find a way
to be profitably employed, Congress next sought to limit the acquisition of expensive capital
equipment and structures by the hospital sector. To that end, a federal law in 1974 estab-
lished the regional Health Systems Agencies (HSAs) from which hospitals had to secure
certificates of need for capital expenditures costing in excess of $150,000. Unfortunately, that
law had two undesirable consequences. First, the HSAs were completely divorced from
accountability over financing their decisions. When in doubt, they tended to err on the side
of expansion, for theirs was not the task of funding the operating cost of the new capacity.
Second, when an HSA did refuse to permit the acquisition of expensive equipment by a
hospital, the physicians affiliated with the hospital were offered the profitable opportunity
to provide that equipment with their own funds. In one of the many ironies that attend
government regulation, the government's half-hearted foray into health sector planning
during the 1970s encouraged the growth of venture capitalism among American physicians.
Legislative attempts in the 1970s simply to cap hospital revenues were easily defeated by
the hospital sector's promises to practice "voluntary restraint." When, predictably, the
promise was kept in the breach during the late 1970s and early 1980s, there emerged a brief
but fiercely fought national debate on the relative merits of "competition versus regulation."
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That debate was won by the proponents of the so-called pro-competitive market strategy,
an approach that had gained respectability in the literature of mainstream neoclassical
economics and that was music to the ears of the incoming Reagan administration.
T1e Pro-competitive Strategy
The pro-competitive strategy rested on the intuitively appealing premise that third-party
payment is the chief cost driver in modem health care. By itself, however, the large postwar
decline in direct payments by patients, from an average of 66 percent in 1950 to 28 percent
in 1984, can account for only a small portion of the postwar increase in real health care
expenditures (Newhouse, Anderson, and Roos 1988). In place of the supply-side regulation
practiced in other countries, the pro-competitive strategy called for the further deregulation
of the supply side by granting American health care professionals even greater clinical and
economic freedom than they had hitherto enjoyed to manage health care as they saw fit, and
likewise to price their services. Furthermore, the strategy openly welcomed into the health
sector the genius and energy of profit-seeking American entrepreneurship, including the
latent energy of the financial markets, which soon discovered in health care a new and richly
endowed economic frontier. Figure 6-3 illustrates that approach to resource allocation.
Today, the booths of venture capitalists are standard fixtures at conventions of hospitals
and physicians, persuading both to join profitable joint ventures in imaging, laboratory
testing, and one-day surgery. Joint ventures allow the physician to sell the cash flows likely
to be triggered by sick Americans. Although overt kickbacks for referrals of patients are
illegal under the Medicare and Medicaid programs, and for all patients in some states, that
stricture is easily circumvented by offering physicians who can supply such referrals-and
only such physicians-direct investment opportunities in such facilities, at enticing annual
rates of return (Bogdanovich and Waldholz 1989).
To constrain the push for added revenues (health care expenditures) likely to be un-
leashed by this entrepreneurial energy, the pro-competitive strategy called for the conver-
sion of patients into more cost-conscious consumers of health care through greater cost
sharing at the point of service, a policy that some economists (for example, Baumol 1988)
would extend even to the frail elderly. Next, the pro-competitive strategy envisaged the
amassing of greater market power by private payers (self-insured business firms and
insurance carriers) through selective contracting with a limited number of providers that
promised to grant price discounts in return for having patients steered their way. Patients
could be steered by third-party payers to these preferred providers by, say, paying 100
percent of the cost of care rendered by preferred providers but a much smaller percentage
if patients sought care form providers outside the preferred provider organization (PPO).
On its face, this strategy may appear fundamentally "fair" and economically sound; but
it has two major limitations. First, its implementation presupposes the availability of reliable
indices for "quality" and "costliness," because third-party payers setting up such networks
must be able to at least appear to have chosen that network on the basis of the providers'
cost and quality. Alas, these cost and quality indices were not available in the early 1980s,
and they are not available now, at least not at the stage of development that permits their
widespread use by patients and third-party payers.
In principle, such measurements ought to be no more complex than, say, the intelligence
quotients the United States has shown no hesitancy to assign to its children. In the context
of health care, however, where the flow of millions of revenue dollars may hinge on such
numbers, the measurements would first have to withstand the rigors of litigation by
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Figure 6-3. The American Health Care Sector
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providers who might be assigned low quality ratings. These ratings would next have to gain
the trust of employees whose choice of provider would by limited by such indices.
The latter consideration points to the second difficulty associated with the pro-competi-
tive strategy, namely, its tacit assumption that employed Americans will easily countenance
a tiering of health care by income class. To be sure, an employer steering insured employees
toward a PPO could rightly argue that every employee, from the chief executive on down,
is being offered the same health insurance package and that employees are free to triage
themselves into either the PPO or other providers. If the quality of care rendered inside and
outside the PPO were perceived to be significantly different, however, and the triage of
employees perceptibly reflected their income class, the firm's management might find it
difficult to sell the scheme to its employees. In this connection, it must be recalled that
Americans continue to profess the notion that every citizen, regardless of ability to pay,
should have access to the same quality of care (see "HMQ Survey" 1986).
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Economic Footprints of the Pro-competitive Strategy
The theoretical groundwork for the pro-competitive strategy was laid during the 1970s,
largely in the writings of academic economists.10 It was promoted in the political arena
by the associations of health care providers who saw in it an effective shield against the
more than half-hearted regulation they perceived on the horizon. Their hope, one suspects,
was that competition in health care would always take a form other than outright price
competition.
As it turns out, there actually is little evidence that the health sector in recent years has
been driven pervasively by more price competition, presumably the objective of the pro-
competitive cost-containment strategy. As noted, the government, which now pays for
about 42 percent of national health expenditures, early on abandoned any hope of im-
plementing a price-competitive strategy for its programs. Far form relying on competitively
bid or even negotiated prices, it has generally imposed prices unilaterally, subject only to
behind-the-scenes negotiation in the political arena. One would certainly not call this price
competition as envisaged in the pro-competitive strategy.
Although American business firms have tried to make their employees shoulder more of
the cost of their care at the point of service and some of them have experimented with PPOs
and greater reliance on HMOs, the available evidence indicates that, at least so far, such
efforts have been rather modest and have actually been more than offset by a broadening
of covered benefits (Health Insurance Association of America 1988; Jensen, Morissey, and
Marcus 1987; see also Marquis 1984).
Nor has the growth of health care expenditures abated during the deregulatory phase of
the 1980s. On the contrary, that growth has turned out to be more rapid than it had been
during the quasi-regulatory period of the 1970s (see figure 6-4). Between 1980 and 1986, real
national health expenditures as a whole grew at an effective annual rate of 4.4 percent;
between 1970 and 1980 they had grown at the rate of only 3.8 percent (Fuchs 1988). Ironically,
only the strict price controls imposed by Medicare on hospital compensation appear to have
had the intended effect. Between 1976 and 1982, real inpatient revenues of hospitals grew
at an effective annual rate of 9.5 percent; between 1982 and 1987, they grew at only 3.3
percent per year (Altman and Rodwin 1988: table 1, p. 332). But the triumph over cost growth
in the Medicare program is hardly a vindication of market forces. It is a triumph of
regulation.
One of the fastest-rising components of national health expenditures has not been outlays
on patient care per se, bu, program administration and the net cost of private health
insurance (see table 6-8). For the mostpart, this item represents the loss ratio of private health
insurance. That figure, however, does not include the time patients spend in choosing
among different health insurance products and in claiming reimbursement. Nor does it
cover the providers' cost of staffing the insurance claim functions in their facilities. Further-
more, the figure does not include the growing armada of health care consultants, marke-
teers, accountants, and financiers required by a dynamic, market-driven health care system
(see, for example, Himmelstein and Woolhandler 1986). Whatever the virtues of such a
system may be, it is by necessity a paper-happy system with a high ratio of strictly
paper-moving health workers to the total number of health workers in the system. If one
measures the "bureaucracy" of an activity not by the number of civil servants engaged in it
but by the number of paper-pushing persons it involves, sitting in some bureau, then the
American health care system probably ranks as one of the most bureaucratic systems in the
world. One physician has described this paper war as a deliberate attempt to "ration health
care through inconvenience" (Grumet 1989: 611).
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Figure 6-4. National Health Expenditures as a Percentage of GNP, 1960-88
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Prospects of the Pro-Competitive Strategy
In assessing the potential of the so-called market strategy to constrain health care costs, the
first step should be to define precisely what is meant by "market." In the classical conception
of the market, individual consumers transact with individual suppliers. Given the peculiar
nature of health care-particularly its high concentration among a few very sick individuals
at any point in time-one may doubt that individual patients, retrofitted through cost
sharing into consumers, will ever be able to offer the providers of health care adequate
countervailing market power. Eventually, even Americans will learn that this strategy has
its early limits as a tool of cost containment.
A market strategy based on more vigorous price competition might help constrain private
sector outlays on health care, however, if American business firms were prepared to limit
their employees' freedom of choice among providers more strictly than has hitherto been
the case, and if the government were willing to subject the aged and the poor to similar
constraints. This is the basic strategy proposed by Alain Enthoven (1988). Under that
approach, the government or a business firm would act as a "sponsor" who would offer the
individuals in their charge a menu of competing private sector regulators (HMOs or other
managed-care plans). Consumers could choose among the regulators when they are healthy,
but the regulators would manage the health care to be received by the insured when they
are sick. In other words, the private regulator, and not the patient, would bargain with
individual doctors and hospitals over prices and also supervise the patients' method of
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Table 6-8. Growth in Selected Health Expenditures, United States, 1980-87
(billions of U.S. dollars)
Total expenditu(res Percentage clhange,
Category of expenditiure 1980 1987 1980-87
National health expenditures 248.1 500.1 +101.5
Health services and supplies 236.2 483.2 +104.5
Hospital care 101.6 194.7 +91.6
Physician services 46.8 102.7 +119.4
Program administration and the net
cost of private health insurance 9.2 25.9 +181.5
Souirce: Letsch, Levit, and Waldo (1988), table 2, p. 113.
treatment. The ideal concept of such a private regulator, according to Enthoven, would be
the classical staff or group model HMO, which, as noted earlier, is but a private sector
American version of the British National Health Service.
A limitation of patients' freedom of choice would enable the private regulator to extract
price discounts and more conservative prescription of services from physicians, and, in the
process, to wring out of the system the excess capacity it now carries on its books and in its
prices. Such a strategy would have to overcome three large obstacles, however. First
American patients would have to abandon their hitherto cherished belief that only they and
their own doctor are the proper authorities to determine the course of their medical
treatment. Second, a truly price-competitive health care market of this sort would resemble
in crucial respects the airline market in the Untied States. In such a market, the recovery of
overhead and profit that providers package in to their prices vary inversely with the payer's
ability to resist high prices. Inevitably, such an approach should shift more costs from large
regulators (HMOs) to smaller ones. It is not clear that such a system would be accepted as
fair. Third, the strategy would have to develop a set of tight regulations prohibiting the
competing regulators from seeking to profit by selecting only favorable risks into their fold,
which is a time-honored method among American health insurers.
The strategy also presupposes the explicit budgeting of public funds for those individuals
not now covered by employer-paid health insurance or a government program. Vigorous
pursuit of this competitive strategy would eliminate still further the hidden cross-subsidies
through which the United States has hitherto financed critically needed health care for the
nation's millions of uninsured, low-income citizens, thereby retaining its membership in the
club of civilized nations. More of these hidden cross-subsidies were squeezed out of the
health system during the 1980s, partly in response to the price controls imposed by the
Medicare and Medicaid programs, but also, one suspects, as the result of a subtle change in
the ethical norms that began to drive the American health care system. Before any thought
can be given to a more serious application of price competition in health care, the traditional
system of hidden taxation must be replaced by a workable alternative. Any such alternative
will, of course, involve taxation, pure and simple.
The prospects for the requisite tax increases and regulations appear rather dim at this time
as the U.S. government finds itself lacking the funds to implement what the voters claim
they seek. Until the nation can unshackle itself from its self-imposed budgetary constraints,
it is likely to muddle through as usual, spending more on health care than any other nation
and yet denying some of its less fortunate sick access to health care resources, of which the
nation demonstrably has too many.
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Lessons for Other Countries
To the rest of the world, The American health system must appear to be a living paradox.
On the one hand, the system remains at the forefront not only of clinical research and
innovation, but also of organizational innovation. At its best, the system can rightly boast
of being a magnet for students of health care from all over the world, and for patients as
well. On the other hand, the American people now seem disillusioned with a system they
had always assumed to be the very best in the world. In several recent surveys, the American
system has scored at or near the bottom in terms of consumer satisfaction, although no other
country spends as lavishly on health care as the United States does (table 6-9).
To better understand this paradox, one must distinguishbetween shortcomings perceived
by the experts and those perceived by the population at large. Experts in health policy point
to the pervasive excess capacity engendered by the nation's laissez-faire entrepreneurial
approach to health care and to the frequency with which that excess capacity appears to
lead to the application of medically unnecessary procedures to patients. The experts also
decry the resulting high cost of American health care, which has served to price low-income
families out of the mainstream health care market. The experts also worry about the
ever-growing share of GNP that is absorbed by health spending, an inroad that is thought
to displace other important social investments in education, research, and other parts of the
nation's industrial infrastructure.
These concerns are real, and they are warranted. There is no evidence, however, that these
facets of the health care delivery system are responsible for the general public's discontent.
By and large, the American people seem satisfied with the quality of the care they receive
at their doctor's office or from their hospitals, and they seem to show no concern over the
percentage of GNP that is allocated to health care. Rather, the misgivings appear to center
on the bewildering and haphazard manner in which health care isfinanced.
There are misgivings about the fact that the bulk of private health insurance in the United
States is tied to a particular job and is lost with that job: a particularly cruel blow at that time
of trial. There are misgivings about the fact that the private health insurance system
frequently exacts considerably higher premiums from chronically sick individuals than it
does from healthy persons, and that it often refuses to cover chronically ill people at any
price. And there are misgivings about the complexity of the many health insurance options
that now confront the American consumer, and even more so about the unseemly paper
war that accompanies claims for reimbursement from insurers. This complexity, it is felt,
provides insurers with an opportunity to exploit the uninitiated, and it wastes time all
around.
In short, it is unlikely that the American public will ever be satisfied with its health system
until that system manages to provide them with policies that are portable between jobs, that
are adrninistrativelysintple, and that divorce the premium exacted from the insured from that
person's health status. The fundamental reform called for in the survey reported in table 6-9
is a major reform of the nation's brittle health insurance system.
What lessons does the American experience hold for the rest of the world, particularly for
the newly industrialized economies that still have a wide range of options in configuring
their health systems? To answer that question, it may be useful to distinguish between
lessons on broad strategy and those pertaining to narrower tactics.
Lessons for Strategic Planning
Table 6-10 presents a schematic image that may help clarify alternative approaches to
national health policy. It is based on the assumption that the three principal goals today's
Table 6-9. The Publics View of Their Health Care System
(percent)
United United
View point Canada Netherlands Germany France Australia Sweden Japan Kingdom Italy States
On the whole, the health care system works 56 47 41 41 34 32 29 27 12 10
pretty well and only minor changes are
necessary to make it work better.
4> There are some good things in our health care 38 46 35 42 43 58 47 52 46 60
C0 system, but fundamental changes are needed
to make it work better.
Our health care systern has so much wrong with 5 5 13 10 17 6 6 17 40 29
it that we need to completely rebuild it.
Per capita health expenditure (U.S. dollars). $1,483 $1,041 $1,093 $1,105 $939 $1,233 $915 $758 $841 $2,051
Source- Blendon and others (1990), 185-92.
The Health System of the United States: Lessonsfor Other Cotntries 141
Table 6-10. Competing Objectives in Health Care
Freedom from
government interference
Egalitarian in pricing and in the Budgetary and
distribiution practice of medicine cost control Prototypical system
Yes Yes No The health care provider's dream world
Yes No Yes A national health insurance system with
fee schedules and other utilization review
budgetary controls (e.g., Canada,
Germany)
No Yes Yes A price-competitive market system
Souirce: Reinhardt (1985a), table 10.
civilized and democratic societies are likely to seek from their health care system are (1) an
equitable distribution of health care, which means that the medical treatment of patients
would be independent of their socioeconomic status; (2) clinical freedom of providers to
organize the production of health care as they see fit, and economic freedom to charge
whatever prices they deem appropriate; and (3) economic and budgetary control, which
means that the benefits of health care at the margin should always be able to justify its cost
and that households, insurance companies, and governments can know in advance how
much to budget for health care in a coming year.
It appears that a health system can simultaneously attain only two of these goals in their
purity. Practically, there always has to be some compromise among the three goals, because
one of them always conflicts with the other two. Canada and the European nations, for
example, have always emphasized equity in the design of their health system, but they have
also sought vigorously to control the percentage of their GNP transferred to the providers
of health care. They have pursued their two primary goals mainly by constraining the
economic freedom of providers to act as profit-seeking entrepreneurs (see the middle row
of table 6-10). By contrast, the United States has never reached a consensus on the relative
priorities of the three goals. Instead, it has vainly sought to extract an egalitarian distribution
of health care from a highly entrepreneurial supply side, only to discover that the providers'
economic freedom comes at a stiff price to those who pay for health care, and also to those
who are rationed out of the system for budgetary reasons.
In terms of table 6-10, Americans have always rejected the middle row as "socialized
medicine." At the level of principle, they have rejected the bottom row as well, because it is
not egalitarian and thus un-American. thus, unable to set priorities, Americans flirted
during the 1970s with moving to the top row of the table-to the providers' unconstrained
paradise-only to tumble down toward the bottom row when health care costs were
thought to be out of control. And somewhere in that bottom row the system now lingers,
much to everyone's distress.
Although some economists still seek to persuade policymakers that an unregulated
entrepreneurial supply side in health care could be controlled through the demand side, if
only the payers tried hard enough, that faith was shaken badly during the 1980s. The
wisdom of pursuing an unbridled market strategy is being questioned among a wide
spectrum of Americans, as even otherwise conservative business executives have begun to
call for a system on the Canadian model.
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This experience suggests that before newly industrialized economies can hope to develop
a well-functioning national health system, they must reach a consensus on the social role
health care is to play in the nation. Specifically, their political leaders should lead a national
dialogue centered on the question, Is health care to be viewed primarily as a private
consumption good whose financing is to be the responsibility of the individual in society,
or is it to be viewed as a social good to be distributed to all, on equal terms, without regard
to ability to pay, in which case it is to be collectively financed?
Before asking policy analysts to design the numerous tactical maneuvers required for
health care reform, political leaders must give their policy planners clearly articulated
guidelines on the relative priorities to be attached to the three goals in table 6-10 and to
others lurking behind these three overarching goals. In the absence of such guidelines, the
work of even the best-intentioned and most competent policy analysts will be largely wasted
and highly frustrating for all concerned.
Countries will have to decide, on one hand, whether they want their health system to be
like that of the United States, in its technical sophistication, organizational dynamism, and
entrepreneurial spirit. If so, the government could confine itself simply to implementing
some form of universal health insurance coverage without worrying too much about the
configuration of the supply side. Of course, the nation's leaders should then also be prepared
for the likely outcomes: a rather expensive health system that will quickly claim increasing
proportions of the GNP; a system so advanced that it may become a magnet for ailing elites,
but also a system tiered by income class in terms of the ambience and technical quality of
care it offers patients, and thus a system that may be a source of social unrest at home.
On the other hand, if cost control and equity in the distribution of health care are to be
considered the more important policy imperatives, then the nation will have to give serious
thought not only to covering all citizens with health insurance, but also to controlling the
supply side of this complicated market. In that case, the introduction of national health
insurance should be coupled explicitly with broader policies on health sector planning. This
prescription does not imply that the supply side of the health sector mustbe publicly owned,
nor does it rule out the existence of for-profit providers competing side by side with
not-for-profit providers. It merely implies that private entities on the supply side must
conform in their behavior to an overall health plan and that they must also adapt to whatever
binding price agreements are negotiated between payers and providers. Time is of the
essence in this matter, as it is difficult and possibly politically infeasible to rein in a fully
developed, unregulated, entrepreneurial supply side in health care.
A political decision to give equity and cost control primacy would not necessarily require
a single insurance carrier-for example, a single, government-run insurance program on
the Canadian Model. As the German model suggests, one can achieve most of the advan-
tages of a single, government-run scheme also with tightly regulated private system that
forces private insurers to pursue preferred social strategies.
A health system with multiple, competing insurance carriers would become unwieldy if
each insurance carrier was left free to define benefit packages as it chose, to compete for
enrollees on the basis of favorable risk selection, and to negotiate prices independently with
providers, as in the United States. Under such a system, large carriers can extract substantial
price discounts from doctors and hospitals, possibly so large that the negotiated prices no
longer cover fully allocated costs, including overhead. The end result will be that providers
will sift the recovery of overhead (and the extraction of profit) to those payers who lack the
market power to resist higher prices, which may not at all conform to social objectives.
An effect of this sort is clearly evident in the United States now, where recovery of
overhead costs and profits are being shifted by providers away from large payers and
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Figure 6-5. Illustration of Cost-Shifting in American Hospitals
Playing the Cost-Shifting Game
Selected cases showing how Stanford Medical Center compensates for losses on the
poor and elderly by raising rates for others.
Gain or Loss
Patient Cost of Operation Paid by Insurance to Hospital
61-year-old female $34,433 Medicaid paid Loss of $23,723
from Fremont, Calif. $10,710
77-year-old male from $39,082 Medicare paid Loss of $11,922
Santa Cruz, Calif $27, 160
58-year-old male from $41,738 Private insurance Gain of $39,025
Soquel, Calif. paid $80,763
32-year-old female $3,741 Patient not covered by Loss of $3,741
from Chicago any insurance
28-year-old female $3,842 Medicaid paid $2,295 Loss of $1,547
from Sunnyvale, Calif.
35-year-old female $7,119 Employer negotiated a Loss of $576
from Redwood City, discount and paid
Calif. $6,543
32-year-old female $6,680 Private insurance paid Gain of $6,426
from San Jose, Calif $12,926
Source: Stanford Medical Center
Copyright © 1990 by The New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.
toward smaller insurance carriers, to small business firms, and to paying patients. It is
generally agreed that the Medicaid program for the poor now pays the typical hospital more
than the true incremental cost of a patient day, but less than fully allocated costs. The
Medicare program for the aged also now tends to pay the typical hospital less than fully
allocated average costs, although generally more than Medicaid. The uninsured who do
receive care form hospitals on a charity basis usually pay nothing or less even than
incremental costs. That shortfall is then made up by the hospital in the form of commensu-
rately higher charges to the private sector. Large insurance carriers, health maintenance
organizations, or business firms that self-insure may be able to fight this so-called cost shift
by bargaining for some price discounts; but they typically must pay charges much above
full costs. Small payers, on the other hand, bear the full brunt of the cost shift. The example
in figure 6-5 from Stanford University Medical Center illustrates this shift.
A recent survey conducted by the National Association of Manufacturers (1989: 32) found
that outlays for health insurance among small employers during 1987-88 rose by more than
30 percent, whereas those of large firms rose by "only" 20 percent or so. The inequitable
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economics of the hot (health care cost) "potato" will eventually (say, in the mid-1990s) drive
small business in the United States to join the clamor for a broader national approach to
health insurance. Other nations could avoid some costly and inequitable detours by moving
toward an all-payer system from the start, once again, if equity and cost control are to be
the major policy goals. Under an all-payer system, every payer will pay a given provider
the same price for the same service.
The preceding considerations also bear upon a touchy but strategically important decision
that needs to be made concerning the social and economic role to be accorded the medical
profession in a national health system. American physicians have traditionally viewed
themselves as private, professional entrepreneurs. From that perspective, American medi-
cine has viewed the growing role of government in the financing of health care as a serious
deviation from the ideal, and it has been fighting the trend in a rancorous ongoing battle
that has created tension not only between the profession and the rest of society but also
within the profession itself. In contrast, physicians in Canada and Europe-while they
jealously guard their professional freedom as clinicians-usually recognize that health care
is essentially a social good and thus are far more ready to accord government a legitimate
role in defining the economic terms on which health care is financed and delivered (see
Government of Canada 1983).
If a nation elects to elevate equity and cost control to the main goals of its health policy,
then the United States contains few lessons on the health sector planning implicit in that
decision, other than the insight gained from the American experience that half-hearted,
haphazard regulation coupled with half-hearted haphazard competition and an overall lack
of clarity on social ethics tends to beget the worst of both worlds. More positive lessons on
the social control of the supply side in health care, however, can be learned from other
nations in the more affluent industrialized world.
Tactical Lessons
Although one could surely not give the United States high marks for setting national
priorities in health care and then acting on them, its health system does present to the world
a giant laboratory supporting a myriad of experiments in clinical practice and organizational
design. That laboratory holds many lessons for the rest of the world. Probably the most
important tactical decision to be made under any new health system will have to do with
the payment of the providers of health care. The American system is, as usual, spread over
a broad range of options.
COMPENSATING PROVIDERS. The American health system can claim credit for innovations
in the payment of hospitals, particularly the DRG system of payment by case. The United
States now has almost a decade's worth of experience with that form of reimbursement.
Although a system of prospective global budgeting or prospectively set per diems could be
made to work just as well in procuring hospital services and their costs, it is apparent that
the American DRG system will be here to stay for the duration. Information on its modus
operandi and on its strength and shortcomings is available in abundance, and free.
No originality can be claimed by Americans for the idea of compensating physicians on
the basis of fully articulated relative-value scales that apply to all physicians within broad
geographic confines, preferably the nation as a whole. Most other nations in the industrial-
ized world have long used such schedules in their health systems. The innovative feature
of the American approach has been its formalism, particularly the formal statistical research
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on which the schedule is to be constructed (Hsiao and others 1988). Most other nations
develop their relative-value scales through negotiations, first, among physicians themselves
and, next, with third-party payers (ultimately, the government). Presumably, such negoti-
ations are guided by casual to semiformal empirical research on relative costs. Those nations
that would like to base these decisions on more penetrating analyses can now look to the
United States for one possible methodology.
One tactical decision to be resolved early is the question of whether individual providers
may bill individual patients charges in excess of the officially designated tariff. That question
emerges from whatever view is taken regarding the proper social role of the medical
profession, as mentioned earlier. If this issue is neglected, the system may eventually make
a mockery of universal health insurance coverage. In the United States, the issue touches on
the rawest ideological nerves, certainly among physicians, but also among hospital leaders
in some parts of the country. In the end, the issue is closely related to the question of what
level of compensation is appropriate for providers. As the Medicaid program in the United
States clearly demonstrates, attempts to set that level artificially low usually trigger ration-
ing, by way of denying access.
Prepaid capitation to HMOs is not an American invention-they existed in Europe before
World War II-but no other nation has developed as long and as broad an experience with
this integrated insurance-and-delivery system as has the United States. As is so often the
case in the United States, some of its HMOs are distinguished by their clinical and organi-
zational excellence, while others are horror cases. Because prepaid capitation, the basis of
HMOs, is a sensible compromise between fee-for-service medicine and salaried practice,
other nations might wish to study carefully how HMOs could be usefully employed within
a national health insurance system.
QUALITY ASSURANCE. A large and growing body of careful research (for a review, see
Brook and Vaiana 1989) has convinced Americans that many of the health services they
receive and pay for are medically unnecessary.1" Spurred on by these studies, and by the
ever-mounting national health bill, both the government and the business sector have in
recent times embraced the idea of a wholesale research assault on this issue. It is envisaged
that ultimately there will be a giant national data base that will make it possible to link a
patient's sociodemographic background and medical treatments to his or her lifestyle one
or several years subsequent to the medical intervention. Congress has recently appropriated
$50 million for this type of research, an appropriation expected to grow to $150 million per
year or so during the 1990s. The objective of this so-called outcomes initiative is to settle
more rigorously than is c:istomary today among physicians just what does and what does
not work in modem medicine. There is every reason to believe that, on the strength of this
research initiative, the United States health system will be leading at the turn of the century
in the definition, measuremen', mnd assurance of quality in health care. The rest of the world
can sit back to await the fruits of that initiative. Better still, it can join the endeavor.
Notes
1. "Hispanic" Americans include persons of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban origin, and persons with
origins in other Spanish-speaking Central and South American countries. A Hispanic person may be
of any race. Hispanic Americans are often segregated in social statistics, because their average income
tends to be below that of white Americans and they are often recent immigrants.
2. One may broadly define members of the "underclass" as individuals not integrated into the
regular social and economic fabric of the nation.
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3. As will be shown later in the chapter, millions of Americans are not served adequately at all by
the system, although the United States spends more per capita, or as a percentage of GNP, on health
care than does any other nation (see, for example, Levit and Freeman 1988; Schieber and Poullier 1988).
4. Oddly, in the table that appears in Gonzalez and others (1988), the number of solo practitioners
among the respondents to the American Medical Association's periodic survey is given as 55.1 percent.
5. The term "entrepreneur" may not describe accurately each and every such health care provider,
but it surely does portray accurately central tendencies in the health sector. American physicians, for
example, have always considered themselves quintessential representatives of the American free-en-
terprise spirit. (On competition among physicians, see Sloan and Feldman 1978.)
6. The relative values are based on reported average accounting costs for some base year. The cost
basis of the scales is updated from time to time.
7. Many economists beholden to strict neoclassical doctrine, for example, argue that the correct
relative-value scale for any particular region in the United States is that set of fees that procures just
the right degree of access to particular health services one wishes to secure for the aged in that region.
It is an intellectually appealing notion, but one facing almost insurmountable hurdles in the im-
plementation.
8. Enthoven was thinking of this compensation method in his proposal for a universal health
insurance system based on what he calls "regulated competition" among alternative delivery systems
compensated by prepaid capitation (see Enthoven 1988).
9. Most states in the Northeast will apply the certificate-of-need laws. In contrast, most states in the
Midwest, West, and South have abolished them in recent years.
10. See, for example, Greenberg (1978) and the collection of essays in a special issue of the loutrnal of
Health Politics, Policy and Law (1311988]), which offers a ten-year retrospective of the market strategy.
11. Of course, a service that may be deemed medically unnecessary by an American physician may
still be judged legally necessary by him or her in a malpractice suit.
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Assessing the Experience of Health Financing
in the United Kingdom
Brian Abel-Smith
The purpose of this chapter is threefold: to describe the framework of health insurance in
United Kingdom and the manner in which the system evolved, to consider the obstacles
that had to be overcome in implementing it and in securing the necessary resources, and to
assess the positive and negative features of the policies adopted and of the current reform
efforts. Some lessons are also drawn from this experience for developing countries.
Historical Development
Compulsory health insurance was introduced in the United Kingdom in 1911. It was built
on a widely developed system of voluntary health insurance that had been founded two
centuries earlier by groups of skilled workers in different areas and was steadily expanded
in the following years. Sick clubs or friendly societies (there were a variety of names) were
nonprofit insurers, controlled by a committee elected from members, which set out to pay
cash for a limited period to a worker who was sick. In time local doctors were contracted
and, in some cases, employed to certify the sick and provide treatment in the hope that this
would reduce the period of sickness. The doctor was given a share of the premium for each
worker covered whether the member needed to use his services or not. This is the origin of
capitation payment. It had the advantages of simple administration and predictable costs
for an organization staffed originally by volunteers without any special qualifications for
insurance work. The doctor was expected to provide the drugs out of his capitation
payment.
These insurers catered to those who could not afford to pay a private doctor at the time
of sickness. The only general health services available for the poor were those provided by
the state for indigent persons. And becoming indigent was deliberately made a humiliating
experience that respectable working people wanted at all costs to avoid.
This system of insurance developed without any involvement of employers, which is a
critical difference from such continental countries such as Germany and Austria. Another
point to note is that the insurance did not normally provide for hospital care. This was partly
because hospitals played a relatively small role in health care at the time and partly because
substantial free care existed, either in the low-standard hospitals operated by local author-
ities for the poor under the poor law or in charity hospitals where doctors worked without
payment. From 1891 everyone had the right to free care in state hospitals for major infectious
diseases.
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In time, some of these friendly societies expanded into national organizations or chains
run by paid staff. There were a few in remoter areas that became what would be called in
the United states "staff model HMOs"; in other words, they recruited doctors, whom they
paid a salary, and built a small hospital because local personnel and facilities were inade-
quate. But the usual system of provision was by contract with a local doctor who also had
a private practice among those better off.
Medical organizations and doctors were often at odds over four issues (Abel-Smith 1988).
First, doctors regularly complained that the level of capitation payment was too low. Many
societies would ask local doctors for tenders quoting the price at which they would take the
contract, though the lowest price quoted was not necessarily accepted. The local doctor felt
it necessary to quote a favorable price to keep a potential competitor from coming into his
patch, who might hope to use the low but reliable friendly society income as a base from
which to build up a rival private practice. Second, they disagreed over the admission to
membership of people who could afford to be private patients or the retention of members
who had become affluent during their membership. They objected to people belonging who
could afford to be private patients. A third concern was security of tenure: in most cases,
the society could cancel the contract at any time. The fourth had to do with clinical freedom.
Lay committees were the ones who judged whether a doctor was giving a good service, for
example, whether he was giving inferior drugs or failing to make house calls on request, as
expected under his contract.
Over the years doctors tried four strategies to make the societies conform to what they
thought appropriate. All were unsuccessful (Abel-Smith 1988). First, attempts were made
to boycott societies that paid low rates of capitation. But underemployment in the medical
profession, the desire of doctors to keep out local competition, and the lack of any effective
sanction in the hands of the professional organizations made this tactic fail. Second, doctors
tried to negotiate a rule specifying a maximum income for membership. The societies saw
no reason to impose such a rule. Third, they tried to persuade the licensing body to rule that
it would be "infamous conduct" for a doctor to work for one of these agencies and that such
action merited removal from the medical register. But all the registering authority would
do was to express its strong disapproval of agencies that systematically canvassed and
advertised to get members. Fourth, the doctors themselves started clubs that they controlled
and that operated according to the principles they had laid down. But they succeeded in
capturing only a small share of the insurance market.
T7he Start of National Health insurance
By 1910, the year before the law introducing compulsory insurance was passed, registered
societies had about 7 million members and unregistered ones about 3 million (Green
1985:93-96). By this time the sanitary reform movement, started in 1842 by a wide-ranging
commission of inquiry, had borne fruit. Virtually all towns had safe piped water and
water-borne sewage disposal systems. From 1875 every town had by law a medical officer
of health to oversee the health of the community. There was no shortage of doctors.
There were at least 20,000 general practitioners (Honigsbaum 1979:10) and they were well
distributed in the country. National income per capita had increased to £44 in 1910 (about
US$2,250 in 1990 prices and rates of exchange), having doubled in real terms over the
previous fifty years (Mitchell 1962:367-8). But the period 1900-10 was one of recession and
heavy unemployment as a result of international competition, particularly from Germany.
This was one of the factors behind the decade of pioneering social legislation that followed
(1902-12).
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The Motivation
The Minister of Finance who initiated compulsory health insurance in 1906 was Lloyd
George. He had studied the German scheme and set about adapting it to British circum-
stances. Coming from the mining area of Wales, he had a deep concern about health
problems, particularly tuberculosis. The ruling classes, too, had expressed some concern
about the health status of the working class, after about a third of the volunteers to fight in
the Boer War (1899-1902) had been found medically unfit. How could an unfitnation defend
the vast world empire it had accumulated over the past century or face Germany, which
was known to be arming rapidly? Many also deplored the poverty in Britain and the fact
that a section of the population could not afford to join a friendly society out of their low
wages. It was believed that health insurance could be made affordable for the low earner if
both the employer and the state shared the cost with the employee. Perhaps what motivated
Lloyd George even more was the fact that the 1906 election had for the first time given the
Labour Party considerable representation in Parliament. By dealing with the legitimate
grievances of workers, he hoped to persuade them to vote for his party, the Liberals, rather
than for the growing Labour Party.
T1he Bargaining
The announcement that there would be a health insurance scheme in 1910 galvanized the
British Medical Association into action. It put forth six demands: the capitation payment
should be adequate; the majority of doctors in each area should choose the method of
payment; there should be an income limit for membership; every doctor should have the
right to take insured patients, and each insured person should have free choice of doctor;
doctors were to have security of tenure and matters of discipline were to be decided by local
medical committees; and the local control of health insurance should be placed in the hands
of special local insurance committees in which they had strong representation (Vaughan
1959:202). Lloyd George agreed to all these demands in whole or in part. The income limit
was set so as to exclude about 10 percent of those in employment with the highest incomes.
Although doctors were not satisfied with the small representation they were given on the
new local insurance committees, they felt they had achieved a great deal in that the
government had rescued general practitioners from the hated friendly societies, especially
from competing insurers or HMOs searching for the best buy in an open market.
The scheme that was introduced included not only the general practitioner and the drugs
he prescribed but flat-rate cash benefits for a limited period of sickness. The whole scheme
was financed by weekly contributions: 4 pence paid by the insured person, 3 pence by the
employer, and 2 pence paid from taxation. The capitation system of paying doctors helped
to keep costs within the contribution income. A small experiment was made in two areas
with fee-for-service payment, but after a few years it was abandoned at the request of the
doctors concemed. The participating doctors continued to eam the bulk of their income
from private practice. But the system of capitation pa,yment drew a still firmer line between
the general practitioner who worked outside the hospital and the specialist who had his
base in the hospital. The insured patient would be sent to the hospital as a referral. The
general practitioner was not expected to follow his patient into the hospital.
The precedent of what had spontaneously developed was allowed to determine the
outcome, modified only to meet the doctors' demands. The scope of compulsory insur-
ance-general practitioners' services and drugs-remained unchanged. There were no
charges at the time of use. The cash sickness benefit program was expected simply to
regulate the friendly societies and require insured persons to choose a society that was
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approved. It was not used for the health care benefit as the doctors would probably have
tried to boycott the scheme if this option had been selected. The altemative favored by some
left-wing thinkers and public health doctors-which was to develop a salaried service in
state-owned dispensaries or clinics-was hardly considered. This would have taken time
and would have been unpopular with the doctors. Some, however, would like to have seen
a more preventive orientation to the services provided.
The Thin Edge of the Wedge
This move brought compulsory insurance to some 15 million employed persons, but not to
their wives and children. About 15,000 general practitioners out of more than 20,000
participated in the scheme, giving an average of 1,000 patients per doctor. But the doctors
found tihemselves in an embarrassing position. Should they treat the wives and children of
their patients even when it was unlikely that their private bills would ever be paid, or should
they refuse treatment unless cash was offered at the time treatment was requested? Many
did the former. Thus it was not surprising to find in time the British Medical Association
pressing for compulsory health insurance to be extended to cover the wives and children of
the insured under the same scheme. This was considered unrealistic at the time, however,
because of the cost. By 1930 the profession was asking in addition that benefits be extended
to cover maternity care, specialist consultations, dentistry, and spectacles (BMA 1929). But
it was decided that the income limit for membership of compulsory health insurance should
be preserved to keep out the 10 percent of higher earners who "ought" tobe private patients.
By this time the local authorities had taken over the poor-law hospitals and were able to
upgrade them and run them as a service for all users-not just for the poor-charging those
who could afford to pay. Then in 1939 the British Medical Association proposed that the
local authorities should combine to provide hospitals on a regional basis (BMA 1938:44).
Unlike the community hospitals in the United States, which were originally charitable, those
in Britain continued to provide free care to people who could not afford to pay and
attempted to extract some voluntary donations from those who could give it. Their special-
ists remained unpaid, eaming their living from private practice, which was enhanced by
the prestige of having being selected to do honorary work in a charitable hospital. Although
the British Medical Association argued that doctors in charitable hospitals should be paid
for their work, this suggestion was ignored. Some beds were gradually set aside for those
who could pay the full cost in these hospitals, but only on a small scale. Also, there were
still only a handful of small private for-profit hospitals that were equipped to treat those
who were acutely sick. The main development in the private sector was the institutions for
convalescence and for the chronic sick.
The Influence of the World War II (1939-45)
Soon after the outbreak of World War II, attention tumed to organizing hospitals for the
vast number of air raid casualties expected. Bombs dropped in city centers were likely to
overload the city hospitals, and arrangements had to be made for the rapid movement of
patients out of the city to hospitals in the country to make room for the next batch of air raid
casualties. The Ministry of Health divided the country into hospital regions, and contracted
with both voluntary and charitable hospitals for the care of air raid casualties. It was decided
at this time that salaries should be introduced for doctors working in charitable hospitals.
An assurance was given that the central government would not interfere with the adminis-
tration of the hospitals and this was honored. Doctors were recruited into the Emergency
Medical Service (EMS) and given salaries and military ranks without any rights to private
Assessing the Experience of Health Financing in the United Kingdom 153
practice and had to be prepared to serve wherever they were posted (Abel-Smith 1960:425).
During the first four years of the war, free care under the EMS was extended to a wide range
of people, from air raid casualties and servicemen to munitions workers, certain chronically
sick patients, and eventually to all manual workers in the industries of wartimne Britain and
others waiting for hospital care. It proved impossible to draw a line between those who were
and those who were not contributing to the war effort.
The Emergency Medical Service had considerable influence on medical opinion. Many
doctors from the leading hospitals found themselves working in grossly inadequate and
poorly equipped hospitals built many years earlier to house the sick poor. For the first time
they learned what a low standard of care was provided by some local authorities. And in a
rush of patriotism at the outbreak of war, they had surrendered their most precious asset,
the goodwill of their private practices. They found themselves with less of a vested interest
in the medical needs of the wealthy and a new familiarity with the unmet needs of the poor.
Within months the leading medical journals were crowded with letters about the need to
reform Britain's health services. Within less than a year the British Medical Association set
up a medical planning commission with seventy-three members to consider the future of
the country's medical services. Local branches of the association held meetings to discuss
not whether there should be some type of national health service after the war but how it
should be organized. In October 1941 the Churchill government announced that after the
war there would be "a comprehensive hospital service" for all who needed it (U.K. Hansard
1941:374:1116).
The Doctors' Plan
In mid-1942 the Medical Planning Commission published a report favoring the organization
of health services by the central rather than local government, but with considerable
delegation and strong representation of the medical profession at every level. There were
to be regions covering a population of at least half a million. General practitioners were to
be paid partly by salary and partly by a capitation rate per patient registered. Specialists
were to have three types of contract: whole-time salaries with no private practice, whole-
time salaries with private practice at the hospital, and part-time salaries with rights to
private practice also outside the hospital. At the association's annual meeting, it was
resolved that Britain would have a health service that would "render to every individual all
necessary medical services both general and specialist and both domiciliary and institu-
tional" (British Medical Journal 1942:31). The details of organization were not discussed at
the meeting, however. Instead the debate focused on whether the service should cover 90
percent or 100 percent of the population with lower incomes. By a small majority the meeting
favored 100 percent coverage.
Public Opinion
The war brought an unprecedented mixing of social classes in Britain: in air raid shelters,
in hospitals not chosen by the patient, and in war work both voluntary and paid. At the
outbreak of war, one and a half million mothers and children were evacuated out of the
cities and billeted with both rich and poor families in small towns and villages (Titmnuss
1950:137). A great social leveling had begun, with high taxes suddenly imposed on high
incomes and everyone forced to queue for rations of food. Domestic servants were quickly
becoming a thing of the past. Never before had the comfortable classes become so directly
aware of the problems of the sick and the poor. It was in this atmosphere that support for
postwar social reform was born.
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This support was manifested by the enthusiastic reception given to the report by Sir
William Beveridge published in late 1942. His task had been to review the system of cash
benefits. But he stretched his terms of reference and produced a blue print for what became
known as the "welfare state." One of his assumptions was that there would be a com-
prehensive national health service, thus going somewhat further than the government's
statement a year earlier about the right of everyone to hospital care.
Beveridge's main scheme was for the rationalization and extension of cash benefits for
sickness, injury, unemployment, widowhood, and old age. The contributions of employees
and employers were to be increased to pay for it. He assumed that the existing insurance
contribution for health care benefits would be retained but that the substantial extra cost of
the service would be found from taxes. This system of financing was eventually introduced
and has been retained in large part up to the present.
The Beveridge Report received vast and on the whole favorable press coverage. It was
discussed at meetings throughout the country. Beveridge himself was in great demand as
a speaker. In addition, the bulky report sold over 100,000 copies, which was quite unprec-
edented. (Harris 1977:420).
The Government Becomes Committed
Meanwhile, the government was considering what to say about the report. Churchill
thought that the whole question should be left until after the war and public support tested
in a general election. But he and other doubters in the cabinet were persuaded to take a
positive line when they saw the enthusiastic public reception and the strong support the
report was receiving from the two other political parties that formed his coalition govern-
ment. Thus the government welcomed the idea of a comprehensive health service covering
the people as a whole and agreed that the service should be entrusted to local government
(U.K. Hansard 1943:386:1659-64).
The Negotiations
In private discussion with the doctors, the Minister of Health raised the possibility of a
salaried general practitioner service, but it abandoned the idea in the face of their strong
opposition (see Honigsbaum 1989; Abel-Smith 1960: 458-60). The government published a
plan for the service in 1944 (Ministry of Health 1944). The existing system of insurance
committees was to be retained but given wider functions. General practitioners were to
continue to be paid on a capitation basis. Smaller local authorities were to combine and
establish joint committees to run the hospitals in their area. These committees were also to
make grants to the local charitable hospitals.
The British Medical Association, however, was vehemently opposed to hospital doctors
being employed by local authorities. Also enraged were the representatives of the charitable
hospitals. They did not wish to see themselves placed in a position of "complete subservi-
ence" to the local authorities (Abel-Smith 1960:467). They preferred to continue receiving
grants from the central government as they had throughout the war, without any interfer-
ence in their internal administration.
Resolving the Dispute
It fell to the new Labour government, elected at the end of the war, to resolve this
acrimonious dispute. The solution finally chosen followed the guidelines offered by the
doctors' own Medical Planning Commission. The comrnittees that had long administered
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national health insurance were retained and renamed, given much stronger professional
representation, and the expanded responsibility of administering the main dental and
ophthalmic benefits. General practitioners continued to be paid on a capitation basis
modified by incentives to work together in groups. For nearly all patients access to a
specialist or a hospital was to be by referral, except in an accident or emergency. In addition,
a balanced distribution of general practitioners was sought throughout the country.
Two suggestions were put forward to deal with the controversial question of control of
the hospitals (see Pater 1981:178). One was to let it rest with the local authorities and weather
the storm of opposition from the doctors and the charitable hospitals. What the prestigious
charitable hospitals feared most was that they would be marginalized by the local authori-
ties, who in time might build their own hospitals. Furthermore, local authorities that were
too small to build up a comprehensive hospital service would have to run joint services with
neighboring authorities, and such liaisons were not likely to work smoothly. The second
option was to place all the hospitals, both those under local authority and the charitable
institutions, under the ownership of the central government and establish regional bodies
to plan them and local bodies to run them in groups. The second option was chosen. A third
possible option would have been to leave the hospitals in their present ownership and
establish regional bodies to contract services from them and use government funds to
rationalize their buildings, but apparently this idea was not put forth.
Thus regional authorities were established to plan hospitals and distribute budgets to
hospital groups: at first, teaching hospitals were allowed to receive their budgets directly
from the central government. The main change was to bring nearly all the nonprofit
hospitals, both local and charitable, into the ownership of the central government. The
specialists were paid in much the way that the Medical Planning Commission had envis-
aged. But they were expected to give more time to their hospital work. As for the charitable
hospitals, they saw that they had no alternative but to hand over their assets. They could
not return to the situation that had prevailed before the war. They would have had to start
the whole system of fund-raising again but could not be sure that people would give money
when the state was providing hospital care through local hospitals. There would clearly
have been too few people able and willing to pay the full cost of care if they had tried to
cater only to the higher-income groups.
The local authorities lost their hospitals but they were left with a number of health
services: ambulances, home nurses, public health nurses, domiciliary midwives, maternal
and child health, school health, and the after-care of mental patients. In the case of the
hospital service, the ministry controlled the number of specialist posts which could be
advertised and filled, thus establishing an important means of ensuring that specialists in
short supply were evenly spread throughout the country. The hospitals were given budgets
and were run by collaboration between a lay administrator, the elected chairmen of the
medical staff, and the senior nurse. This was the tradition of the voluntary hospitals. It was,
however, difficult for a lay administrator or elected chairman of the medical staff to question
a specialist about his use of resources: this would have been seen as an encroachment on
"clinical freedom." The posts of medical superintendent that had existed in tocal authority
hospitals and had been responsible for supervising the work of all the doctors in the hospital
were allowed to lapse.
Why Was It possible?
Why were the British able to provide a free and comprehensive health service to the entire
population in 1948 when this would have been considered an impossible burden on the tax
system in the 1920s or 1930s? For one thing, as mentioned earlier, medical and public opinion
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had changed as a result of the war. In addition, there was no shortage of general practition-
ers, and even the problem of finding specialists was eased by refugees who had escaped to
Britain from Hitler's empire. Perhaps a greater concern was the shortage of nurses, which
the Ministry attempted to resolve through a major recruitment campaign. But how was this
change financially possible? The country was not much richer: national income per capita
had increased by only about 20 percent in real terms. The fact that there was full employ-
ment, however, relieved the government of having to provide financial support to an army
of unemployed, which had risen to between one and three million between the world wars.
Most important, taxes had been greatly increased to pay for the war, and it was clearly
possible that they could be lowered considerably and still pay for the postwar "welfare
state."
The Altemnatives
The principle of national health service was accepted by all the political parties. The Labour
Party had long favored a salaried medical service in which doctors would not have had the
right to practice privately. The medical profession feared that was the government's
ultimate intention and was highly suspicious of the government as the plans for the new
service were brought to fruition. If local-authority control had been instituted, the medical
profession, backed by charitable hospitals, would probably have boycotted such a move. In
any case, many of the local authorities were too small to produce a comprehensive service.
Another possibility would have been for the central government to contract with the main
hospitals rather than take them over, as happened in Ireland. But this would have made
hospital planning difficult and would have forced the Ministry of Health to become
involved in resolving a host of local disputes from the center. The result might have been
greater efficiency. Contracts were in some cases made with the few private hospitals
equipped to do surgery. Once the national service started, they were often made with private
hospitals for the care of the chronically sick and psychiatric cases.
*The First Reforms
When the service was introduced, it cost much more than had been estimated. Within two
years, flat-rate charges were introduced for prescriptions. A year later charges were intro-
duced for dentures and spectacles, and charges for dentistry have increased over time. A
large number of categories of services are exempted from these charges, however. Charges
have never risen more than about 3 percent of the cost of the service but they did restrain
demand. There was little change in the public-private mix of the financing of health care
after the service began (see table 7-1).
In the course of time a number of changes were made in the way general practitioners
were paid: their rents were reimbursed, they were given subsidies to encourage them to
employ staff, and more preventive services were separately paid for. Allowances replaced
part of the capitation payments to give incentives in a number of directions. Recently,
bonuses were introduced for achieving target rates of immunization among children and for
screening for cervical cancer, and payments were introduced for defined health checkups.
One persistent worry was the lack of coordination between hospital care and care in the
home. Thus in 1974 the responsibility for home care health services was transferred from
local governments to the health authorities. The organization was streamlined by enlarging
the local groups of hospitals and putting them under the control of District Health Author-
ities, of which there are now 192 in England. These District Health Authorities are respon-
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Table 7-1. The Public/Private Mix of Finance for Health Care
(percent)
Year Putblic Private
1938 47.la 52.9
1949/50 87.3 12.7
1987 86.6 13.4
a. 33.2 percent local authority, 10.8 percent national health insurance, and 3.1 percent central
government expenditure.
Soutrce: Compiled by the author.
sible to fourteen Regional Health Authorities, whose main function is to plan the region's
services. Priorities were established by the secretary of state at the center, and the distribu-
tion of financial resources between regions was made more equitable under a formula
known as RAWP. Lay general managers were appointed as the executive head of each
district and region and charged to make efficiency savings but were not given any effective
authority over the doctors who determined the use of the bulk of the resources. The scope
of the National Health Service (NHS) remained unchanged until 1985, when spectacles were
no longer provided for adults, with some exceptions.
Strengths and Weaknesses
The strengths and weaknesses of the U.K. system can be judged by its universality, degree
of consumer choice, accessibility, efficiency of resource use, and potential for technological
change.
Universality
The whole population is entitled to use the service. There are, moreover, no bureaucratic
obstacles to this use. The United Kingdom has no separate insurance funds associated with
employment status that could create problems for the unemployed and those changing jobs.
All the patient has to do is register with a general practitioner relatively near his or her home
or, failing that, can turn up at one of the 2,800 National Health Service hospitals. Persons
thought to be foreigners will be asked for their passports or evidence of British nationality.
This is a relatively recent development. Previously foreigners were treated on the same basis
as British citizens unless they had come to Britain to obtain health care.
Degree of Consumer Choice
Each citizen is free to choose a National Health Service general practitioner and can attend
the Accident and Emergency room at any NHS hospital. But a patient can only be registered
with one general practitioner at a time. This restriction was imposed to encourage continuity
of care as the general practitioner keeps a record of all visits as well as of the services patients
have received from hospitals. There are no bureaucratic obstacles to changing one's general
practitioner. To see a specialist, the patient has to be referred by his or her general
practitioner. The choice of specialist and hospital is normally discussed with the patient.
There is nothing to stop a general practitioner from referring a patient to any hospital in the
United Kingdom, and many patients are in practice sent to highly specialized London
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hospitals from all over the country. The patient can have the prescription written by an NHS
doctor dispensed at any private pharmacy: the pharmacist claims the cost from the NHS
and collects the standard charge for such patients as are not exempt. The patient can go to
any dentist who has a contract with the NHS: the latter is paid on a fee-for-service basis.
Equal Access
As explained above, there are no barriers to using the NHS. Perhaps the greatest achieve-
ment of the health service has been its equity. The financial resources of the service are
allocated between regions on a population-based formula that takes into account the age
and sex structure of the population of each region and gives extra to regions with worse
mortality rates as a proxy for morbidity. In Britain, as elsewhere, the lower social classes
have worse health and are in greater need of health care. A recent study has shown a marked
pro-poor distribution of resources (O'Donnell and Propper 1989). This is also reflected in
self-reported morbidity and therefore may be consistent with allocation according to need.
General practitioners are paid a higher capitation rate for persons over the age of sixty-five
and a still higher rate for persons aged seventy-five or older. Thus general practitioners are
as willing to take an aged person on their list of patients as a younger person. There is in
addition a private sector parallel to the NHS. This sector has about 200 private hospitals
containing more than 10,000 beds; NHS hospitals have some 290,000 beds and also offer
some private beds.
Nearly 10 percent of the population has private insurance that pays mainly for private
specialist visits and the cost of care in a private hospital or in a private wing at an NHS
hospital. Most NHS specialists also care for private patients. One of the advantages of private
care is that one does not have to wait as long to see a specialist for a nonurgent condition
and admission to hospital can be arranged at a time convenient to the patient: thus the
waiting lists for nonurgent surgery in the NHS are avoided. Many claim that this amounts
to a two-tier service: those who are willing and able to pay or have private insurance can
"jump the queue." On the other hand, nearly all the conditions for which patients have to
wait for treatment are not life-threatening and do not interfere with the quality of life. The
exceptions are hernias and hip replacements. But the waiting time for hospital (surgical)
service is the main drawback of the NHS and is one of the public's complaints.
The NHS is financed mainly by general taxation, which is mildly progressive in the United
Kingdom. Thus the NHS represents a redistribution of resources from the richer to poorer
segments of the population, as is highlighted by the fact that those who use the private sector
are disproportionately the higher-income groups.
Efficiency of Resource Use
The NHS has very low transaction costs. The money used to pay for it is collected by taxes
and social insurance mechanisms that already exist, and the marginal cost of collecting the
extra money for the NHS is negligible. The patient is only billed for the standard charges.
Phannacists and dentists send their bills to central NHS agencies each month for checking
and paying. There is no billing in the hospitals except for private patients.
NHS expenditures are under the direct control of the government, which makes a limited
cash allocation for the service each year. The health service appears to be cheap when
compared with that in other countries. Health expenditure as a proportion of gross domestic
product has risen from 3.9 percent in 1960 to 6.1 percent in 1987. Although in the first year
this was just about the average for OECD countries for which information is available, by
1987 the United Kingdom was 1.2 percent of GDP below the average (Schieber and Poullier
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1989:169-77). In comparison with other developed countries, the United Kingdom spends
less per head than one would expect from the cross-sectional relationship that seems to exist
between gross domestic product per capita and health expenditure per capita. As explained
later, those in the Service believe it is underfinanced.
Limited budgets mean priorities in the purchase of new equipment have to be carefully
assessed in each district. The policy is to concentrate expensive equipment at specialized
units with the best skills to use them. As a result, there is much less underutilized equipment
in the NHS than in a system of hospitals that are in a competitive relationship. The policy
has also been to concentrate acute hospital care in large district hospitals and close small
hospitals so that skills are concentrated and economies of scale are achieved.
One possible explanation of why the NHS is cheap is that doctors are not paid on a
fee-for-service basis, except in a few cases. Therefore they have no financial incentives to
induce demand. Moreover, because the risks of negligence are low, doctors do not need to
practice defensive medicine. There would appear to be an incentive for general practitioners
to refer patients to specialists unnecessarily to reduce their own work load. But such
evidence as there is suggests that there is a much lower use of specialist visits in the United
Kingdom than in other comparable countries. Fee-for-service payment for doctors is used
alnost exclusively to promote preventive activity such as immunization, cervical screening,
health checks, health-promoting clinics, and family planning, which might otherwise be
neglected.
The Department of Health has introduced "performance indicators" to judge the process-
ing activities of each district and region. The lower levels of the service are required to
identify "efficiency savings" each year and report them to the center. There is also a powerful
National Audit Department that monitors efficiency at the local level and undertakes studies
on particular subjects on which it is thought savings might be made. Until recently, however,
the authorities have been reluctant to interfere in matters of clinical decisionmaking so there
are wide variations in Britain as elsewhere in referral rates to specialists, prescribing rates,
and lengths of stay in the hospital. This area of decisionmaking was the main object of the
Thatcher reforms, described below.
Potentialfor Technological Change
Each year the Department of Health lays down priorities for the development of the service,
and regions and district are judged by how fast they have been able to move toward these
priorities. One such target has been to move forward with community care of the mentally
ill and mentally handicapped, which would involve closing large hospitals for this type of
patient.
With advanced equipment not as available as in the United States and research receiving
less funding, it might seem that technological change is not within the United Kingdom's
grasp. However important innovations have emerged from the NHS, such as the CAT
scanner and hemodialysis. Britain also has a good record in pharmaceutical innovation, to
which NHS clinicians have contributed. As mentioned earlier, until recently politicians have
been reluctant to interfere in any way with the way medicine is practiced. Moreover,
innovating clinicians are much less likely to be sued for clinical negligence.
The Thatcher Reforms
Over the years, 85-90 percent of NHS activities have been funded from general taxation.
Lacking an independent source of finance, the service has had to compete with all the other
conflicting claims for centrally controlled tax funds, and successive governments have failed
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to give the service all the money it demanded. In the first fourteen years, the main economy
was made in capital expenditure. Although many of the hospitals were in old buildings,
hardly any new hospitals were built. Substantial building did take place between 1962 and
1976, however, by which time one-third of the general hospitals had been rebuilt. In 1976
capital expenditure was again substantially reduced. By the time the Thatcher government
came into office in 1979, cash-limited budgets were being applied to public expenditure.
Previously, budget estimates were supplemented by additional appropriations to cover
actual price increases. Thereafter, health services were given a cash limit based on expected
inflation. If inflation was greater than expected, no additional appropriation was made to
make up for the difference. Year after year, health services failed to grow as planned because
price increases absorbed the cash available for growth in services.
Even though some argued that according international comparisons the health service
was too cheap, it did not receive much more money. Some financial relief came in the form
of expanded user charges, which were increased up to the extent regarded as politically
tolerable. But still the service called for more money, reminding the government that 2
percent growth a year was needed in real terms to provide for the aging population,
introduce new technology, and achieve some of the objectives that the government had set
for the service. Over the past decade or more, successive governments have been unwilling
to increase funding, especially in the face of having to support millions of unemployed and
hoping that by reducing public expenditure they could stimulate economic growth and
control inflation. Between 1982 and 1989 the hospital and community services were only
allowed about 3 percent real growth. The consequences were politically embarrassing:
hospital wards closed through the lack of funds while the number of patients recorded as
waiting for hospital admission steadily increased; the total now approaches a million
persons. Experience suggested that this problem could not be solved simply by throwing
money at it-at least in the quantities that the government was willing to contemplate.
The U.K. experience has made clear the fundamental difficulty with financing hospitals
out of budgets. There is little incentive to reduce the length of stay. In a hospital system
where nonurgent cases are waiting for admission (as has been the situation throughout the
.history of the service), reducing the length of stay leads to more admissions. Since the early
days of care are the expensive days of care, more admissions would require a larger budget.
Meanwhile the delays in obtaining care in the NHS hospitals and their perceived inade-
quacies have led to the considerable growth of well-equipped private hospitals financed
mainly by private health insurance, which now covers about 10 percent of the population.
The government encouraged health authorities to contract with these hospitals in the hope
of reducing waiting lists.
The government focused its attention on the apparent inefficiencies in a service where the
doctor responsible could determine what resources were used on each patient. As pointed
out in a paper setting out Margaret Thatcher's proposed reform,
In 1986-7, the average cost of treating acute hospital in-patients varied by as much as 50
per cent between different health authorities, even allowing for the complexity and mix of
cases treated. Similarly, a patient who waits several years for an operation in one place may
get the same operation within a few weeks in another. There are wide variations in the drug
prescribing habits of general practitioners, and in some places drug costs are nearly twice
per head of population as in others. And, at the extremes, there is a twenty-fold variation
in the rate at which general practitioners refer patients to hospital. The government wants
to raise the performance of all hospitals and general practitioner practices to that of the best.
(HMSO 1989:3)
Performance was to be improved in three main ways. First, district health authorities were
to contract for services after seeking bids from both public and private hospitals and taking
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into account both price and quality. It was accepted, however, that some "core" hospital
services, such as accident and emergency departments and provisions for the chronic sick,
would be paid for by a block grant.
Second, larger general practitioner groups having at least 9,000 patients each were to be
offered budgets out of which they would have to pay for all the services needed by their
patients, including specialist consultations and "noncore" inpatient care. These budgets
were to be based on the size and characteristics of the patients for whom they are responsible.
In other words, they would resemble an extended capitation system. Other general practi-
tioners were to be given indicative budgets for their prescribing. Financial penalties would
be imposed on general practitioners "who persistently refuse to curb excessive prescribing."
Third, larger hospitals were to be given a degree of independence so they could adjust
the remuneration of staff rather than have to obey nationally negotiated salary scales.
Presumably they would be able to reward specialists who use resources economically and
contract new specialists on a basis other than salary.
The reforms will be difficult to implement in several respects. The necessary information
base is not in place for hospitals to cost their services in detail. The attempt to assess and
protect quality may prove difficult in a country with no experience with accreditation.
Moreover, the government seems unwilling to make the financial resources available to
build a truly effective system. It was extremely difficult to find a formula for distributing
money to the large practices that opt to receive inclusive budgets that fully reflect the
characteristics of their patients. Since general practitioners can pick and choose their
patients, there are bound to be attempts to "cream off" low health risk patients and "counsel
out" high users of services, as is the case in HMOs in the United States. Some have argued
that budget-holding general practitioners will be tempted to do procedures themselves
rather than pay for them to be done elsewhere, and that some might exceed their compe-
tence. Others feel the doctor-patient relationship will be fundamentally altered in a budget-
holding practice in that the patient might come to believe that he or she is being done a favor
if sent outside the practice for care. U.S. experience, many have argued, also shows that a
group of general practitioners serving 9,000 patients is far too small to spread risks.
In general the government is rushing into this experiment on a national basis without any
local trials and is taking considerable risks. It will only take a few glaring instances of
budget-holding practices denying necessary care (as happened with some HMOs in the
United States) or of hospitals discharging patients early with inadequate follow-up leading
to avoidable death for the whole system to become discredited and possibly withdrawn.
Lessons for Developing Countries
The lessons of the British experience can be summarized as follows. A health service
financed to the extent of 85-90 percent from national taxation is at risk of becoming
underfinanced. Canada seems not to have faced this problem, at least to the same extent,
but it is financed through the provinces. Where local taxes play a substantial part, as in the
Scandinavian countries, there also appears to be less of a problem. Health services seem to
fare better in this respect where they are almost entirely financed from earmarked contri-
butions from employers and employees.
The system of restricting access to a specialist or hospital, except in an emergency, to cases
referred by a general practitioner has proved to be economical. One of the roles of the general
practitioner is to sort out those patients who need further investigation by pathology or X
ray. General practitioners typically have limited facilities for doing tests in their offices.
Capitation payment of the general practitioner has proved to be an economical compro-
mise between salaried payment, which removes the incentive for the doctor to go out of his
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or her way to be responsive to the patient, and fee-for-service payment, which makes the
doctor responsive to the patient but at the same time gives the doctor a financial incentive
to stimulate unnecessary services. Under both, capitation payment and fee-for-service
payment, doctors are in competition for selection by patients, but under the former, the
patient can only have one general practitioner at any time. Thus the patient can originally
consult only one doctor on his or her illness. This leads to continuity of care outside hospital.
Capitation payment can be extended to cover the drugs prescribed by the doctor, as in the
original system used by friendly societies, or to nearly all health care, as under the Thatcher
reforms for large general practices. Supplementing capitation payment by additional fees
and bonuses paid for preventive work ensures that such services are given considerable
priority.
The NHS has developed three important mechanisms for securing geographical equity
in the distribution of health resources: it has limited the entry of further general practitioners
to overdoctored areas; it has controlled the number of specialist posts that can be advertised
and filled; and it has distributed the funds for the hospital and community services by a
population-based formula (RAWP), which also takes into account health need, using age
and sex standardized mortality rates as a proxy for morbidity.
There is no ideal way of paying hospitals. Budget finance can force hospitals to be
economical in purchasing but it fails to give sufficient incentives to reduce length of stay. It
remains to be seen what will emerge from the district and large practice experiments with
different types of contract mechanisms.
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Germany's Health Care and Health Insurance
System
Uwe E. Reinhardt
Germany's health system represents an attempt to achieve horizontal equity in the distri-
bution of health care and fairly good control over total health care expenditures without a
complete takeover of the health insurance system by the government. The chief policy
instruments used to that end are (a) tight, statutory regulation of a network of self-govern-
ing, self-financing sickness funds that observe substantially identical methods and sched-
ules for compensating the providers of health care; and (b) the use of health insurance
premiums, rather than taxes and transfers, to redistribute income from relatively healthy or
high-income groups to relatively sick or low-income groups.
Table 8-1 illustrates the position of Germany's health system in the spectrum from purely
governmental to purely private health care. It shows the German system as being largely a
private one operating within clear government regulations. It indicates clear distinctions
often overlooked by observers who tend to lump together all foreign health care systems
under the derogatory label "socialized medicine," between largely government-operated
and private systems.
Strictly speaking, the term "socialized medicine" should be reserved for health systems
in which the government operates the production of health care and provides its financing
(that is, systems in Cell A of the table). Great Britain and most of the Nordic countries of
Europe fit that label.' By contrast, one would not call Canada's health system "socialized
medicine" on that definition, because it combines socialized (government) financing of
health care with a pluralistic, partly private and partly public delivery system that extends
over all three rows in table 8-1.
Nor does the German health system fit the label. Germany's health system is concentrated
in rows D, E, and F of table 8-1. It is even further removed from bona fide socialized medicine
than is Canada's health system, because both the production and the financing of health
care in that country are pluralistic (although both facets are rather tightly constrained by
federal statutes). At this time, for example, only about 12 percent of total direct health care
Editor's Note: This chapter was written in large part before the full incorporation of the former
German Democratic Republic into a unified Germany in 1989. Thus the chapter refers primarily to the
situation in the former Federal Republic before unification. The health insurance system in Germany
was founded more than fifty years before the breakup of Germany after World War II, and its present
format continues to have the same features that prevailed in the former Federal Republic. For a recent
assessment of the German health care and financing system, see US GAO (1993). Among others, this
chapter uses some material in Reinhardt (1990).
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Table 8-1. Alternative Mixes of Health Insurance and Health Care Delivery
Collective (socialized)financing
Private health insurancea Directfinancing
Government- Within a Within an Ouit of pocket by
Production financed statuttory uinregiulated patients at point
and delivery insuranceb frameworkc narketd of serviced
Purely government owned A D G 1
Private not-for-profit entities B E H K
Private for-profit entities C F I L
a. Technically, whenever the receipt of health care is paid for by a third party rather than by the
recipient at point of service, it is financed out of a collective pool and is thus "socialized" financing. In
this sense, private health insurance is just as much "collectivist" or "socialized" as is government-pro-
vided health insurance. Both forms of financing destroy the normal working of a market, because both
eliminate the individual benefit-cost calculus that is the sine qua non of a proper market.
b. Canadian health system.
c. German health system.
d. Private portion of the American system.
Source: Compiled by the author.
expenditures in Germany is paid for directly out of public budgets. The comparable
American number is 42 percent.
The German Health Care Delivery System
In 1985 Germany had a population of 61 million. Only 15 percent of the population was
younger than fifteen years. At the same time, close to 15 percent of the German population
in that year was older than sixty-five (table 8-2). Total direct spending on health services
and supplies amounted to less than 8 percent during 1986 (figure 8-1) (Schneider and others
1987).
The German health care delivery system represents a pluralistic mix of private medical
practices and both private and publicly owned inpatient facilities among which patients
typically may choose freely.
Of Germany's roughly 150,000 active physicians (about 2.5 physicians per 1,000 popula-
tion), about 67,000, or 45 percent, work in private, office-based ambulatory practice. Patients
are free to choose from among them. These physicians are compensated for their services
on a fee-for-service basis, according to a predetermined and binding fee schedule negotiated
between regional associations of physicians and health-insurers.
Under the strict statutory dividing line between ambulatory and inpatient care imposed
by German law, physicians in ambulatory practice do not follow their patients into the
hospital after they have referred a patient there. Instead, all inpatient physician services are
rendered by the 80,000 or so hospital-based physicians who are salaried employees of their
hospital. Among these hospital-based physicians, only the chiefs have the privilege of seeing
private patients on both an ambulatory and an inpatient basis.
Germany has about 11 hospital beds per 1,000 population. Close to half of all German
hospital beds are in publicly owned facilities, mainly municipal hospitals. Another 35
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Table 8-2. Selected Demographic Data, 1985
Statistic Datum
Total population 61 million
15 years of age 15%
> 65 years of age 15%
Life expectancy
Male 71.2 years
Female 77.8 years
Infant mortality ratea 9.6/1,000
a. Deaths of children one year or younger: per 1,000 live births, 1984.
Source: Schneider, Sommer, and Keleci (1987), tables F.2.2.1 and F.8.2.1.
Figure 8-1. Direct Health Care Expenditures, 1975-86
United States and Germany Direct HeaRh Care
Expenditures per Caphta Adjusted for
General Price Inflation
Index, 1975=100
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percent of beds are in private, not-for-profit community hospitals, and close to 13 percent
are in privately owned, for-profit facilities.
As a rule, the capital budget of German hospitals-even of privately owned, for-profit
hospitals-are furnished by the state governments, subject to a regional plan. The operating
funds of hospitals, on the other hand, come from the nation's health insurance system in the
form of predetermined per diems that are negotiated by each hospital separately with
regional associations of health insurers, under an all-payer system.
In 1990, the average cost per inpatient day in Germany was about DM 300 (US$180), with
some variation about this average, depending on the type and location of the hospital. About
15 percent of the total per diem cost represented the salary of hospital-based physicians. An
inclusive per diem cost of US$180 or so may seem extremely low and reflects the widespread
use of German hospital beds for long-term care rather than acute.
Figure 8-2 presents compact data on the sources and uses of direct health care expendi-
tures in Germany. The statutory health insurance system accounts for about 70 percent of
these outlays and private health insurance only about 7.4 percent. In contrast to the United
States, where more than 40 percent of direct health expenditures now flow through govern-
ment budgets, only about 12 percent of German health expenditures come directly from
government budgets.
As can be seen in figure 8-2, the hospital sector absorbs only about 36 percent of total
direct expenditures, and that figure includes the salaries of the country's more than 80,000
hospital-based physicians. Health expenditures by other government departments gener-
ally do not exist because ambulatory care is by statute the domain of the country's private
medical practitioners.
Private households in Germany pay directly out of pocket for only about 7 percent of total
direct health care expenditures, mainly for over-the-counter drugs and appliances (for
example, eye glasses) of a higher quality than that fully covered by health insurance in
general. Germans bear few if any out-of-pocket expenses for health care at the time such
care is received (Schneider and others 1987).
A inique feature of the German health system is the Concerted Action (Konziertierte
Aktion), an annual assembly of all of the stakeholders in the country's health care system.
This annual assembly was mandated by federal law in 1977. It includes representatives of
the associations of all of the providers (including pharmacists), the statutory and private
health insurance carriers, the pharmaceutical industry, the major unions and associations
of employers, and representatives of the state and local governments. It is the task of this
assembly to establish annually broad, national guidelines for the economic development of
the health care system, including those for the overall growth in expenditures in relation to
the expected growth of the gross national product (GNP).
The assembly was intended to serve as a consensus-building device. It does not have
governmental powers. For example, the guidelines it establishes are not legally binding on
any of the parties; they merely serve as benchmarks for negotiations over fees, prices, and
per diems of health services that take place annually at the state level between associations
of insurers and of providers. So far, the assembly has carried forward its work with varying
degrees of success but is generally creditori vs ith having had sonic constiai iirkg effect on
negotiations at the lower level. Furthermore, its work is widely covered in the media.
Historical Development
Most characteristic of the German system is the statutory sickness fund (Gesetzliche
Krankenkassen), whose genesis was an address by Emperor Wilhelm I to the Reichstag in
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Figure 8-2. Sources and Uses of Direct Health Care Expenditures, 1985
Germany
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37.5% 10.9%
Note: Excludes administrative costs, research, and construction.
Soutrce: Schneider, Sommer, and Kecici (1987), pp. 278-97.
1881. When the Health Insurance Act came into effect in 1883, blue-collar employees-and
later other members of the population-had to be insured by one of the numerous sickness
funds. Accordingly, the statutory health care scheme became the oldest part of the social
security system, followed by the acts concerning accident insurance (1884), retirement funds
(1889), public assistance (1924), and unemployment insurance (1927). Contributions, bene-
fits, and other components of the statutory sickness funds are regulated in detail by the
second code of the Social Insurance Act, the first draft of which dates from 1911.
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After World War II, the German legislature enacted numerous statutes concerning public
health care, the most important of which resulted in the founding of the Federal Department
of Health and Human Services in 1961. The government established statutory fee schedules
for physician services and dentist services in 1965, revised in 1982; specified employer's
liability for continued payment of wages in case of illness; and created the Medical Profes-
sion Education Law in 1970. Also important were the 1972 law concerning the financing of
hospitals and the disputed Health Insurance Cost Containment Law of 1977, which was
followed by the Second and Third Health Insurance Cost Containment Law of 1982 and the
Health Insurance Structural Reform of 1989. With these regulations the German health care
system became the most regulated sector in the entire economy (Schulenburg 1989).
Universal Coverage and Consumer Choice
Virtually the entire German population has comprehensive health insurance coverage for
a broad range of benefits that include ambulatory physician care, all inpatient care, prescrip-
tion drugs, dental care, medical supplies and appliances, and even recreational stays (the
Kuren) in health spas following major bouts of illness or merely a state of exhaustion. With
minor exceptions, the covered services are made available to patients free of coinsurance
and deductibles at the point of service.2 Until the Health Care Reform Act of 1988, the
sickness funds even paid for taxis the elderly might take to see the doctor.
As a general rule, all Germans have free choice of doctor, hospital, pharmacist, and other
providers of health care. The comprehensive insurance coverage enjoyed by Germans is
provided by a highly structured and highly regulated insurance system that cannot be easily
labeled as either private or public. About 90 percent of the population is covered by the
so-called statutory health insurance system (the GesetzlicheKrankenversichertng or GKV) that
has, for more than one hundred years, constituted the backbone of the country's health
insurance system. Close to 9 percent of the population is covered by private, commercial
insurance carriers. The remainder is covered by various governmental programs, notably
those for the police and the military. The number of uninsured individuals at any point in
time is below 0.3 percent.
Figure 8-3 provides a road-map of this structured health insurance system. The percent-
ages shown represent the fraction of the German population belonging to each type of
insurance carrier (Verband der Privaten Kranbenversicherungen e.V. 1987/88).
The Statutory Health Insurance System (GKV)
The statutory health insurance system is composed of some 1,200 fiscally independent,
self-governing, not-for-profit sickness funds, each of which serves either a specific area,
typically a geographic one (the local sickness funds or Allgemeine Ortskrankenkassen), or the
workers of a particular firm (the Betriebkrankenkassen), or members of a particular trade or
craft (the Innungskrankenkassen). Together, these funds are commonly referred to as the
Reichsversicherungsordnmngor RVO funds. They have been the cornerstone of the country's
social security system, which dates its origin to the late 1800s, and were originally intended
to cover only blue-collar workers.
The operation of the RVO funds (including benefit packages as well as underwriting and
reimbursement practices) have been tightly regulated by a federal insurance statute, the
RVO, which has been amended repeatedly to adapt the statute to changing demographic
and economic conditions.3
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Figure 8-3. Structure of the German Health Insurance System
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Subsequently, there were added to the RVO funds the substitute funds (Ersatzkassen) for
white-collar workers. There are now fifteen such funds, each of them operating nationwide.
The substitute funds, too, are subject to the federal insurance statute and form an integral
part of the statutory health insurance system (the GKV). Until very recently, blue-collar
workers in the statutory system did not have access to the substitute funds, which were
reserved strictly for white-collar workers. The latter, on the other hand, could elect mem-
bership in either a substitute fund or the RVO fund relevant to their locality or company.
Since the Health Reform Act (Gesundheitsreformgesetz or GRG) of 1989, blue-collar workers
exceeding a certain income limit may elect membership in either their appropriate RVO
fund or a substitute fund or private health insurance. It can be expected that, before long,
the archaic distinction between blue- and white-collar workers will disappear altogether
from the statutory system.
Every individual is entitled to join the statutory health insurance system. An individual's
"membership" in a statutory sickness fund automatically covers all of the member's
dependent family members. Membership in the statutory system is compulsory for employ-
ees with a specified income limit (currently about DM 55,000, or US$30,000, per year) and
for retired persons who had belonged to the system during their work life. At this time,
roughly three-quarters of the 90 percent of the population insured under the statutory
system are compulsory members. The remainder have joined the system voluntarily.
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Once an individual joins a particular sickness fund within the statutory system, he or she
typically remains with that fund for life, unless his or her income rises above the threshold
below which statutory insurance is compulsory and the individual exercises the option
either to join a substitute fund or to choose private health insurance.
Employed members of sickness funds pay for their own and their families' insurance
coverage with a contribution that is strictly a percentage of the total compensation (roughly,
salary and fringe benefits before taxes) and not at all related to either the size of the family
or its heal'ch status.4 The premiums of retired persons are paid by the retirees' pensions funds
in the form of a flat percentage of the retiree's pension (now a national average of 12.9
percent). That percentage is equal to the average payroll contribution rate (the Beitragssatz)
working members make to the fund.
Obviously, the premiums paid by the elderly are much below the true actuarial cost of
caring for them. In 1989, for example, the premiums paid by this group covered only about
40 percent of the outlays they received from sickness funds (in 1977 that percentage had still
been as high as 65 percent). The difference is made up by cross-subsidies paid by working
members of the funds, a transfer that is becoming a source of contention among the
generations. Funds with a particularly heavy load of retired members receive compensating
contributions from a national reserve fund (the Krankenversichentng der Rentner). The objec-
tive of that system is to equalize across the various sickness funds the financial burden
imposed by the aged on working members.
Because premiums in the statutory system are based on ability to pay and also cover the
insured member's dependent family members (while commercial carriers charge premiums
based on actuarial cost), most individuals who have the option to seek private coverage
nevertheless prefer coverage under the statutory system (although there has been somewhat
more rapid migration to the private system in recent years). Furthermore, under the recently
passed Health Insurance Reform Act of 1989 (the Gestindheitsreforngesetz or GRG), persons
who opt out of the statutory system in favor of private health insurance lose the right ever
to return to the statutory system (as they hitherto could). Younger single persons who may
now find it financially advantageous to exit the statutory system may later come to regret
that step when they start a family. Thus they will think twice before opting out of the system.
Administration of the Statutory System
The statutory sickness funds are managed within the private sector, under the stewardship
of boards of trustees, half of whose seats are filled from the ranks of unions and half from
the ranks of employers. The chairmanship rotates between these two groups.
In principle, each of these funds is to be fully financed by its members, who are either
workers or retired persons. Since passage of the Health Care Reform Act in 1988, however,
in some states sickness funds in particular fiscal distress do receive cross-subsidies from
financially better-off funds.
Although the statutory sickness funds tend to consider themselves part of Germany's
private sector, they are at best a distant cousin of what Americans would consider the
"private sector." The statutory funds operate within very tight federal statutes that, asnoted,
dictate not only the catalog of benefits these funds must offer their members, but also their
governance, as well as their fiscal and regulatory relationships with the providers of health
care. One may therefore think of the statutory system also as a private sector extension of
the government's will. They are private, self-financing, and self-governing entities charged
with certain governmental duties and therefore are endowed with certain governmental
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powers, among them the power to levy payroll taxes on employed persons and their
employers and to redistribute economic privilege among their members.
Controlling Health Expenditure
Within a region (usually a state or a substate region), the statutory sickness funds join
together in associations to negotiate with counterpart associations of physicians the sched-
ules of fees that must be accepted by individual physicians as payment in full. The regional
negotiations are based on a national relative-value scale (the Einheitlicher
Bewerttingsrnassstab, or EBM) that is negotiated for the entire statutory health insurance
system between national associations of all sickness funds and the corresponding national
associations of sickness fund physicians.
Although, as members of the statutory health insurance system, the substitute funds
(Ersatzkassen) share with the RVO funds the common, national relative-value scale for
physician services, they negotiate the monetary value per relative-value point separately
with the corresponding regional physician associations and have traditionally paid slightly
more than the RVO funds. In 1988, for example, they paid physicians DM 0.0935 per point,
versus an average of about DM 0.0915 per point paid by the RVO funds. The RVO funds in
a region all pay the same fees to physicians (Reinhardt 1985).
In 1985, the sickness fund physician associations agreed to accept an overall expenditure
cap for their services. Although it had been hoped by the associations that this cap would
eventually be lifted, the cap is still in place and is apt to remain so for the foreseeable future.
Because all statutory sickness funds work with the same relative-value scale, it is easy to
implement the cap under that system: if the utilization of services threatens to put total
expenditures over the cap, the monetary value per relative-value point is automatically
reduced.
The expenditure cap is negotiated annually as so many deutsche marks per insured, after
adjustments for age and sex. Once that amount has been set, the total budget is turned over
by the sickness funds to their counterpart physician associations, which then disburse the
fund to their members on a fee-for-service basis. In a nutshell, then, the system subjects all
physicians to a zero-sum game jealously watched by the physician associations themselves.
It is they who police their own members.
The introduction of the expenditure cap for physicians has not led to the rationing of
health care. On the contrary, the steady decline of the monetary value per relative-value
point in Germany suggests that the number of services delivered to patients has increased
substantially as a result of the cap.
The statutory sickness funds negotiate jointly with each hospital a predeterrnined, binding
per diem based on approved, projected line-item operating budgets (Reinhardt 1984). As
already noted, these per diems now average about US$180. There has been some experi-
mentation with reimbursement by diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) on the American
model, or with a system that combines a basic per diem with a fee-for-service catalog for
ancillary services.
German insurance policies also typically provide fairly complete coverage for dental care
(including dentures) and for all prescription drugs. Dentists are paid negotiated, predeter-
mined fees for their services. These fees have been so high in recent years that German
dentists enjoy a higher income than do German physicians in private, ambulatory practice
(who earn a pretax net practice income of about US$90,000). In order to curb the dispropor-
tionate growth in their outlays for dental care, which appears to be driven by outlays for
dentures, recent legislation has mandated substantial cost sharing by patients for dentures.
172 Couintry Case Stutdies
Until January of 1989, both the private insurance carriers and the statutory sickness funds
paid pharmacies the full retail price of whatever medications physicians had prescribed.
Patients did not share in the cost of prescriptions drugs, but merely paid a modest fee (DM
3) per prescription. The price the insurance carrier was forced to pay the pharmacists was
the sum of (a) the manufacturer's price, which the mantfacturer was free to set, plus (b) a
regulated, fixed, wholesale markup, plus (c) a regulated, fixed retail markup. The private
carriers and the sickness funds all pay the same retail price.
This open-ended pricing policy left the demand side of the market effectively without
countervailing power. Combined with the effect of full insurance coverage, it led to a
relatively large allocation of German health care expenditures on prescription drugs. As was
shown in figure 8-2, close to 17 percent of total direct health care expenditures in Germany
go for the payment of pharmaceuticals.
To control the large outlays for prescription drugs in the system, the conservative Kohl
government drastically altered the payment for insured prescription drugs as part of its
Health Care Reform Act passed in November of 1988. For Germany's pharmaceutical
industry, this act has been nothing short of revolutionary. It is bound to shrink the size of
that industry in the years ahead.
Henceforth, prescription drugs are to be assembled into groups of "equivalent" drugs,
where the definition of "equivalency" is to be broadened gradually over time eventually to
include groupings of totally different chemical substances deemed to be "therapeutically
equivalent" (Phase III in the evolving definition of "equivalency"). Under the new pricing
policy established by the act, the insurance carrier covers fully only the price of a selected
low-cost drug in the equivalence group-typically a generic. If patients or their physicians
insist on a higher-priced brand-name drug, the patient must pay the price differential out
of pocket.
So far, the publication of the first equivalence groupings and the least cost for each has
completely shocked the pharmaceutical manufacturers and has led brand-name producers
to slash their prices by up to 40-50 percent for competing drugs within the announced
groupings. They have done so because they fear that Germany's spoiled patients will never
consent to paying sizable sums out of pocket for brand-name drugs in the equivalence
groups.
Commercial Insurance Carriers
The roughly 5.5 million individuals (close to 9 percent of the population) covered by the
forty-two private, commercial (for-profit) insurance carriers in 1986 include civil servants,
self-employed individuals, retirees who were covered by private insurance during their
work years, and white-collar workers with an income above about DM 55,000 or $30,000
per year (in 1989/90) who have chosen to opt out of the statutory system.
As already noted, the premiums charged by the private carriers reflect the actuarial risk
of five-year cohorts. Unlike the statutory system, which employs coinsurance only spar-
ingly, privately insured patients may choose among alternative plans, with varying degrees
of cost sharing and commensurately varying premiums.
An insured who enters an insurance contract with a private carrier pays the premium
appropriate for his or her five-year cohort at that time. Thereafter, the premium is not raised
further as a function of the insured's age. It can be increased only to reflect general increases
in health care costs that affect all age groups. In effect, then, this premium structure
resembles the level premiums that American life insurance companies levy for their whole
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life insurance policies. And like these policies, a private Gennan health insurance policy
overcharges young people in relation to their own actuarial, short-term risk and forces them
to build up an old-age health insurance reserve, the Altersruecklage.
By law, Germans who decide to leave their private insurance carrier for another private
carrier forfeit their accumulated old-age health insurance reserve. Furthermore, upon
joining the other carrier, such persons must then pay the premiums appropriate for their
age cohort at the time of the switch. This policy is intended to force privately insured persons
into life-cycle planning as well, for it contains the powerful financial inducement to stay
with one carrier for life.
About 4.6 million people covered by the statutory system purchase supplementary insurance
coverage from the private carriers. These supplementary policies typically cover semiprivate
accommodations in hospitals and cash allowances per hospital day or day of illness.
The private insurance carriers compensate physicians on the basis of a statutory fee
schedule (the Gebutehrenordnungfiier Aerzte or GOA) set by the federal government (after
consultation with experts and the medical profession) and applicable only to the private
insurance sector. Although in principle the relative-value scale underlying this fees schedule
is not the same as that underlying the fee schedule used by the statutory health insurance
system (the EBM schedule described earlier), the two relative-value scales have come ever
closer together over time, as the government leaned on the statutory RVS in establishing the
RVS for the private health insurance system.
As a rule, physicians treating privately insured patients may bill the insurer up to 2.3 times
the official fee schedule, as most of them now do. Physicians may exceed even this maximum
multiple, but only after justifying such extra billing in advance and in writing. Some
physicians do so, notably the chiefs of staff in hospitals who, as a rule, may treat patients
on a private basis very much like their American colleagues who have hospital privileges.
For hospital care, the private insurance carriers pay predetermined per diems. These lie
somewhat below the per diems paid by the statutory system, because hospital-based
physicians who treat patients in the hospital (typically only the chiefs of services) bill their
patients directly for inpatient physician services, while the per diems paid hospitals by the
statu-tory sickness funds cover all inpatient physician services rendered by the hospital's
staff of employed physicians.
In addition to this (somewhat lower) basic per diem, however, the private carrier must
pay sizable surcharges for the semiprivate rooms (typically double-occupancy rooms)
occupied by their insured. In 1988, for example, the average basic per diem rate for private
insurers was DM 251 (US$128) and the surcharge for a private room was DM 116 (US$60).
The private carriers and the statutory sickness funds pay the same prices for prescription
drugs.
Administrative Cost
The administrative cost of German health insurance is relatively low. For the statutory
sickness funds, these costs amount to about 4 to 5 percent of total premium income.
Although the sickness fund associations that actually pay the individual physicians have
additional administrative costs, the overall administrative costs of the system, including the
billing costs borne by individual physicians and hospitals, probably lie substantially below
the average registered by the complex American system.
The private insurance carriers distinguish between purely administrative costs-about
4.4 percent of premium income in 1987 and probably comparable to the number reported
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by the statutory sickness funds-and the "closing costs" (Abschlusskosten), which represent
the marketing and administrative costs of establishing new insurance policies. In 1987, these
closing costs amounted to about 11.6 percent of total premium income.5 It appears, then,
that the total loss ratio (payments to providers/premium income) in private health insur-
ance exceeds that under the statutory system by a considerable margin.
Lessons from the German Experience
Health care systems that rely on a great number of independent third-party payers for
financing face problems not encountered by systems in which the flow of funds to providers
is concentrated in the hands of one single third party, usually the government.
First, in a multicarrier system providers may find it easy to divide payers and thus rule
them. Second, if consumers are given free choice among competing insurance carriers, a
multicarrier system can be plagued by judicious adverse-risk selection and the exclusion of
high-risk, low-income families from insurance coverage altogether.
Both sets of problems have been addressed through statutory constraints in the German
health system, although not with complete success. Indeed, there are now sufficient stresses
in the system to have triggered widespread calls for a fundamental reform of Germany's
health insurance system.
Amassing Market Power on the Demand Side
Figure 8-4 depicts two distinct sets of relationships among the three major actors in health
care: patients, providers, and third-party payers. The top panel illustrates the manner in
which money flows from society to the providers of health care. That flow now goes through
a myriad of independent and uncoordinated pipes of varying size. Most of these pipes are
so small, in relation to the overall money flow, that persons controlling their valves cannot
exert much influence over the market for health care. Should they seek to constrain prices,
they can easily be threatened by providers with the loss of access to health for the insured
covered by that money pipe. It is a system designed to maximize the transfer of gross
national product from the rest of society to the providers of care.
Indeed, it is a system so constructed that it effectively shields most households from
knowing, at any time of the year, precisely how much their families spend on health care.
The money flow from households to pay for uninsured services, coinsurance for partially
covered services, and contributions to insurance coverage is so complex that it takes a special
effort to tabulate the flow for one year.
It can be argued that this is precisely as it should be, that most other markets in the
economy also are characterized by a myriad of money pipes to the suppliers. The counter-
argument that has prevailed in most modern societies-certainly in Germany-is that the
ethical dimensions of health care and the fact that the bulk of health expenditures are
accounted for by very sick, aching, and frightened individuals make analogies with regular
markets moot for health care.
Most countries have therefore all but relieved the individual patients from the role of a
cost-controlling consumer. Instead of conceiving of the health care market as a set of
economic transactions between individual patients and providers, they have transferred the
economic facet of these transactions to a middle plan where prices are negotiated between
associations of third-party payers and associations of physicians. In other words, they have
concentrated the money flow to providers into one large pipe (or at most a few) whose valves
are operated through negotiations, as is illustrated in the bottom panel of figure 8-4.
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Figure 8-4. Alternative Financial Arrangements between Patients, Providers, and
Third-Party Payers
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Sotirce: Compiled by the author.
In the Canadian health system, for example, there really is but one money pipe to
providers per province. That pipe originates in the provincial goveinment, which adminis-
ters health insurance in that country. In Germany, there are more than a thousand pipes
going from the sickness funds or private insurance carriers to the providers. The money
flow through these pipes, however, is coordinated at the level of the state (Land) into
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all-payer systems that offer the payer a degree of market power similar to that enjoyed by
truly single-source payers. For that reason, it is not inappropriate to think of Germany's
health system as effectively a single-pipe system as well.
Every German household knows what it spends per year for comprehensive health
service, because that spending can be read off a simple barometer: the percentage of gross
compensation paid to the sickness fund, or the insurance premium paid to a private carrier.
This simple index is carefully read by the citizenry, by employers, and by the government
(AOK Bundersverband 1989). The previously cited Health Care Reform Act of 1988 was the
government's reaction to the sharp increase in the contribution rate after 1984. The chief
objective of that act has been to stabilize that contribution rate.
The single-pipe or quasi-single-pipe health insurance system prevalent throughout Eu-
rope and in Canada have certain advantages and drawbacks that require further comment.
First, the systems enable those who directly and ultimately pay for health care to procure
health services at lower monetary transfers to provider per unit of real health service than
is paid under the looser American system. Second, these systems enable those who control
the valve of the single pipe literally to determine that physical capacity of the health system.
They can make favorable turns of the valve contingent upon regional health planning, as is
the case in all of these nations.
In short, the single-pipe approach probably more so than any other factor enables these
countries to allocate to health care a much smaller slice of the gross national product.
But these single-pipe systems also have drawbacks that should be acknowledged. Clearly,
a single-pipe system is vulnerable to possible mistakes made by the few who wrangle at the
single valve. Such a system may allocate less to health care than the citizenry actually would
like to see allocated, if it had its choice, and it may also provide less variety in health care
than the citizenry might want. Furthermore, such a system makes it far more risky for
entrepreneurs to venture their funds in search of new medical technology, because those at
the valve may capriciously refuse to pay for that technology.
From the viewpoint of providers, single-pipe systems are clearly undesirable. They
manifestly tend to reduce the providers' income. There is no reason why normal, income-
seeking providers of health care should favor a system that serves to shrink their income.
Equity in Financing
There are two principal issues to consider under the heading of equity in financing: how to
avoid adverse-risk selection and how to contend with the threats to the principle of
solidarity.
AvoidingAdverse-Risk Selection
The term "adverse-risk selection" has varied meanings in discussions on health policy, and
it is often misused. For the purposes of this discussion, it refers to situations in which the
distribution of actuarial risks among different insurance pools is not perfectly matched by
the distribution of premium income needed to cover those risks.
Suppose that the likelihood of particular levels of health expenditure for an individual
could be accurately ascertained by both the individual and the insurer issuing an individual
a health insurance policy. Next, suppose it was possible to group people into distinct cohorts
so all people within a cohort are exactly alike in their likelihood of incurring particular levels
of health expenditures. This would yield cohorts of relatively healthy people and cohorts
of relatively sickly people. For a large enough cohort, one could quite accurately predict the
total health expenditure that would be incurred by that cohort for a given future period. On
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dividing that total by the number of persons in the cohort, one would obtain an average
predicted per capita expenditure level. In the jargon of insurance actuaries and of econo-
mists, an insurance premium set equal to this average predicted level would be an "actuar-
ially fair" premium.6 The premium would be considered fair in the sense that it would not
force cohorts of relatively healthy persons to subsidize with their insurance yremiums
cohorts of relatively sickly persons, a cross-subsidy actuaries define as "unfair."
An insurance industry that always charged perfectly actuarially fair premiums could be
said to be free of adverse-risk selection, because a particular insurance pool's premium
income would always fully reflect and cover its own mix of risk.
Two factors of the real world intrude upon the actuary's idyllic world.
First, the individual's likelihood of future health expenditures usually cannot be ascer-
tained with such accuracy. Even if the individual could ascertain it, he or she would surely
not reveal it to a prospective insurance carrier if that revelation would drive up the
actuarially fair premium. From the insured's perspective, the selective withholding of facts
has always been considered fair game in this context. In the asymmetry of information-the
fact that the buyer of insurance knows so much more about his or her health status than the
prospective insurer ever will know-lies a major source of adverse-risk selection.
Adverse-risk selection, of course, can originate also on the insurers' side when they have
some discretion in composing the risk-mix of their members in response to externally
determined insurance premiums. It might occur, for example, when a government an-
nounced that it will pay a voucher of $X year per member in some cohort and insurance
carriers then seek to enroll at that predetermined premium only individuals whose actuar-
ially fair premium is below $X. From the insurer's perspective, such judicious risk picking
is probably considered fair game as well.
Quite aside from the problem of adverse-risk selection, however, most of the world
considers the actuary's conception of fairness ethically repugnant. This is the second
intrusion of the real world on the actuary's idyllic model.
The dominant notion throughout Europe and in Canada is that health insurance should
not only help smooth the individual's own outlays for health care over time, but that it
should also force chronically healthy people to bear part of the health care costs incurred
by the chronically sick, and that the insurance mechanism is the ideal vehicle to effect this
redistribution. This notion is fundamental to these countries' idea of community and
nationhood. 8 They call it the principle of social solidarity.
Germany's statutory health insurance system is a perfect expression of that principle. The
system openly uses health insurance premiums to redistribute income from healthy and
high-income households to low-income households and to the sick. To cope with the
adverse-risk selection that such a premium structure might otherwise engender, the system
has traditionally limited the choice individuals and their families have among different
sickness funds.
Traditionally, the sickness fund for compulsorily insured Germans has been dictated by
location or employment. Blue-collar workers typically have had a choice, if any, among only
one or a few RVO funds, although white-collar workers had a wider choice among RVO
funds and substitute funds. Even the 25 percent or so of the population who are not
compulsory members of the statutory system, but may join that system voluntarily, have
much less effective freedom of choice than is typically available in the United States. All
statutory health insurance funds, for example, must offer the same catalog of prescribed
benefits, and they cannot tailor their premiums to the individual's actuarial risk.
Although private insurers have greater freedom in this respect, their policies also are
much more uniform in basic parameters and much more restrictive than is typical in the
free-wheeling U.S. health insurance market. And, as already noted, their premium structure
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Table 8-3. Variance in the Payroll Tax Rate across German Sickness Funds, 1988
(percent)
Payroll tax ratesa
Type offiind Range Average
Local sickness funds 10.8-16.0 13.5
Company-based funds 7.5-15.0 11.5
Craft-based funds 9.8-15.6 12.8
Substitute ftnds
Blue collar 10.2-14.6 11.9
White collar 8.8-12.9 12.7
All statutory funds 7.5-16.0 12.9
a. Employers and employees's contribution to sickness fund, as a percentage of gross compensation
(including fringes).
Sou(rce: Bauer and Schoenhafen (1988), table 1, p. 650.
prescribed by statute builds in a nontransferable old-age reserve that effectively locks an
insured into a particular private carrier for life.
Threats to the Principle of Solidarity
Not surprisingly, this approach to eliminate adverse-risk selection and, at the same time, to
effect a redistribution of income through the statutory system's premium structure, has led
to considerable strain within the system. Because the individual sickness fund is empowered
to levy whatever payroll tax is necessary to cover the risk-mix of its own members, these
taxes vary widely among the funds. Table 8-3 illustrates this phenomenon with the most
recent data. It is impossible to defend these highly different payroll tax rates with any appeal
to social equity, and one must wonder why these differentials have not led to a more open
revolt among the insured and their employers alike. But that revolt is starting.
Round one in that revolt is the increasing tendency among large business firms to take
their employees out of high-premium sickness funds and to fold them instead into newly
established company-based sickness funds (Betriebskrankenkassen) whose actuarial health
care costs may be lower. As table 8-3 shows, such a switch might yield these companies
substantial savings, at least in the short run, while their fund members are still young.
Naturally, this move is vigorously opposed by the other funds in the system, particularly
by the local sickness funds that cover a demonstrably higher average morbidity (Bauer and
Schoenhafen 1988).
The local sickness funds have entered the fray from another corner. They would like to
see legislation mandating interfund financial transfers to compensate for differences in the
risk borne by individual funds. Such transfers are already being made in some states within
particular types of sickness funds (for example within the company-based funds), but not
yet across types of funds.
Although the local sickness funds have a legitimate point, their plea is opposed by other
funds in the system on the ground that, pushed to its logical conclusion, the policy would
convert the statutory Health Insurance system into once single national fund, a Uni-
versalkasse with one level of payroll tax and one benefit package for all members. Such a
result, although perfectly equitable on its face, would make the statutory system resemble
more and more a fully government-financed system, such as Canada's.
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Yet another attack on the present system comes from Germany's neoclassical economists
who, like their colleagues on this side of the Atlantic, regard as the only fair and efficient
health insurance system one priced strictly on actuarial principles and one offering every
citizen the widest conceivable choice among competing funds. Neoclassical economists
believe that governmental paternalism should not override individual myopia and that the
individual should be made to suffer the consequences of his or her myopia. Neoclassical
economists also believe that health insurance premiums are not a proper vehicle for the
redistribution of income-that if society wishes to assist poor and sickly citizens, it should
do so with taxes and cash transfers (or, at most, vouchers).
At the time of writing, the German government was planning to arbitrate the emerging
fight over Germany's health insurance system with legislation. If the philosophy of the local
sickness funds prevails, the German health insurance system may move substantially
toward a government-financed system on the Canadian model. But if the neoclassical school
of thought prevails, the system may abandon the principle of solidarity altogether and
become more like the American health system. The status quo is unlikely to be tenable over
the long run.
Germans would be unlikely to move toward the American health insurance model,
however, which is decried throughout Europe as not only wasteful but also grossly inequi-
table. A move toward the Canadian model probably would be more palatable to Germans
unless, as seems more likely, the system can evolve toward a more workable middle ground.
One such compromise might be a model akin to the highly regulated pluralism advocated
by Enthoven and Kronick (1989: 94-101).
An alternative compromise might be to mandate upon the system more extensive inter-
fund redistributions of premium income and to encourage more extensive emigration from
the statutory system toward the private health insurance sector. That approach would
preserve the structured health insurance system (die gegliederte Krankenversicherung) that,
according to most Germans, has served the country well for over a century.
General Lessons Learned
A basic lesson tobe drawn from the German health experience is that it is possible to provide
universal access to health insurance-and to needed health care-without having the
financing for such a system flow through the public budget.
At the same time, the German experience illustrates that it is extremely difficult, and
probably impossible, to maintain an unregulated, pluralistic, competitive health insurance
system that avoids adverse-risk selection and, at the same time, maintains horizontal equity
in the financing and distribution of health care.
Finally, the more freedom of choice that is granted to those who purchase health insurance
from a multitude of competing insurance carriers, the more opportunities there are for both
the insured and the carriers to sort people into distinct risk classes, and the more inequitable
will be the distribution of health care and its financing, unless society is willing to sub-
sidize the health insurance premiums of high-risk, low-income persons with tax-financed
subsidies.
Notes
1. Even in the case of Great Britain, primary medical care is provided by private general practitioners.
Private contractors are paid by the govemment on a per capita basis for the services they render to
enrolled individual consumers.
180 Cotuntry Case Stuidies
2. There are some co-payments for certain dental procedures and for some higher-priced brand-
name drugs for which lower-priced substitutes are available.
3. Incidentally, the RVO statute has served as a model also for the Dutch and Belgium health
insurance systems.
4. The system maintains the fiction that half of this contribution is paid by the employer and half by
the employee. In fact, of course, the total contribution can be thought of as being paid out of the
worker's gross wages.
5. See Verband der Privaten Krankenversicherungen e.V., Die Private Krankenversicherung:
Zahlenbericht 1987/1988, September (1988), 54. According to that annual report, the pure administrative
costs in 1987 were DM 602 million, said to be 4.33 percent of total premium income. The total closing
costs for that year were reported as DM 1.6 billion, which must therefore have represented 11.6 percent
of total premium income.
6. Of course, to this "actuarially fair" premium there would be added an allowance for administra-
tive costs.
7. In fact, only last year the American Council of Life Insurers declared such a cross-subsidy as unfair
in a nationwide advertising campaign.
8. Economists and actuaries typically counter that notion with the argument that the proper
redistribution is not from the healthy to the sick, but from the wealthy (healthy or sick) to the poor
sick. Such distributions, they argue, should be effected through taxes and transfers, and not through
prices (insurance premiums) in the marketplace.
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Part III
Lessons of Experience

Lessons Learned
Jo. M. Martins and David W. Dtunlop
The primary concem of this chapter is to draw together the lessons learned from the
preceding case studies and to advocate greater use of existing data so as to provide a better
empiricalbasis for policy development in health care financing. It also identifies some issues
that are central to development and implementation of health financing policy, including
one incorporating health insurance.
Case Studies
Three general features of the countries studied are particularly noteworthy: their different
starting points, their lack of motivation to formulate a health financing policy, and the path
and tradeoffs they chose in pursuit of their social goals.
Different Starting Points
Countries come to assess their present health financing realities from many different starting
points based on past decisions. Some countries have had a long legacy of publicly owned
and financed health services. Others have had a tradition of individuals' payments to
individual providers. In many there is a mix of private and public financing and ownership
of service delivery, with quasi-private and public institutions involved as well. In addition,
the explicit or implied social contract between the government and governed regarding
health care varies: from a constitutionally mandated arrangement to one that has no legal
basis but is grounded in social or culturally acceptable norms.
Motivation to Formulate a Health Financing Policy
Few if any countries have explicitly addressed the health financing predicament until faced
with the prospect of establishing some form of universal "health insurance" or comprehens-
ive financial coverage of the population as an alternative to existing forms of health
financing. Strategic planning in developing countries, which has been undertaken in many
other sectors of the economy-using the process established to generate a national devel-
opment plan-has not been used for the health sector, by either ministries of planning,
finance, or health. None have attempted to define a set of steps required to move from an
existing health financing situation to a new one. It is only when some of the implications of
a national health financing policy surface, in the process of working through the details of
nationally defined "insurance" schemes, that a de facto strategic planning process begins to
emerge.
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Evolution in the Achievement of Social Goals and Tradeoffs
The empirical evidence from the set of more affluent nation case studies suggests that most
countries have periodically revisited decisions taken previously. This process aims to
address, and hopefully mitigate, the effects of some prior decisions through a set of tradeoff
criteria defined in chapter 2: equity in terms of coverage, access, and financing; as well as
affordability, efficiency in resource use, and consumer choice. The evidence from each
country suggests there is constant tension between these various social goals. As time
passes, after a policy change has been made to pursue any of the above criteria, countervail-
ing forces come into play seeking further adjustments.
In the context of the health sector and the role of health insurance, much of the debate
revolves around whether certain services should be funded by either health insurance
premiums or direct public financing using general tax revenues: namely, individually
consumed preventive health care services that might benefit other individuals (immuniza-
tion for communicable diseases or screening for HIV) and services that affect the community
as a whole, such as mass media health education or biomedical research. The thorny issue
of financing basic health care for those physically or mentally disabled or without the
financial means to pay for health insurance premiums, either through employment taxes or
direct premium payments, also continues to spark debate, especially when economic
expansion is not robust and greater attention is being paid to minimizing the cost of health
care.
Learning from Empirical Analysis
Country-specific historical analyses of health financing and the evolving rate of health
insurance in each case provide rich empirical information on a number of tradeoffs and
technical-design issues involved in defining and implementing health-financing schemes.
Unfortunately, the number of empirical studies is limited and the diversity of efforts
undertaken globally to finance health care is only now becoming known. A more systematic
review of these countries experiences is warranted. The potential tradeoffs between alter-
native policy choices can be clarified and options for minimizing adverse policy outcomes
can be improved. As an example of the type of empirical analysis possible, information is
presented below assessing the relationships between the availability of health insurance,
GDP growth, and health expenditures.
Data from the OECD countries suggest that where health insurance expenditure flows
to providers are regulated by the government, the share of GDP spent on health care is less
than in those countries where such regulations are not in effect.' This is largely due to the
basic characteristics of insurance: moral hazard and adverse selection tend to be associated
with additional demand for service by those covered by insurance. To mitigate against these
behavioral tendencies, governments typically establish regulations regarding benefit plan
coverage (in terms of services included, and the use of coinsurance and deductible arrange-
ments), prices for provider reimbursement, and other rules that define the benefits for the
insured. In the case of Korea, which has recently expanded insurance coverage to the entire
population without fully developing the above-mentioned regulatory mechanisms, health
expenditure inflation has been significant (see chapter 4).
Since health insurance in its various forms is only now beginning to be more widely
implemented in less affluent nations, it has not been as pervasively assessed for its impact
on aggregate health expenditures and their rate of increase, coverage of the population and
equity of existing coverages, access in terms of utilization of health care services, efficiency
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of resource use, impact on technological innovation, and choice of health care provider. A
more comprehensive analysis is required to fully assess these issues. Even a cursory
comparison of comparable information on health insurance coverage and spending across
a broad spectrum of countries is revealing. Information from the 100 countries in table 9-1
shows:
. Perhaps as much as 40 percent of the world's population is included in one or more
health insurance schemes.
The principal type of scheme is a social security type of health insurance (SSHI) scheme
where health care coverage is included along with pensions, disability, unemployment
insurance, and other employment-related fringe benefits (about 80 percent of the
countries included have such programs).2
About 30 percent of the countries have one or more private health insurance schemes
available for their consideration, with the largest share being in the Asian region.
Virtually all country schemes include in their benefit packages inpatient and outpatient
care (some with co-payments and deductibles included), and many also have maternity
benefits, and some provide drug coverage as well, especially when a person is hospi-
talized or is using one or more drugs to manage a chronic health problem.3
* The share of total health financing coming from insurance programs is relatively low
(typically less than 10 percent in countries of Asia and Africa) but is higher in other
regions where incomes and per capita health expenditures are higher and social
security-type programs have been in place for a longer period.4
For most regions of the world, the share of GDP spent on health care increased during
the 1980s. 5
Table 9-26 provides an additional indication of the determinants affecting the growth in
health expenditures from all sources: population growth; price increases of health sector
inputs such as wages and fees of providers, pharmaceutical prices, and other capital items,
from laboratory and surgical equipment to building costs; and utilization increases.7 The
relationship between health spending growth and these three principal factors basically is
as follows:
The annual rate of increase in total health spending is equal to the sum of:
a. the annual rate of population growth;
b. the annual rate health sector prices; and
c. the annual rate of utilization increases.
Given assumptions about health sector price increases, it was possible to define estimates
of the change in aggregate utilization from information about total health spending and
population growth. Table 9-2 summarizes these findings on a regional basis. It shows that
over the periods of the 1980s for which data were available in most regions, the combination
of population growth and price increases overwhelmed total health sector spending such
that utilization (or intensity of service use) tended to decline. This has generally been
manifested by drops in occupancy rates (especially in small rural hospitals) and average
lengths of stay in hospitals, rather than in declines in ambulatory care use or in preventive
service coverage, such as immunizations. In Fiji, for example, the average length of stay in
hospitals dropped from about ten days in 1971 to seven days in 1989, and occupancy rates
fell from about 80 percent to 65 percent (annual reports of the Fiji Ministry of Health).
Table 9-3 presents the results of a cross-sectional statistical analysis of the relationship
between health sector spending and health insurance. Two data sets were utilized: 43
Table 9-1. Characteristics of Health Insurance in World Bank Member Countries, 1980-92
(in countries with some type of health insurance)
Share Average
of total Share of annualServices crn,erd Tot. cap. finance by GDP spent Share of percentage
Type of health insurance poption Share Preven- recurred health on health GDP spent increase in
Other enrolled of total IP OP tive healthexp. nsurance insurance onhealth shareperyear
Region SSHI public Private (thousands) pop.(%) care care services Drugs SUS (%) (%) (%) (1 = 1990)
Africa
Total = 17 7 6 7 4,2972 1.5 10 8 7 7 11.64 6.8 2.64 3.28 9.4
Asia and South Pacific (1986)
Total = 15 9 9 12 745,495.8 32.6 15 14 8 12 15.62 7.3 4.33 4.10 (4.7)
Eastem Europe and CIS
Total = 7 7 7 0 296,503.0 100.0 7 7 7 7 228.90 75.9a 4.1
Middle East and North Africa
(1985)
Total = 10 7 4 0 41,854.1 15.9 8 8 6 7 584.22 62 .3a - 3.3 -
Latin America and Caribbean
(1978)
Total = 24 23 0 5 243,834.1 61.1 21 19 20 19 50.17 31.6 3.84 3.99 0.3
OECD Countries (1980)
Total = 24 24 24 6 786,129.0 98.6 24 24 23 24 1,439.0 74.5a 7.0 7.6 0.8
Grand total 77 50 30 2,118,113.2 - 85 80 71 76 - - - -
- Not available.
a. Percentage of public expenditure.
Source: Compiled by the authors.
Table 9-2. Estimated Change in Health Spending, Prices, Use, and Population Growth in the 1980s in Selected World Bank Member Countries
(percent)
Est. increase
Increase Estimated increase health prices in total health
Period in population 1980-90 (%) Estimated increase in use spending period
Region (Years) 1980-90 Assumption A Assumption B Assumption A Assumption B 198X-90
Africa
Total = 14 85-90 3.2 15.8 19.0 (16.5) (19.7) 2.5
Asia and Pacific
Total = 15 85-90 1.7 6.5 7.8 5.4 4.0 13.6
Eastern Europe and aS
Total = 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Middle East and North Africa
Total = 2 86-90 3.1 18.2 21.9 (5.6) (9.3) 15.7
Latin America and Caribbean
Total = 12 77-90 2.1 192.5 231.5 (154.5) (193.6) 40.1
OECD Countries
Total = 24 80-90 0.7 4.6 5.6 (0.8) (1.8) 4.5
n.a. Not applicable.
Note Assumption B is that inflation in health prices is 20.3% higher than in assumption A, which is derived from infornation regarding the population increase,
use charges, and total health spending.
Source: Compiled by the authors.
Table 9-3. Health Sector Spending Increases Related to Health Insurance in a Set of Poor and More Affluent Countries, 1980-89
Assumed Equation 1: poor countries only Equation 2: all countries, incl. OECD
relation- Std. error Std. error
Independent variables ship Coefficient of coef. t stat. Stat. signif. :oefficient of coef. t stat. Stat. signif.
Constant n.a. 17.76 16.92 1.050 NS 17.79 13.48 1.320 0.1
Region (Africa Numeraire)
A. Asia n.a. 1.24 8.30 0.149 NS 2.11 6.38 0.331 NS
B. Middle East and North Africa n.a. 5.11 14.94 0.342 NS 2.40 11.41 0.211 NS
C. Latin America n.a. (0.32) 8.91 (0.036) NS (2.61) 6.50 (0.401) NS
D. OECD n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. (3.27) 10.19 (0.321) NS
Services Covered (Dichotomous)
A. Inpatient services + (10.62) (22.08) (0.481) NS (13.46) 17.39 (0.774) NS
B. Outpatient services + 9.32 13.44 0.693 NS 9.68 10.55 0.917 NS
C. Maternity/preventive services + 3.85 8.31 0.464 NS 4.97 6.02 0.826 NS
D. Drugs + (1.93) 9.35 (0.206) NS (3.72) 7.22 (0.515) NS
Private health insurance exists (Dichotomous) + (7.92) 6.84 (1.157) 0.16 (4.78) 4.48 1.068 0.2
Growth rate of GDP/capita + (0.80) 1.35 (0.594) NS (0.76) 1.02 (0.742) NS
Percentage of population covered by health insurance + 0.44 0.13 3.335 0.001 0.35 0.10 3.722 0.001
Percentage of health sector financing from insurance - (0.81) 0.27 (3.024) 0.0025 (0.57) 0.17 (3.351) 0.001
R 2 0.361 0.350
Number of observations 43 67
Degree of freedom 31 54
n.a. Not applicable.
NS Not significant.
Note Dependent variable: the annual rate of increase (decrease) in the health sector GDP share.
Source: Compiled by the authors.
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developing countries for which all information was available about health insurance and
health sector growth in spending, and 67 countries, including 24 from the OECD countries
along with the 43 in the first group. The primary purpose of this analysis was to ascertain
whether there were any statistically significant relationships between the rate of increase in
the share of GDP spent on health and attributes of health insurance in the countries for which
full information was available. It was hypothesized that health sector spending increases as
measured by the annual percentage increase in the share of GDP spent on health might
increase
* as the percentage of the population covered by health insurance rose (a moral hazard
phenomenon as well as a reduction in the price of a normal goods-service);
* when the benefit package, as measured by the four services included in table 9-1 is more
comprehensive in terms of covered services;
* when private health insurance exists in a country, as private coverage tends to provide
more "luxury benefit packages" to the more affluent in the countries where it occurs;
and
. when the share of total health financing coming from health insurance programs is
lower.
This later assumed relationship was based on the notion that as a larger share of total
health spending is controlled by insurance mechanisms, more regulations and controls
would be placed on the sector to reduce the tendency of moral hazard and other factors to
increase spending. In addition to these insurance factors, the analysis included two control
variables: one for possible regional differences in health sector spending patterns, and a
second to control for differences in the rate of increase in income, since the income elasticities
of demand for health care (see table 1-2) suggest that increased health sector spending would
be related to even higher rates of increase in per capita income.
Table 9-3 presents both the assumed relationships between the dependent and indepen-
dent variables presented above and the empirical findings of this statistical test where a
simple linear regression model was utilized. The findings statistically support the idea that
as health insurance coverage rises, health sector spending increases its share of GDP.
Further, they suggest that as the share of total spending in the sector is financed via health
insurance programs, health sector spending reduces its share of GDP, most likely because
of increased regulation imposed on the sector. Most other variables were measured so
crudely that no other variables were statistically significant. Given the cross-sectional nature
of the estimated relationship, the resulting R2 of about 0.36 was relatively high. Further, the
results appeared to be stable between the two samples (for all countries, n = 67; for only the
relatively poor countries, n = 43). The two control variables-region and income increases-
did not appear to be statistically significant in this specific empirical test.
These preliminary relationships are presented not to support any particular research
agenda, but rather to suggest the importance of conducting empirical research on the
collective experience provided by the many countries in the world in which health insurance
has been implemented as a means of financing health care. The findings presented above
suggest that more detailed investigations are warranted on this and related topics.
Central Issues
The fundamental questions policymakers have to face in matters related to health care
financing pertain to society's views about social welfare, financing schemes that involve
public and private arrangements, and efficiency in the allocation of resources.
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Perceptions and Social Values
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC WANTS. Perhaps the most basic question policymakers must consider
is whether health services financing is a private matter or a social issue.8 If health services
were produced only for the satisfaction of private wants, and if other conditions prevailed
for attaining market efficiency in consumption and production, they should be produced
and marketed like any other. The role of government in their production and funding would
be minimal, since the price mechanism would secure the optimal allocation of resources and
distribution of services.
If an efficient market is to maximize consumer welfare, the following conditions must
prevail: each economic unit, consumer or supplier, is sufficiently small or exists in such large
numbers that they exert an insignificant influence on the price of goods and services; no
obstacles are imposed on the free movement of resources into a productive area; no
discrimination is made in the price paid or received by consumers and suppliers; there is a
standardization of quality, localization of transactions, and full knowledge both on the part
of the consumer and supplier; quantities produced are infinitely divisible and economic
relationships continuously variable; and there are no "extemalities" (Stigler 1959). In
addition, it must be assumed that the distribution of income is socially acceptable.
The efficiency of the market in performing its social function of maximizing welfare can
be hampered by technological or institutional factors that prevent free entry into the market
and lumpiness of factors of production, which may lead to monopolistic practices. These
will preclude the supplier from behaving in a socially optimizing fashion since minimizing
costs could lead to a supplier loss. There might also be differences between public and
private risks, and public and private time preferences might also differ.
When any of these impediments are present, the price mechanism cannot ensure a socially
efficient allocation of resources and efficient production. Economic theory shows how
monopolistic practices make markets inefficient in their maximization of social welfare but
does not say how to make monopolies or oligopolies (few producers) efficient, as long as
they remain so. Efforts by governments to encourage efficiency by the regulation of natural
monopolies (for example, utilities) have achieved disquieting results, especially over time.
In addition, there are some wants-such as national defense, public information, envi-
ronmental protection, and the results of biomedical research-that are consumed in equal
amounts by members of the community. People who do not pay cannot be excluded from
the benefits that result from expenditures made regarding these items. Accordingly, the
level of consumption of social wants cannot be efficiently determined by the price mecha-
nism.9 Consumers have an interest in not revealing their true preferences about prices. Even
if true preferences were known, a difficulty arises because there is no single most efficient
solution when services are consumed in equal amounts by all.
Another category of public-provided services are those that individuals can consume in
unequal amounts but that society, through the political system, finds to have social merit
and determines what their provision to all members of society should be independently of
preferences manifested in the market through the price mechanism. These items are referred
to as "merit wants." Typical merit wants have often been basic education, health care, and
postal and communication services. For these items, the achievement of social welfare
is maximized only through the exercise of budgetary interventions, independently or in
conjunction with market mechanisms. Although the satisfaction of both social and merit
wants (public goods) must be ensured by government financial support, the services
produced to satisfy consumers' need not be produced by the public sector (Musgrave 1959).
The efficiency of production is an empirical question and the answer may be different for
different services and even from one country to another.
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ARE HEALTH SERVICES LIKE OTHER SERVICES? Although there is a degree of consensus that
health care services delivered to communities as a whole are different and that "externali-
ties" apply to some preventive services, the controversy concerning services consumed by
individuals continues. Accordingly, it is helpful to examine whether health care services are
like other services. If preventive services provided in the absence of illness are excluded,
most health services are sought to minimize pain or diminish disability and the risk of death.
This is different from most market situations. Thus the demand for health services arises at
times when individuals and their families are under stress and facing a different set of
motivations than when they buy and consume most other goods and services. The "con-
sumer" changes into a "patient," and the relationship between the "consumer-patient" and
the "supplier-practitioner" is one in which the patient relies on trust and the knowledge of
the service provider to relieve pain and shorten disease or prevent death. This trust is based
on social conventions and culture and is often reflected in legal conventions, including
legislation. Accordingly, the patient is unlikely to behave like a consumer in securing
everyday goods and services. Further, in order to make personally appropriate choices, the
consumer would need to have knowledge about the services required and the adequate
level of quality: for instance, what type of medicine, what quantity, and whether it should
be taken orally or intramuscularly or intravenously. The answer to each question implies a
price to be paid. Often there might be alternatives with different prices that will have a
similar satisfactory outcome for the patient-consumer, but with a different income implica-
tion for the provider. Most people do not have this knowledge. This knowledge "asymme-
try" between the consumer and provider of health care is yet another characteristic of health
services. It might be possible to improve individuals' knowledge of health care to a degree,
but it is unlikely that it will be possible to achieve full or even "adequate" symmetry between
consumers and providers so as to assume that informed consumer's choice is operational
in the health care market. Thus, providers are entrusted with the choice of inputs of care
required to meet the consumer's perceived needs. Further, through their political systems
societies have also developed attitudes toward health care, which turned it into a "merit"
good that determines its availability to individuals in society regardless of their ability to
pay. This is the case in the United Kingdom and Canada for the entire population, and even
partly so in the United States, where medical care for the aged (Medicare) is an entitlement.
To protect individuals from unqualified providers, most societies have relied on the
licensing of medical practitioners and other health professionals to ensure minimum stan-
dards at entry. The same applies to some selected health facilities such as hospitals. This
practice is a barrier to entry to the market and prevents perfect competition. The scale of
operation in hospital and even ambulatory services ensures that there are only a few
producers of services in any given locality, especially in rural and small urban centers, but
this also applies to services requiring large investments and a large service area, such as
many diagnostic and surgical services. The result is a single (monopoly) or few (oligopoly)
producers of services with the power to influence prices and the quantity of services
produced. For some infrequently consumed services, however, a single or small number of
providers might be the only efficient solution to ensure a large and continuous practice for
the maintenance of skills that can make the difference between life and death to the
consumer.
The market is also characterized by discontinuities and indivisibility of services. It is not
effective, and is harmful, to consume half a course of antibiotics. It is useless to have half
and almost impossible to have two or more appendectomies. In other cases, there are
complementary services that must be consumed for the treatment to be effective. It has also
been indicated that some health services have "externalities" in that they benefit others
besides the individuals who might purchase the service, as in the case of immunization or
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hospital treatment of individuals to cure communicable diseases and stop the spread of
disease to others. Thus, in addition to individual and public perceptions of the different
nature of health care services, the set of characteristics of their consumption and production
make them different from other goods and services traded in the market. These differences
are important in the design and implementation of health financing schemes.
INSURANCE AND TAXATION. The basis for insurance is to protect individuals from the
financial consequences of events with a low probability of happening but with the potential
to cause a substantial loss. Insurance usually involves a contract that includes the payment
of a premium to an insuring entity by individuals, which will secure the individual or
someone nominated against a specified loss arising from an event, such as damage to
property or death or disablement. The insurer pools the different risks presented by different
individuals and calculates premiums based on the assessed risk presented by the individu-
als seeking insurance, the likelihood of the event taking place, and the likely value of
compensation for the pooled risks. If the event is certain to occur, it is obvious that the
premium will need to be equal to the loss insured against plus a margin for the insurer. Thus
insuring against events carries no advantage for individuals unless there is a degree of
uncertainty. Further, there is little advantage in insuring against relatively small and regular
losses, as the administrative expenses and the premium might be larger than the actual loss
likely to be incurred, as may be the case for over-the-counter medications. Accordingly,
insurance tends to be for events with a relatively low probability of happening over a fixed
period of time, and for losses that are large in nature. Otherwise, self-insurance is likely to
be cheaper.
In the United States a variety of health insurance schemes have evolved, which range from
those funded from payroll and other taxation, such as Medicare and Medicaid, to private
health insurance based on risk assessment for groups of employees. In such schemes
premiums are based on the principle of "community rating," which means the premium is
the same for all members of the group regardless of the individual risk presented. Other
"health insurance" schemes, such as those of Canada and the United Kingdom, do not
involve premiums, and the financing is not based on individual risk, since they are financed
from taxation, with those likely to use services most being taxed less, as a result of
progressive taxation based on the ability to pay rather than health risk. Accordingly,
universal health insurance schemes financed from general or even payroll taxation are
hardly "insurance." They are schemes for public funding of the provision of subsidized or
free health services, which may be provided by public or private providers, or a mixture of
both, as in the case of Canada and the United Kingdom.
CONSUMER CHOICE. Consumer choice or sovereignty as the guiding criteria for the
allocation of resources and distribution of services has the benefit of maximizing welfare
when certain conditions are met. This requires consumer knowledge of the alternatives, the
ability to exercise choices according to personal taste, and an interest in revealing these
preferences through the price mechanism. The nature of health services tends to work
against these conditions. In the case of public goods, the consumer has an interest in not
revealing true preferences through the price mechanism, and a lack of knowledge or time
preferences may also hinder the exercise of beneficial choices.
In spite of difficulties related to knowledge and low incomes, most studies of health care
demand conducted throughout the world over the past ten to fifteen years have revealed
that consumers are quite interested in having provider options. A number of such studies
have revealed that most consumers have more than one option open to them, and not all
pick the cheapest in terms of money-price. Thus the design of any insurance scheme must
Lessonis Learned 193
allow for the possibility of some consumer choice. There are some tradeoffs that must be
assessed between cost and choice, on one hand, and quality and choice, on the other. For
instance, some health care activities require a minimum scale of operation, and when this
scale is relatively large the availability of alternatives to allow choice will often have an effect
on the costs of service production. In other cases, it is important that health care providers
have a minimum caseload to ensure skillful practice. Once again, where either population
densities are low or the caseload required is large, choice might be obtained at the cost of
efficiency or quality.
EQUITY. Two types of equity issues arise when the government is involved in the financing
of health services through health insurance or some other method of funding, as in the direct
provision of services. They have to do with the method of raising funds and the beneficiaries
of government subsidies. Some methods of raising government revenue may have a
different impact on various socioeconomic groups in society. Of particular concern is the
protection of the poor, especially those under the subsistence level. The imposition of a fee
or tax for health care services on the poor will have a major impact either on their use of
health care or their ability to consume basic necessities such as food and shelter. Studies
have shown that not only does the demand for health services vary according to income per
capita of different countries but also that the price of health services is a barrier of access to
care by the poor. Therefore the use of health insurance to finance health services requiring
the payment of premiums by the poor might have a deleterious effect on their welfare. The
same applies to the imposition of co-payments, deductibles, or user fees that do not make
provision for poor people.
Government subsidies for services that are not accessible to poor people or to people in
some geographical areas also raise equity questions, especially in developing countries
where the supply of basic services is not universally available. Government subsidies
provided for medical care through "health insurance" schemes that cover only people
employed in the formal sector and that are unavailable to the poor are a prime example. The
same applies to government subsidies for medical services through "universal" health
insurance, when large differences in the ratio of medical practitioners to population make
geographical access to a doctor physically impossible for a significant proportion of the
population.
Public and Private Mixtures
METHODSOFFUNDING. The question of a single payer or a multitude of payers is important
to consider because it has a bearing on the relative power of the parties involved when
contracts are negotiated in a mixed system of public and private funding and delivery of
health care services. It has been widely documented that oligopolistic situations, such as
those prevailing in health services, may not lead to socially efficient production and
equitable distribution in accordance with consumer choice. A single payer can be placed in
a monopsonistic position to countervail the oligopolistic power of the producers. The
monopsonistic position of the single payer may not, however, ensure an acceptable return
to the supplier. To fulfill a socially acceptable role, the monopsonist must have social
acceptance and legitimacy in acting in the public interest.
In countries where the government directly (for example, Canada and United Kingdom)
or indirectly (for example, Japan and Germany) has used monopsonistic power, the single
established payer has been able to keep overali costs of the system more in control than has
been the case in the United States, where the share of GNP going to health services is nearly
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twice as high as in these other cases. This tendency is reconfirmed by the findings in table
9-3. At the same time, the results of recent surveys on the extent to which people in a number
of countries are satisfied with their health care services, the United States ranked well below
other countries paying less for their health care (Blendon and others 1990). This finding
suggests that the government's use of monopsonistic power to achieve certain cost contain-
ment objectives may not always be in conflict with other health sector objectives.
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF SUPPLY. The discussion of public-private health financing
has been often made more confusing by the lack of differentiation between the nature of the
sources of funds for health services and the public or private ownership of the facilities that
deliver services. The proportion of public and private funds used in the financing of health
services varies considerably in the country case studies (table 9-4). Korea and the United
States had the highest proportion of private sources, while the United Kingdom and Canada
showed the highest proportion of public funds used.
Public funding can take the form of direct provision of services free of charge or subsi-
dized services supplied either by public or private providers. There are often both public
and private sources of service delivery. In the United Kingdom, for instance, free services
are provided by public hospitals and private general medical practitioners on contract with
the government, whereas in the United States there is a mix of both public (state, county,
and veterans' hospitals) and private hospitals, as well as medical services provided by public
clinics and private medical practitioners. Seldom is service provision either totally public or
private. This usually follows historical developments and adaptation in an evolutionary
process.
CONTRACTS. The mixture of public and private delivery of subsidized services implies the
need for contractual arrangements between those providing the funds and those delivering
services. The ability to negotiate and administrate contracts and mechanisms to resolve
conflicting interests is an important feature of effective health financing schemes. This
applies both to public and private sectors when the source of funds is different from the
ownership of the means of service delivery. In addition and where relevant, the negotiation
of fee-reimbursement methods, within the context of a socially defined budget constraint,
and, assuming reimbursement occurs in a timely manner, implies the establishment of a
relatively efficient and unbiased information system to process the millions of consumer-
provider encounters throughout the country.
Allocation of Resources and Efficient Production and Distribution
MARKET MECHANISMS. The appeal of perfect competition is that the invisible hand of the
market resolves the basic questions for the economist that are also of importance from a
social point of view. First, it enhances efficiency in the allocation of resources to meet
different consumer wants. Second, goods and services are distributed in accordance with
personal preferences. Third, it minimizes the cost of production by forcing suppliers to
produce at the lowest cost to remain competitive in the market. However, perfect competi-
tion requires that a number of basic premises hold. If these are not met, then the market may
not fulfill socially desirable functions. The oligopolistic nature of most health services is not
supportive of the necessary premises, and therefore it cannot be assumed that the price
mechanism or the invisible hand will ensure efficiency the in allocation of resources or the
production of most health care services. Consequently, the question of efficiency becomes
an empirical issue that should be the object of more intensive analysis and review. The
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Table 9-4. Shares of Public and Private Financing of Health
(percent)
Coutntry Ptiblic Private Othter
Canada 76 27 n.a.
Germany 85 15 n.a.
Japan 60 27 13
Korea 33 67 n.a.
United Kingdom 85 15 n.a.
United States 42 58 n.a.
n.a. Not applicable.
Soutrce: World Development Report, 1993.
relative efficiency of public and private facilities in the delivery of services is dependent not
only on the nature of the health market but also on economic and management practices
that vary from country to country. For instance, the organization of the public hospital
system in Canada is substantially different from that in the United Kingdom and the United
States, just as the organization of private sector medical services in Germany is considerably
different from that in Canada.
It has been argued that private ownership of the means of delivering services allows for
a greater degree of diversity and flexibility depending on scale and mode of operation. This
can be a source of innovation and experimentation in the introduction of new technologies
and management approaches. It also provides for greater diversity and choice in arrange-
ments between providers and consumers. In addition, private ownership can also allow
versatility in employment conditions and cope more easily with changes in affordability
and the use of alternative quantities and type of health workers and complementary inputs.
As can be observed from the U.S. case study, the predominance of the private sector did not
ensure lower overall costs than in countries such as the United Kingdom and Canada, which
have used a greater proportion of publicly owned facilities. Therefore, ownership of services
delivery is only one of the factors in determining overall efficiency in resource allocation
and production of services.
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS. One of the determinants of efficiency is the cost of operating the
financing scheme itself. In the case studies, countries costs vary from close to 5 percent to
15-20 percent. Therefore systems that do not require or can minimize collection costs have
an advantage. This is the case in Canada and the United Kingdom, which use existing
taxation mechanisms for the collection of revenues. The absence of specially established
funds requiring separate administration or investment-making capacity also reduce costs
in administration. They have the added benefit of avoiding the perils of differences between
the time of collection of revenues and entitlement (as is the case in many social security-
based schemes). The method of payment to suppliers of services also has a great impact on
the costs of administration. Budgetary and capitation methods of payment are less costly to
administer than fee-for-service and reimbursement schemes.
RATIONING. The allocation of resources for the production of health services and the
rationing of the limited services produced takes place in all financing mechanisms studied.
At issue here is the method used to ration. In most of the case studies presented, the rationing
is done through the allocation of resources available on the supply side of public piovision.
In Canada, the location of hospital facilities and personnel is under the jurisdiction of the
provincial governments. Sometimes the rationing is obtained by also imposing penalties for
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inappropriate use via differential user charges. The private-provided systems tend to be
rationed through the disposable income of different individuals and the oligopolistic
practices of the suppliers. The two situations tend not to provide an optimum quantity of
services in a market-defined way, and some potential consumers are left out. In both cases,
the exclusions are a public policy issue.
Conclusions
Many lessons can be drawn from existing experience in health financing. First, health
financing policy is evolutionary in nature. The present tends to reflect the accumulation of
past policy decisions, or even an absence of purposeful policy development, to meet often
conflicting means and ends. Proposed changes need to take into consideration the con-
straints imposed by current practices and resources available.
Second, market mechanisms will not ensure either equity or economic efficiency, because
of the characteristics of the health care market on both the supply and demand side, which
suggest the presence of market failure conditions.
Third, health financing policy usually has three ultimate concerns: (a) equity and effi-
ciency, (b) free price setting and consumer choice, and (c) budgetary constraints. Empiri-
cally, two of these can be achieved but success in all three has been elusive. Usually the
pursuit of (b) conflicts with (a) and (c).
Fourth, health financing can be done through a variety of mechanisms, as illustrated by
the diverse experiences of many countries: the instruments range from tax financing and
health insurance premiums to user fees using dedicated institutions or existing ones adapted
for the purpose. The private-public mix of ownership of the delivery system also varies.
These arrangements represent choices and tradeoffs, but they usually have an impact on
overall costs, consumer choice, income of providers, and access by the poor and the less
well-off with chronic illnesses. They can also have an effect on innovation and the introduc-
tion and diffusion of new technology.
Fifth, the establishment of mechanisms and facilities to gather relevant information,
contract, and manage a large number of transactions between providers and those financing
such arrangements in an efficient manner are necessary in the implementation of health
financing policy.
Sixth, in the absence of unlimited resources or a government or household budget
constraint, it is inevitable that "rationing" of health services will take place. The question is
whether the rationing process will be through market-determined prices that will give
preference to people with larger incomes and neglect services that have public goods
characteristics, or whether rationing will place more emphasis on the supply side by
regulating the availability of services by budgetary means, through direct provision by the
public sector or by subsidies and contractual arrangements with services provided either
by public or private entities.
Finally, more work can and should be done to enrich the empirical bases available to
policymakers. In view of the theoretical underpinnings and the actual nature of the health
market, the data available from experiences in countries with a variety of health financing
schemes should be analyzed to test hypotheses, assess consistency in the findings, and
identify the characteristics of variables that have affected differences in the outcomes of
various approaches. An example has been presented in this chapter. This type of research
should provide an improved empirical basis to assist decisionmakers in the formulation of
health financing policy. It would also greatly contribute to the public discussion of health
financing, which is of increasing concern to the public.
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Notes
1. For analyses of OECD health expenditure information, see the 1989 and 1992 issues of Health Care
Financing Review.
2. This number does not include all of the countries that have social security programs. In the most
recent global survey of social security programs, more than 140 countries responded to the survey
with information regarding their programs. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(1992).
3. Maternity coverage represents the dominant form of preventive benefit explicitly included in
country specific benefit packages. Most do not indicate whether they also include immunizations, or
other types of individually consumed preventive health services like physical exams.
4. In Eastern Europe, countries of the formerSoviet Union, the Middle East, North Africa, and OECD,
it is difficult to define precisely the extent of health insurance financing since the data are typically
defined in terms of public and private spending rather than on an insurance program basis.
5. The only region in which an increase in the share was not recorded is Asia. There the rate of
economic growth tended to be greater than the increased spending on health care. These regional
shares are weighted by the size of the economies included in the tables so that the Asian figure is
dominated by China and India, where GDP growth over the 1980s was high in relation to other
countries and regions.
6. The regional information presented in table 9-2 is based on country- specific estimates. Regional
population growth is based on a weighted average of the population growth in the countries included
in each regional sample for which all data were available and weighted according to the 1990
population of each country. Assumed health sector price and health spending changes are weighted
according to the size of GDP. Two alternative assumptions are made regarding health sector price
changes. The first is that factor prices have been rising at the same rate as general inflation in each
country. The alternative rate of price increase is assumed to be equal to the average rate of increase in
health prices recorded in OECD countries relative to inflation as a whole. During the 1980s in OECD
countries, health sector prices rose at 20.3 percent more rapidly per year than for all prices in the
economy.
7. This type of analysis has been undertaken on a country-specific basis in the United States and
other OECD countries for a number of years. For a more detailed specification of the methodology,
see U.S. Office of Cost Estimates (1990). Utilization in table 9-2 is considered more as "intensity" of
service use in the study referred to above and in other affluent country studies.
8. This discussion is based on the theoretical public finance discussions of Musgrave (1959) and
Arrow (1963). This theoretical discussion has been cast in health terms by Blumstein and Zubkoff
(1973).
9. There has been some theoretical work on the development of a particular type of demand revealing
tax which could yield a market equivalent solution for the quantities of public goods of pervasive in
the health field. However, there are many problems with implementing such a tax. See Edward Clark's
article in Mushkin and Dunlop (1979).
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